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abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
Political trials are generally understood as extraordinary events in the life of liberal 
democracies, dramatically staging claims to and contests over political authority 
and legitimacy. Notably, political trials often attract commentary on their theatrics 
whereby the spectacle becomes a matter of uneasy scrutiny, despite the tacit cross-
cultural acknowledgment that the trial is an inherently theatrical form. This thesis is 
an attempt to conceptualise the political operations and effects of the relation 
between performance and performativity in trials, treating these as separate but 
related terms. It proposes a new framework for studying political trials by drawing 
on theories of performativity (J.L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler, Shoshana 
Felman, Stanley Cavell) which assist not only in rethinking the role and effects of 
performance in trials, but also in introducing a multivalence to the meaning of 
‘political’ in political trials. In other words, performative theory allows the 
formulation of the politics of trials beyond its standard conception in terms of the 
utilisation of legal procedure for political ends or expediency, instead attuning us to 
the unconscious processes, inadvertent gestures, ghostly operations, structural 
infelicities and other similar dynamics that recast the political effects of legal 
proceedings. This thesis is therefore an attempt to conceptualise the spectacles and 
spectres of justice at the intersection of law and politics. In addition to 
incorporating brief discussions of various 20th and 21st century political trials to 
develop this theoretical framework, it offers close studies of three cases: the 1921 
Berlin trial of Soghomon Tehlirian, and two contemporary ‘deep state’ trials from 
Turkey – the Ergenekon trial, and the Hrant Dink murder trial. A sustained concern 
is with legacies of political violence, how they are addressed or contained by law, 
and how they are perpetuated by law.  
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introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
The beginnings of some of the questions pursued and ideas developed in this thesis 
can be traced back to my involvement in the World Tribunal on Iraq (WTI) from 
mid-2003 until late-2005. My first encounter with the idea of organising a war 
crimes tribunal was in an email from a friend on one of the listservs of Turkey’s 
anti-war movement, about a week into the US and UK-led war on Iraq. The 
movement in Turkey had secured significant victories in the months prior to the 
start of the war, most notably blocking a parliamentary proposal to allow 
deployment of US troops from Turkish territory.1 This was important given not 
only that the leaders of the governing party were strongly in favour of the proposal 
(thus our campaign was successful in convincing a critical number of MPs to defect 
from the party line), but also and more crucially, given Turkey’s geopolitical 
positioning as a special and dependable ally for the US in the Middle East and an 
immediate neighbour to Iraq with a land-border length of around 350km. This 
victory, the majority anti-war public opinion in Turkey, as well as our awareness of 
being part of a truly global anti-war movement had reassured us that we were going 
to stop this war, with our bare hands, before it begun.  
We could not. When the war was launched on 20 March 2003, like many 
others, I was seeking meaningful ways to continue my activism. This proposal for 
                                                
1 ‘Turkey Upsets US Military Plans,’ BBC, 1 March 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2810133.stm. 
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organising a global people’s war crimes tribunal was intriguing, though I had my 
reservations about the legalistic form. Once we started discussing and networking 
around the proposal locally and internationally, we found out that the same idea had 
emerged simultaneously in different parts of the world. Eventually, over a period of 
two years, WTI sessions were held in Barcelona, Brussels, Copenhagen, Genoa, 
Hiroshima, Lisbon, London, Bombay, New York, Östersund, Paris, Rome, Seoul, 
Stockholm, Tunis, as well as multiple cities in Japan and in Germany, to culminate 
in a final session in Istanbul in June 2005.2 All of these sessions were organised by 
local groups or coalitions that were autonomous but horizontally linked to the 
global WTI network, whose organising principles were collectively laid down in a 
‘Platform Text’ that was the outcome of three days of discussions during the first 
international WTI network meeting, held in Istanbul in October 2003.  
I was involved in organising both the New York session and the culminating 
Istanbul session. One of the most interesting questions for me in this two-year 
process had to do with the area of overlap between the performance of the tribunal 
and its performativity; in other words, the relation between its theatrics, its staging 
and self-presentation on the one hand, and its political claims and effects, its 
implication and postulation of some form of authority on the other hand. What were 
the political implications of opting for a tribunal rather than another form of 
manifestation? What was it that we were playing at and playing with, or perhaps, 
playing havoc with, in playing out a series of tribunals? There was a general 
awareness within the WTI network of the tradition of civil society tribunals3 that 
preceded the WTI; so that for instance, the organisation in Brussels called itself the 
BRussells Tribunal in a salutation to the 1967 Russell Tribunal. There was also a 
will to uphold certain values and principles of international law, as the WTI in part 
understood itself as responding to the failure and silence of international institutions 
in upholding these principles with regard to the war on Iraq. Further, there was an 
acute awareness of the limitations of existing mechanisms of accountability beyond 
                                                
2 For a succinct overview of the WTI process, its context and rationale, see Falk (2008) who 
dedicates a chapter to this initiative. The proceedings of the culminating session are collected in 
Sökmen (2008). See also the documentary For the Record: The World Tribunal on Iraq (Dadak et. 
al. 2006). 
3 Also referred to as people’s tribunals or citizens’ tribunals, see discussion in Borowiak (2008: 
165n11).  
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questions of enforcement. Thus the WTI Platform Text states as among its aims, 
‘expand(ing) notions of justice and ethico-political awareness’ and ‘formulat(ing) 
recommendations for international law’ in an attempt to ‘break the tradition of 
victors’ tribunals’ (WTI 2003).  
The question of how the sessions should be staged in a way that addresses 
these concerns was raised at the October 2003 global network meeting of the 
tribunal. This was an important gathering, as it was the first time that 
representatives from the various tribunal initiatives around the world came together 
to seek and spell out common principles beyond the logistics of coordination. The 
WTI Platform Text was produced at this meeting, and serves as a ‘constitution’ of 
sorts, naming the endeavour, telling a story of its origins, listing the sources of its 
legitimacy, announcing its tasks and aims, and providing indicators as to ‘The Form 
of the Tribunal’ under a separate section entitled as such. Indeed, it emerged at the 
discussions in this meeting that the question of form and self-presentation was 
inseparable from concerns on principles. As one participant, publisher Müge 
Gürsoy Sökmen, noted: 
To do this with credibility and legitimacy, we do not need to replicate 
existing official forms and mechanisms. This is not a theatrical display of 
how the officially set up courts and tribunals should have acted and 
decided and operated if they had upheld international law like they are 
supposed to. This would belittle our endeavour and undermine it. ... We 
should keep in mind that many bodies that in procedure and form claim to 
stick to international law, are in effect condoning its violation. (qtd. in 
Çubukçu 2011: 435) 
Already in this contribution, certain key tensions between the form and substance 
of ‘doing justice’ are identified: in responding to the failure of international 
institutions to deliver substantive justice, we should not be attempting to mimic 
them formally, since it is that very form that has shrouded some of these 
institutions’ complicity in the injustices perpetrated. Indeed, the attempt to mimic 
an official tribunal would make the WTI look ridiculous – as if it were desiring the 
status of an official transnational institution, as if it were desperate for a form of 
recognition that it could never attain. Instead, the formal elements of the 
performance of the tribunal could be derived from the nature of the initiative itself 
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as a coalition of activists and experts across borders, across professions, and 
political convictions.  
In the end, the specific decision on how to perform each session was left to 
the local coalitions organising the sessions. Yet one paragraph made it into the 
Platform Text (WTI 2003) as a guideline:  
Being confronted with the paradox that we want to end impunity but we do 
not have the enforcement power to do so, we have to steer a middle way 
between mere political protest and academic symposiums without any 
judicial ambition on the one hand, and on the other hand impeccable 
procedural trials of which the outcome is known beforehand. This paradox 
that we are just citizens and therefore have no right to judge in a strict 
judicial way and have at the same time the duty as citizens to oppose 
criminal and war policies should be our starting point and our strength.  
So the collective decision was to go beyond ‘mere’ political protest and ‘mere’ 
academic event; but also to avoid mock/show trials that remained loyal to existing 
tribunal formalities by theatrically mimicking common legal procedures. Instead 
the idea was to come up with stagings and performances that communicated 
something of the ethos of this undertaking with all its paradoxes, weaknesses and 
strengths. However, in the desire to go beyond ‘mere political protest and academic 
symposiums without any judicial ambition’, a particular claim to authority is 
discernible. Further, a ‘duty to oppose’ is invoked, and this was rearticulated by 
Arundhati Roy in her closing speech at the culminating session in Istanbul, where 
she served as the chair and spokesperson of the jury:  
To ask us why we are doing this, why is there a World Tribunal on Iraq, is 
like asking someone who stops at the site of an accident where people are 
dying on the road: Why did you stop? Why didn’t you keep walking like 
everybody else? (Sökmen 2008: 490) 
The invocation of a duty to act is at once a postulation of a certain type of ethico-
legal subjectivity, whereby ‘we’ would be liable for negligence if ‘we’ were to fail 
to act. Further, this is the performative conjuration of the law before which ‘we’ 
would be liable for failing to act. It is also a form of self-legitimation and self-
authorisation, as the duty is invoked to validate action as not just justified but also 
necessary.  
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This particular self-authorisation dovetailed with another posited origin of 
authority, namely, the global movement against the war. The claim was that as an 
initiative born out of this movement, the WTI has justice on its side. Further, a 
tradition of mobilisations was invoked for self-authorisation as the WTI claimed to 
act ‘on the basis of the struggles of the past to develop systems of peaceful co-
existence and prevent future aggression and breaches of the UN Charter’ (WTI 
2003). Since the official institutions that these past struggles helped create have 
failed in the case of the war on Iraq, the WTI claimed the responsibility and the 
moral authority to act and to bring ‘the principles of international law to the 
forefront’ (ibid.).  
As anthropologist and WTI activist Ayça Çubukçu notes, it is significant that 
‘the concepts of legitimacy and authority and the identification of their “sources” 
consume[d] the foundational encounter’s “living agenda”’ (2011: 439), that the 
participants felt that these were the questions that needed to be addressed at this 
initial meeting. But it is also significant that the question of how the tribunal 
sessions should be staged emerged concurrently with these questions of authority, 
legitimacy and their sources. It is as if the claim to authority generates the necessity 
to think about how to perform that authority. Here we enter the scene of 
performativity, as a concept distinct from but intimately related to performance. As 
will be seen, the overlap between performance and performativity in trials is one of 
the concerns that found its way into this thesis. 
Several months after the meeting at which the Platform Text was produced, 
Jacques Derrida declined an invitation to participate in the WTI, but agreed to give 
an interview to Lieven de Cauter, a philosopher involved in organising the Brussels 
session of the tribunal. In the interview, Derrida apologises for not being able to 
actively take part in the Brussels session due to his illness, but emphasises his 
support, though with certain clear reservations. He finds the initiative promising in 
its ‘symbolic value in a call to reflection we are in need of, and which the states are 
not taking care of, which not even institutions like the International Criminal Court 
are taking care of’ (Derrida and de Cauter 2006: 262). He repeats that he ‘believe[s] 
in its considerable symbolic effectiveness in the public domain’ but comes across 
as apprehensive about the possibility that the organisers will not choose their 
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targets prudently, perhaps that the initiative may fall into a populist anti-
Americanism of sorts. He advises: 
I would hope that you would treat those you accuse justly, that yours 
would be an undertaking of true integrity, devoid of preliminary 
positioning, without preconditions, that everything would be done in 
serenity and justice, that the responsible parties would be accurately 
identified, that you would not go over the top. (ibid.)  
Before it was published, the interview was distributed to the WTI listserv. I 
remember reading it and asking myself: What kind of performance would be 
considered to ‘go over the top’? Derrida is not asked to and does not explain 
himself on this point in the interview, but one imagines a fantasy of WTI 
participants as mini-Vishinskys on makeshift stages, wagging their fingers at 
poorly-defined imperial monsters, and denouncing the evil conspiracies of the 
wicked witches of the West. Granted, his unease is to some extent understandable: 
as he gives an interview to lend his support in principle, he thereby offers his 
‘countersignature’ to this initiative in which he could not have much say other than 
what he says in the course of this interview. Thus it is important, and was at the 
time so for some of us involved, to pay close attention to his words.  
In his wish-list, Derrida seemed to equate doing justice with the absence of 
‘preliminary positioning’, which would in turn yield a performance of serenity that 
avoids ‘going over the top’. The problem with this formulation was that the WTI 
was not exactly an initiative ‘devoid of preliminary positioning’. It was precisely 
the shared understanding that the US and UK-led attack on Iraq was illegal and 
unjustifiable that had brought people together to organise a tribunal in the first 
place. In the words of international law expert Richard Falk (2005: 92) who served 
both as an advisor to the WTI from the initial stages of planning onwards and as the 
chair of the Panel of Advocates at the WTI’s culminating session: 
[The WTI] proceeds from a presumption that the allegations of illegality 
and criminality are valid and that its job is to reinforce that conclusion as 
persuasively and vividly as possible. The motivations of citizens to 
organise such a tribunal do not arise from uncertainty about issues of 
legality and morality but from a conviction that the official institutions of 
the state, including the United Nations, have failed to act to protect a 
vulnerable people against such Nuremberg crimes as aggression, violations 
of the laws of war, and crimes against humanity.  
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What would it look like had we heeded Derrida’s advice? Would we have had 
to suspend our preliminary positioning, or would we have had to ‘perform’ a 
suspension of this preliminary positioning? Is the absence of preliminary 
positioning a condition for doing everything in ‘serenity and justice’ and without 
‘going over the top’? Or, to ask the question the other way around, would 
preliminary positioning necessarily result in a performance of agitation and 
injustice, a performance that goes over the top? Reporting on the culminating 
Istanbul session of the WTI, Richard Falk (2008: 178) writes:  
There was no pretense of neutrality or balance. The advocates were chosen 
for their familiarity with or exposure to the situation in Iraq, and because 
they were known and respected as critics of American policy in Iraq. The 
Jury of Conscience, which was as convinced about the underlying issues 
before the tribunal got under way as were the advocates, responded to the 
various presentations with unrehearsed questions, and after their 
deliberation and much internal discussion, issued a final unanimous 
assessment that was called the Declaration of the Jury of Conscience.  
Thus the preliminary positioning was not suspended for sake of the performance of 
the tribunal. Instead, the endeavour sought to attain credibility for its preliminary 
positioning through reliable resources and reasoned frameworks. Yet note the 
adjective ‘unrehearsed’. There is a gesture here towards the classic identification of 
justice in the event of the trial with spontaneity, immediacy and liveness.  
Falk further proposes ‘truth-telling’ as a measure of WTI’s justice: ‘The 
credibility of the WTI depends on its capacity for effective truth-telling that 
engages public opinion, and withstands fair-minded critical scrutiny’ (ibid.: 179). 
And indeed, this seems a more relevant gauge for this particular endeavour than 
that of the lack of preliminary positioning. The latter is an idealised condition that 
is desirable (though often structurally compromised) in formal legal institutions and 
exercises of justice, such as criminal courts and trials. The purported absence of a 
preliminary positioning would actually have been self-defeating considering that 
the WTI’s self-assigned task was the substantiation of a preliminary positioning 
that was initially expressed en masse on streets by those who opposed the war.  
What of ‘serenity’, then? Why this word and not another? In retrospect it 
proves a difficult adjective to judge the WTI by: in the two sessions I participated 
in, there was critique, eloquence, intellectual challenge, and an air of collective 
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inquiry; but also the buzz of collective agency, the disquietude of testimony, and 
the inevitable conflict of differences. So I no longer know what to do with 
Derrida’s ‘serenity’. But at the time, what I understood of this prescription was 
something like a performance that is convinced of its justice, or a performance that 
performed its own conviction in its own justice: the cool calm of addressing the 
matter to be judged without resorting to agitation, inflammatory rhetoric, 
grandstanding, or such other ‘unseemly’ supplementation. I remember thinking that 
this must have something to do with the question of authority, that perhaps the 
performance of the conviction in one’s own justice is intimately related to 
authority.4 Could it be that authority is the performatively produced effect of a 
clearly legible conviction in one’s own justice?  
It was around the time of Derrida’s WTI interview, and very much in the heat 
of the challenge of organising the New York session that I came across Hannah 
Arendt’s work on the trial of Adolf Eichmann for the first time. I was struck by the 
force of her polemics, and somewhat scandalised by the oppositions she sets up in 
the opening passages of the book. Arendt begins by offering a visual description of 
‘the house of justice’ in which Eichmann’s trial took place. She claims, with 
characteristic disdain, that the architect of the courtroom ‘had a theatre in mind’ 
(Arendt 1994: 4), though she fails to note that the site was indeed originally a 
public hall for concerts and plays, converted into an improvised courtroom for the 
event, as there were no courts large enough to accommodate the numbers that were 
expected at the historic trial (Lahav 1992). Arendt also provides in these pages a 
description of the performances of the judges and the prosecutor. She appreciates 
the judges for not being theatrical in their conduct at any point during the 
proceedings, and for trying ‘to prevent the trial from becoming a show trial under 
the influence of the prosecutor’s love of showmanship’ (Arendt 1994: 4). She notes 
that the odds were high against this effort due to the political origins of the trial – it 
was made possible by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s illegal but expedient 
decision to kidnap Eichmann to stage this trial for various ideological and 
pedagogical ends. Arendt writes: 
                                                
4 See Schmidt (2010) for a consideration of the relation between authority, authenticity, and the 
performance of sincerity.  
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And Ben-Gurion, rightly called the ‘architect of the state,’ remains the 
invisible stage manager of the proceedings. Not once does he attend a 
session; in the courtroom he speaks with the voice of Gideon Hausner, the 
Attorney General, who, representing the government, does his best, his 
very best, to obey his master. … The latter’s rule, as Mr. Hausner is not 
slow in demonstrating, is permissive; it permits the prosecutor to give 
press-conferences and interviews for televisions during the trial, and even 
‘spontaneous’ outbursts to reporters in the court building … it permits 
frequent side glances into the audience, and the theatrics characteristic of a 
more than ordinary vanity… (5-6) 
Mr. Hausner is said to fully indulge in ‘all the nice pleasures of putting oneself in 
the limelight’ (6) and his performance is diametrically opposed that of the judges. 
Arendt writes that in the conduct of the judges,  
At no time is there anything theatrical… Their walk is unstudied, their 
sober and intense attention, visibly stiffening under the impact of grief as 
they listen to the tales of suffering, is natural, their impatience with the 
prosecutor’s attempt to drag out these hearings forever is spontaneous and 
refreshing, their attitude to the defence perhaps a shade over-polite…their 
manner toward the accused always beyond reproach. They are so obviously 
three good and honest men that one is not surprised that none of them 
yields to the greatest temptation to playact in this setting (4, my emphases)5  
It is often conceded that the Eichmann trial had the trappings of a show trial 
(e.g. in Mueller 1961: 7; Bilsky 2004: 92-93). These opening passages in Arendt’s 
account are nevertheless curious. She regards the prosecutor’s portrayal of his sense 
of justice as ‘showmanship’, and yet the judges’ portrayal of their sense of justice is 
regarded as a token of their goodness and honesty. The setting is that of a theatre, 
the prosecutor playacts, but somehow the judges manage not to. She understands 
the judges’ performance to be a non-performance, it is ‘natural’. One wonders, 
would she describe their performance as one of ‘serenity’? Could ‘serenity’ be the 
sign of a performance that forgets its performedness, its very status as a 
performance? The judges, according to Arendt, are unstudied, spontaneous, sober, 
attentive, able to grieve, impatient with twaddle, polite, and beyond reproach. But 
the spontaneity of the prosecutor is doubtful, with scare-quotes around the adjective 
when she refers to his outbursts. In her criticism of the prosecutor’s conduct, there 
                                                
5 Throughout the thesis, I will signal only my added emphases on citations, so that it can be assumed 
that unsignalled emphases are in the original.  
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is an implicit suggestion that justice requires a certain kind of performance, and her 
applause of the judges’ conduct implies that the kind of performance that justice 
requires is something that passes as non-performance, that is, non-theatrical. Why 
assume that the performance of the judges in this case is non-theatrical, unstudied, 
and unprescribed? May it not be that the judges, too, were aware that there is a 
certain protocol for displaying justness, for posing as just, a certain attitude that is 
deemed becoming of doing justice? When it comes to the formal instance of ‘doing 
justice’ in the formal setting of a court, why should the sobriety and solemnity of 
the authorities that judge be necessarily deemed ‘natural’? May it not rather be that 
the common-sense expectation of how justice should be performed is at the basis of 
that particular kind of performance? Hence, may it not be that this particular kind of 
performance is indeed studied and prescribed?  
As I argue in some detail in Chapter 1, Arendt’s investments in the way this 
trial was staged had to do precisely with its performative aspects. She wanted the 
trial to redefine and substantiate the notion of crimes against humanity for the 
future of international law. In this regard, the trial’s dominant performance starring 
Gideon Hausner constituted a failure for Arendt, and mirrored or symptomised its 
infelicitous performativity, its inability to offer the much needed legal innovation 
that may go some way to address the atrocities that threatened to ‘explode the limits 
of the law’ (Arendt and Jaspers 1992: 54). Her conviction that this was not an 
‘innocent’ failure, a mere inability to cope with the enormity of the task, accounts 
for her brilliantly bitter polemic in her ‘report’. The failure was instead due to the 
prioritisation of other investments, namely Ben Gurion’s vision for the trial’s 
performative outcomes: state-sanctioned historiography, Zionist propaganda, and a 
veritable threat to Israel’s potential and actual foes. According to Arendt, the trial 
failed in certain crucial respects because it was engineered to succeed in achieving 
these prioritised set of performatives, which she understood to be parochial and 
misdirected, if not outright corrupt. 
In Arendt’s response to the Eichmann trial, just as in Derrida’s response to 
the WTI, we see the coincidence of questions of performance and performativity. 
However, we also see in Arendt’s response the confounding of the conceptual 
terrain of performativity with that of performance. What she takes issue with is first 
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and foremost the performative pretensions of the prosecution, but this critique is 
initially formulated in terms of disdain for the prosecutor’s performance. Arendt 
doesn’t even pose the problem with the Eichmann trial as one of ‘bad theatre’ as 
opposed to ‘good theatre’ (cf. Cole 2010: 2), but rather as a problem of theatricality 
pure and simple. Something of what Jonas Barish (1981) termed the ‘antitheatrical 
prejudice’ is clearly in evidence here, and indeed, Arendt is taking recourse to what 
happens to be a very common trope: theatricality is an accusation that is often 
encountered in prose on political trials.  
It seems, however, that Arendt’s discomfort with how the prosecutor 
attempted to stage the Eichmann trial was closely related to her understanding of 
the task of judgment in the face of the unprecedented. In a lecture Arendt prepared 
following the controversy unleashed by her work on the Eichmann trial, she wrote 
of the faculty of judgment in the following terms (Arendt 2003: 27): 
only if we assume that there exists a human faculty which enables us to 
judge rationally without being carried away by either emotion or self-
interest, and which at the same time functions spontaneously, that is to say, 
is not bound by standards and rules under which particular cases are simply 
subsumed, but on the contrary, produces its own principles by virtue of the 
judging activity itself; only under this assumption can we risk ourselves on 
this very slippery moral ground with some hope of finding a firm footing.  
Here we see a formulation of judgment that particularly emphasises its 
performative quality: the judgment is to bring into being the principles on which it 
is based, in a ‘fabulous retroactivity’ (cf. Derrida 2002b). Hence, the responsibility 
of judgment is linked to a responsiveness to the matter to be judged, rather than the 
loyalty to existing standards and rules. In this sense, Arendt’s formulation of the 
spontaneity of judgment is to some extent incompatible with the judicial practice of 
judgment. Although legal judgment should ideally also be attuned to the 
distinctions and uniqueness of the case at hand, loyalty to rules and precedents is 
much more of a priority in law than in Arendt’s scheme. While Derrida (2002a: 
251) shares this view of judgment as reinventing law, his formulation of 
performative reinstitution in relation to following existing rules and standards is 
one of ‘not only, but also’, as opposed to Arendt’s ‘not, but’: 
To be just, the decision of a judge … must not only follow a rule of law or 
general law but must also assume it, approve it, confirm its value by a 
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reinstituting act of interpretation, as if, at the limit, the law did not exist 
previously – as if the judge himself invented it in each case. 
Derrida thus recognises the importance of preserving existing law but suggests that 
a just judgment is one that suspends existing law and judges as if it didn’t exist in 
the first instance. 
Arendt’s emphasis on the value of the spontaneity of judgment explains 
something about why she approved of the ‘natural’ spontaneity of the judges in the 
Eichmann trial and detested what she perceived as the feigned spontaneity of the 
prosecutor. Likewise, the ‘as if’ in Derrida’s formulation explains something about 
his advice to the WTI and how it should be performed: as someone well aware of 
the composition of the tribunal, what he may have meant by an ‘undertaking of true 
integrity, devoid of preliminary positioning, without preconditions’ was perhaps the 
call for the performance of an ‘as if’ that suspended the existing preliminary 
positioning – as if it weren’t there in the first place. While these explanations may 
assist us with a more careful reading, they fail to settle two critical and related 
issues that surface in Derrida and Arendt’s commentaries. One is the deep 
ambivalence of the significance of performance for law; the other is the conflation 
of performance and performativity in law. Trials are particularly conducive sites for 
the manifestation of both of these issues.  
The former, the ambivalence of the significance of performance for law, is to 
some extent captured by the importance attributed to live performance in trials 
(Auslander 1997; Mulcahy 2008; Leader 2010), especially in common law 
jurisdictions. On the one hand, this importance is intimately related to the 
expectation we find in Arendt and Derrida that a judgment ought to be responsive 
to the novelty and uniqueness of the issue to be judged. The very liveness of trial 
performance is supposed to signify a liveliness on the part of all participants to that 
which is adjudicated. But there is always a flip side to this: the strict conventions of 
live performance in the trial (the organisation of space and the bodies in space, the 
authorisation of speech, the rituals of conduct, the costumes, and so on) are also 
precisely what risk a perception of the rehearsedness of what transpires, which in 
turn may lead to the dismissal of proceedings as pure theatre. Julie Stone Peters 
discusses this in terms of the historically ambivalent relation that law has had to its 
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own theatricality: ‘Theatre is law’s twisted mirror, its funhouse double: ever-
present, substantiating, mocking, reinforcing, undermining’ (2008: 198). 
The other issue is the conflation of the showing of justice (performance) with 
the doing of justice (performativity). That legal performance and performativity are 
closely connected is idealised in the classic formulation of ‘not only must justice be 
done, it must also be seen to be done’. While at face value this seems to be a 
relatively unproblematic combination of the doing and showing of justice, it may be 
necessary to consider to what extent the grammar of ‘not only, but also’ does 
justice to the nature of the combination. Notably, the classic formulation originated 
in a judicial bias case where bias was not proven but suspected. It merely 
‘appeared’ that there may have been bias, yet the appearance was sufficient to 
quash the original conviction.6 Unseen justice was justice undone. We may ask, 
then, is it possible to speak of two separate instances, one doing, the other showing, 
so that justice is ‘not only’ done, ‘but also’ shown; or do we instead have a strange 
conflation of the two whereby it is difficult to tell them apart? In a rare literature 
review on law and performance, Peters (2008: 185) writes of the ‘ontologically 
ambiguous fusion’ of performance and performativity in law. She does not then go 
on to try to separate the two, and surprisingly even uses the two concepts 
interchangeably at times, in an otherwise incisive discussion of legal performance.7 
Then again, perhaps there is no simple way of undoing this fusion, which on one 
level tells us that law owes its powers and processes of alchemy precisely to the 
conflation of its performance and performativity. Nevertheless, one task that this 
thesis undertakes is the attempt to rethink the relation of legal performance and 
performativity as separate but related issues.  
It is never easy, and perhaps ultimately impossible to give a thorough account 
of the origins of an intellectual inquiry or a particular curiosity. In relating 
something of the constellation of experiences, readings and thoughts that brought 
                                                
6 The original formulation by Lord Hewart was ‘a long line of cases shows that it is not merely of 
some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should 
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.’ (R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 
KB 260) 
7 The uncritical conflation of performance with performativity is something we encounter often in 
academic literature across disciplines, and I discuss some of the conceptual quagmires produced by 
this conflation in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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me to the subject of this study, I try to provide a situated account of my 
preoccupations here, the ways in which some of the questions pursued in this thesis 
initially took shape. But of course, a departure point is just that, where you end up 
is never fully determined by where you begin. In the end, this thesis is not about 
civil society tribunals or people’s tribunals, such as the World Tribunal on Iraq, that 
have no power of enforcement in the strict sense of that term. Its focus is on 
political trials instead – actual legal proceedings backed up by state power, but 
those that have an explicit political significance. In rethinking the legal and political 
implications of the overlap between performance and performativity in formal 
instances of doing justice, political trials prove to be privileged as objects of study, 
as they can reveal dynamics that are otherwise disguised in legal proceedings. Their 
status as purported exception affords insight into the norm, that is, into the 
dynamics of performativity at work in what are deemed ‘ordinary’, or non-political 
trials – if such a distinction is ultimately valid.  
 If I were to formulate the scope of this thesis in its most abstract form, it 
would be something like this: This thesis is an attempt to conceptualise the relation 
between the form and the substance of doing justice. But justice happens to be a 
worldly thing, and thought has to attach itself not only to ideas and concepts but 
also to issues and materials. So then: This thesis is an attempt to conceptualise the 
relation between the performance and the performativity of trials, treating these as 
separate but related terms. In doing so, it takes political trials as its primary object 
of study, and proposes a new framework for studying trials by drawing on theories 
of performativity. The idiom of performativity proves felicitous both for rethinking 
the role of performance in trials, and for introducing a multivalence to the meaning 
of ‘political’ in political trials. In other words, performative theory allows the 
formulation of the politics of trials beyond its standard conception in terms of the 
utilisation of legal procedure for political ends or expediency, instead attuning us to 
the unconscious processes, inadvertent gestures, ghostly operations, structural 
infelicities and the like in legal proceedings. This thesis is therefore an attempt to 
conceptualise the spectacles and spectres of justice at the intersection of law and 
politics. A sustained if relatively subdued concern has to do with legacies of 
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political violence, how they are addressed or contained by law, and how they are 
perpetuated by law.  
Although the phrase ‘political trial’ has much currency, there is no single 
definition of it. Further, the distinction between a political trial and an ordinary trial 
proves to be provisional rather than categorical. I begin Chapter 1 with a brief 
overview of the different definitions we find in scholarship addressing political 
trials. Rather than encountering a common designation in this literature, one gets 
the sense that a political trial is difficult to describe but ‘you know it when you see 
it’ – perhaps an important sense to hold on to for understanding what makes a trial 
political. My preliminary exploration of the question of definition is therefore 
intended as a way to open the question up rather than circumscribing it. The hope is 
that the thesis as a whole will provide a more multivalent answer to what the 
‘political’ may signify in that particular phrase in various instances.  
The greater part of Chapter 1 is taken up by a close study of three works on 
political trials, all published in the early 1960s in the United States: Otto 
Kirchheimer’s Political Justice (1961), Judith Shklar’s Legalism (1964), and 
Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). These works go beyond the 
predictable outrage vis-à-vis the unkosher mixing of law and politics that political 
trials are conventionally understood to signify, instead offering more varied 
accounts and conceptualisations of the phenomena. In this sense, they can be seen 
as marking a theoretical shift in the literature on political trials. The instigator for 
this shift is very legibly the Holocaust trials – Nuremberg for Kirchheimer and 
Shklar, and the trial of Adolf Eichmann for Arendt. Thus the urgency we find in 
these works to think critically about the politics of political trials can be attributed 
to a felt necessity to come to terms with the legacy of the Holocaust trials, which 
were themselves attempts to come to terms with an unprecedented form of political 
violence. Most significantly for the rest of this thesis, in all three works we find 
incipient formulations pertaining to the performativity of legal proceedings. 
Kirchheimer, for example, discerns the ability of law to enact its own foundations 
into being through the trial. Arendt invests in the legal substantiation of the notion 
of ‘crimes against humanity’ as a way to performatively produce humanity as legal 
community. Shklar’s identification of the performative function of a trial is one that 
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brings embodied practice into play: the performance of a trial as a legalistic ritual 
can performatively recreate a culture of legalism. These insights into the 
performativity of trials serve as a point of departure for my discussion in the 
following chapters. 
In Chapter 2, I engage closely with theories of performativity from J. L. 
Austin to Jacques Derrida to Judith Butler and beyond, and investigate the range of 
insights that performative theory allows for studying (political) trials. The 
combination is not incidental, Derrida has noted that ‘the juridical is at work in the 
performative’ (2000: 46). This proves pertinent when we read J. L. Austin’s 
lectures on performatives carefully. For Austin, law serves not only as a fertile 
resource for many of his examples, but also as an ideal paradigm for performativity. 
This special relation between law and performativity has been taken up by 
numerous scholars, some of whose works I draw on to conceptualise the 
performativity of legal proceedings. But primarily, I work with an idea that Austin 
introduces in passing: performatives often masquerade as constatives. The 
counterpart of this in law, that is, the masquerade of legal performatives as 
constatives is not accidental but rather necessary ‘to produce the sought-after 
effect’ (Derrida 2002b: 49).  
I elaborate on this idea of the masquerade and its relevance for studying trials 
by drawing on Butler’s conceptualisation of the centrality of conventionality 
(understood as a sedimented historicity) for performativity, and on Derrida and 
Costas Douzinas’ formulations concerning the performativity of law. I propose that 
the various performative operations of legal proceedings are often disguised as 
constative functions partially through the hyper-conventionality of trial 
performance. This, then, anchors a new perspective on the coupling between 
performance and performativity in the trial: conventions of embodied trial 
performance assist in disguising a trial’s performative operations and allow law to 
operate as if it were fate. In other words, the overlap between performance and 
performativity works to create an appearance of inevitability. In this analysis, 
political trials can be defined as legal proceedings whose performative structures 
are publicly exposed, thereby resisting the closure of inevitability. I elaborate on 
this proposal in the concluding section of Chapter 2.  
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Chapter 3, entitled ‘Sovereign Infelicities’, is a transitional chapter in the 
overall structure of the thesis: it continues to engage with theories of performativity 
in their relevance to political trials, and prepares the initial ground for my case 
studies in the remaining two chapters. Here I tease out the implications of 
performative theory’s critique of sovereignty for studying the so-called ‘sovereign 
spectacle’ of trials. This critique comes to full fruition in Judith Butler’s work, but 
can be discerned from J. L. Austin onwards, given his emphasis on the doctrine of 
infelicities. Austin’s thorough account of the many ways in which performative 
utterances can fail indicates that infelicities should not be deemed accidental and 
external to his theory of performativity but rather paradigmatic. This account of 
Austin’s theory requires arguing with Derrida’s reading of Austin, and has a close 
affinity with Shoshana Felman’s take on Austin. So I allow myself the space to 
work through the readings and misreadings of the status of sovereign agency in 
theories of performativity.  
The conclusion I draw from this review is that the very idiom of 
performativity complicates the scene of sovereign agency through its emphasis on 
citationality (or conventionality) and performance (embodied practice). These are 
two necessary conditions of performativity that always already undermine the 
possibility of absolute presence, unfettered intentionality, and other such attributes 
of sovereign agency. Carrying these insights over to the study of (political) trials 
requires the generalisation of performative theory’s problematisation of sovereign 
agency to the critique of a broader notion of sovereignty. While such transference is 
not always fully justified, the trial accommodates it well due to not only its 
particular makeup and dynamics pertaining to conventionality and embodied 
performance, but also the overall workings of sovereignty that it accommodates. I 
further substantiate the relevance of this transference through a discussion of three 
scenes from three different political trials: the Chicago Conspiracy Trial of 1969-
70, Saddam Hussein’s 2005 Dujail trial, and the 2013 trial of student protesters 
Alfie Meadows and Zak King in the UK. 
The overall point of Chapter 3, then, is to propose that performative theory 
allows the conceptualisation of the political in political trials beyond its 
overdeterminations. While the sovereign model for configuring the politics of a 
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trial reduces it to questions of expediency and imagines the scene of the trial as one 
that is mastered by sovereign wills and intentions, the performative model 
instigates a more multivalent appreciation of the political at work in a trial. It does 
this by sharpening our awareness to how law’s structural unconscious may play out 
in a trial, and how embodied practices of participants bring fears, desires, anxieties, 
fantasies, projections, fetishisations and the like onto the scene of the trial to 
unsettle and recast the political as it transpires in the proceedings. So the arc of the 
movement from Chapter 1 to Chapter 3 can be identified thus: a rigorous follow-up 
of the initial proposals we find in the 1960s’ literature on political trials concerning 
the performative operations of trials will bring us to a much more multivalent 
account of the politics of any political trial.  
This conceptualisation of the vagaries of the political in trials serves as the 
groundwork for my case studies in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, I offer a close 
study of the 1921 Berlin trial of Soghomon Tehlirian –an Armenian survivor of the 
1915 genocide– who assassinated Talât Pasha, the Ottoman statesman widely seen 
as the mastermind of the genocide. In Tehlirian’s trial, the political transpires as a 
shared state of haunting following the defendant’s introduction into the courtroom 
of the figure of a ghost. I trace the signs of this common haunting in the trial 
transcript as it is inflected in the interventions of the presiding judge, the testimony 
of witnesses and psych-experts, the arguments of the defence counsel, and finally in 
the acquittal verdict of the jury. In giving a form to the impossible recognition of 
political violence, the ghost effects the most felicitous of all performatives in the 
trial. The participants’ susceptibility to haunting create a political effect that is 
beyond any individual or stately sovereign strategies or damage limitation exercises 
at work in the trial. While I also take account of such strategies and exercises in my 
reading of Tehlirian’s trial, my main emphasis is on the political role of the 
inadvertent, the ghostly, the speculative. 
In Chapter 5, I turn to two contemporary trials from Turkey: the trial 
concerning the assassination of Armenian-Turkish journalist and human rights 
activist Hrant Dink in 2007, and the Ergenekon trial. Both of these trials concern 
the so-called ‘deep state’ – a phrase widely used in Turkey to evoke powers 
operating with impunity through and beyond the official state structure. While state 
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involvement is inscribed all over the case file, the Dink murder trial is not officially 
considered a deep state trial and the process has been marked by the disavowal of 
the state’s role in the assassination. On the other hand, the indictments and the first 
instance judgment in the Ergenekon trial proudly claim that this trial purges the 
long-standing deep state to finally fully attain the rule of law in the republic. Before 
going on to discuss these two trials in detail, I offer a brief institutional history of 
the Turkish deep state to give a better sense of the kind of dynamics that the phrase 
invokes. Then, as a way of introducing the complications involved in putting the 
deep state on trial, I explore the different ways of conceptualising this notion.  
The idea of raison d’état offers, perhaps, the best way of grasping the range 
of alliances and activities that this phrase refers to. As a governmental rationality, 
raison d’état evaluates the legitimacy of a state’s activities solely with reference to 
the preservation and perpetuation of the state. Technically, the adjudication of deep 
state activities can be stage-managed to maximum effect as a ‘return’ to rule of law 
(from, say, raison d’état). However, there needs to be some kind of remove 
between the prosecution on the one hand, and the defence and the acts under 
consideration on the other hand, that is, between the state and the deep state for this 
to be a felicitous spectacle. This could either be a jurisdictional remove, or 
something like a ‘transitional justice’ remove, so that there is at least the 
appearance of a conflict between the prosecution and the defence. In the absence of 
such a remove, the trial effects a number of peculiar performatives: the state is 
performatively produced in the scene of the trial as both law and its transgression 
and most importantly, the ultimate instability of the idealised opposition between 
raison d’état and rule of law is exposed.  
In the Hrant Dink murder trial, there is clearly no remove between 
prosecution and defence, so that the criminal justice process legibly operates as an 
extension of the crime. In the Ergenekon trial, there seems to be such a remove at 
first sight, as it has all the signs of a ‘successor regime trial’, and all the clamour of 
radical, incommensurable difference. However, as I try to show in my reading of 
the case file, beyond all the noise and commotion, beyond the accusations and 
counter-accusations of conspiracy, we can discern a deep consensus among the 
defendants, the prosecutors and the judges. This is a consensus that produces the 
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(deep) state as fetish in the scene of the trial. In my reading of the two cases, I pay 
attention to how law’s ways of knowing contribute to the performative production 
of the state in these trials. In the Dink murder trial, a logic of dissociation produces 
the sneering state, where the sneer of the state is much like the grin without the cat. 
In the Ergenekon trial, a logic of hyper-association produces the state as a 
conspiracy of conspiracies. I conclude the chapter by signalling another way of 
knowing the (deep) state, one that follows traces, spectres and other leftovers of 
sovereign agency in a counter-conspiracy against the conspiring case files. 
  
 
 
1 
theorising political trials 
 
 
 
 
 
The literature on political trials is, in one sense, vast. For well-known early 
instances we could easily go as far back as the 4th century BC to the two Apologies, 
namely, Plato’s and Xenophon’s respective accounts of Socrates’ defence in his 
trial for impiety.1 Curiously, this trial from 399 B.C. often crops up in 
contemporary works on political trials. This is true not only for works intended for 
a wide readership (e.g. Harris 2006; Kadri 2005), but also for the more systematic 
studies that aim to provide a genre definition of sorts by presenting an 
encyclopaedic compilation of accounts of various trials (e.g. Christenson 1991; 
1999), as well as for the more analytic treatments (e.g. Kirchheimer 1961). The 
persistence of this fascination with a trial that is two millennia and four centuries 
old could perhaps be explained by the lively intellectual legacy of Ancient Greece 
and its philosophers, if not by a hint of nostalgic envy on the part of the 
contemporary scholar who gazes with awe upon the philosopher whose 
philosophising was deemed so influential as to be worthy of a public trial and 
capital punishment. Yet another explanation for the untimely contemporaneity of 
Socrates’ trial would be that his defence involved quintessential elements of what 
today would generally be recognised as a political defence. 
                                                
1 In Ancient Athens, the charge of impiety, which had been utilised in political trials of the previous 
decades (see Bauman 1990) included three specifications: not believing in the gods of the city, 
introducing new divinities, and corrupting the youth (Brickhouse and Smith 2004: 79).  
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We encounter in many contemporary political trials something akin to 
Socrates’ attempt to ridicule his prosecutor Meletus2 with the charge of 
‘playfulness’,3 ‘insolence and unrestraint and youthful rashness’ and of 
‘contradicting himself in the indictment’ (Plato 1979: 26e-27a). Similarly, it is quite 
common for political defendants to attempt to turn the trial on its head so as to 
accuse the accusers, like Socrates does when he tells Meletus ‘You have cared 
nothing about the things for which you bring me in here’ (25c); and condemn the 
condemners: ‘this brings disgrace not on me but on those who condemned me’ 
(Xenophon 2008: ¶26). One among many examples in this regard was the rhetoric 
employed by Mohammad Ali Jouhar, one of the leaders of the Indian Khilafat 
movement, during his 1921 trial for conspiring to seduce troops from their 
allegiance: ‘I have no defence to offer. And there is no need of defence, for it is not 
we who are on trial. It is the Government itself that is on trial. It is the Judge 
himself who is on trial. It is the whole system of public prosecutions, the entire 
provisions of the law that are on trial’ (Gauba 1946: 177-178). Consider the 
immense drama of Socrates’ refusal to repent to avail himself of a lesser sentence – 
could we not say that something of that drama was replayed in the 1951 trial of 
American communists Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who refused to plead guilty to 
save their lives?4 Isn’t Socrates’ outright defiance of death echoed in Algerian FLN 
militant Djamila Bouhired’s famous laughter upon hearing her condemnation to 
death by a French military court in 1957? And what do we make of the eerie 
similarity of wording between Socrates’ address to his juror/judges ‘men of Athens, 
                                                
2 Meletus was the first to accuse Socrates according to Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro (1961: 170 2b). 
In the Apology, he appears as one of the three accusers. Most criminal proceedings in Ancient 
Athens at the time were initiated by private individuals. The accusing individual would draw the 
indictment and if the charges were deemed admissible by a magistrate (arkhon) following a 
preliminary inquiry (anakrisis), the trial would take place before hundreds, and in some cases 
thousands of jurors. The civilian accuser would play the role of the prosecutor in the trial. Thus in 
Socrates’ trial Meletus was both plaintiff and prosecutor. For a detailed discussion of procedure in 
Ancient Athens, see MacDowell (1978: 24-40, 237-254).  
3 Or ‘pure flippancy’ according to the Hamilton and Cairns edition (1961: 13). 
4 The Rosenbergs did not advance an overtly political defence in their trial, however we can 
appreciate with the benefit of hindsight the political significance of their refusal to divulge any 
incriminating information while obediently answering every question and seemingly accepting the 
court on its own terms. See Sam Roberts, ‘Father Was a Spy, Sons Conclude With Regret’, New 
York Times, 26 September 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/nyregion/17rosenbergs.html.  
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I am now far from making a defence speech on my behalf, as someone might 
suppose. I do it rather on your behalf’ (Plato 1979: 30d) and Saddam Hussein’s 
exclamation ‘I am not defending myself, I’m defending you!’ as he pointed with his 
index finger at the judge in his 2005 Dujail trial? Admittedly, the two exclamations 
do two quite different things: one is the ‘I’ of a liminal figure of a critic, the 
philosopher-pariah about to be banished from the body politic, who claims to 
defend ‘you’ from ‘yourselves’ who have indicted ‘yourselves’ by indicting ‘me’; 
while the other is the ‘I’ of a deposed sovereign who reclaims the prerogative to 
speak on behalf of ‘you’ and claims to defend ‘you’ from the other.  
Nevertheless, such tropes (the arrogation of the defence of the body politic, 
counter-indictment, counter-condemnation, ridicule, defiance of punishment, and 
martyrdom through refusal of mitigation or mercy) are so common in defendants’ 
statements in political trials that one is tempted to trace the political defence speech 
as a genre onto itself, with Socrates’ defence as an early instance. The hall of fame 
of this genre would then include Emile Zola’s statement to the jury at his trial for 
criminal libel following his defence of Captain Dreyfus in his famous open letter 
‘J’accuse’ (Zola 1998: 55-61); Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman’s speeches 
at their trial for conspiracy to defeat military registration (Berkman and Goldman 
1917); Georgi Dimitrov’s address at the Reichstag Fire Trial (Dimitrov 1964); Fidel 
Castro’s defence speech at the Moncada Trial (Castro 1968); and Nelson Mandela’s 
four-hour-long statement from the dock at the Rivonia trial (Mandela 1979), among 
others. While I do not pursue this question of the defence speech as genre in this 
thesis, the theoretical framework I propose for studying trials explains the unique 
effectiveness of the criminal trial as a platform for the political defendant. Where 
the stakes of speech are so high as to be a matter of life or death, freedom or 
incarceration, condemnation or exoneration, the performative potential of speech 
acts become virtually unbounded. It is perhaps not exactly a coincidence that 
published speeches of political defendants were all the rage in tsarist Russia in the 
lead up to the Bolshevik Revolution (Wood 2005: 22-23). Nor is it exactly an 
exaggeration to identify Mandela’s trial speeches as articulating ‘a new 
constitutional order, one that had yet to come into being’ (Cole 2010: 56). 
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The nature of the defence is rarely identified in the literature on political trials 
as definitive, as that which renders a trial political. One key exception in this regard 
is the work of the late French-Vietnamese lawyer Jacques Vergès who is often 
credited as the originator of the theory and practice of the ‘strategy of rupture’ 
(Vergès [1968] 2009). Vergès’ rupture defence is a strategy of explosive 
incommensurability. It is the refusal to enter into dialogue with the court about the 
facts of the case or the points of law. Such radical noncompliance with the terms 
provided by the legal system and advanced by the prosecution is meant to tend 
towards an outright defiance of the sociopolitical order. In this sense, the strategy of 
rupture aims to take the trial outside the courtroom.5 Importantly, Vergès indicates 
in his De la stratégie judiciaire that the rupture strategy need not be limited to 
political trials. We cannot derive the significance of this from his practice as a 
lawyer, as he was known for his role as defence counsel in trials that were already 
of political significance, involving political defendants and/or political crimes.6 
However, in theory, what determines the politics of a trial for Vergès is the attitude 
of the defence towards the social order represented by the court, rather than the 
nature of the crime or the stature of the criminal (Vergès [1968] 2009). Such an 
approach could potentially render the traditional distinction between an ordinary 
criminal trial and a political trial redundant, since hypothetically any criminal 
proceeding could be politicised through a successful rupture strategy. It must be 
noted, however, that Vergès’ approach is based on a particular, somewhat romantic 
                                                
5 ‘Interview with Notorious Lawyer Jacques Vergès’, Spiegel, 21 November 2008, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-notorious-lawyer-jacques-verges-there-is-
no-such-thing-as-absolute-evil-a-591943.html. Let me note in passing that what Vergès has baptised 
the strategy of rupture does not seem to have originated with him. We can identify a predecessor in 
the figure of communist lawyer Marcel Willard who founded L’Association Juridique Internationale 
and advocated throughout the 1920s and ‘30s a similar strategy of refusing to engage with the courts 
in the terms laid down by the accusation and instead using the courtroom as an arena, a stage for 
propaganda (Israël 2005). Willard’s approach was based on a letter by Vladimir Lenin, written in 
1905 in response to members of Russia’s Social Democratic Labour Party who had been arrested the 
previous year and had consulted him as to how to proceed with the defence (ibid: 149). Further, 
Lenin seems to have derived his wisdom on defence strategy from the revolutionary trials of the 
previous decades in Russia (Wood 2005: 23). Thus a preliminary genealogy of Vergès’ rupture 
strategy takes us through Willard and Lenin, back to the late 19th century Russian political trials. 
6 Vergès’ clients included, among others, Algerian FLN militants, Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie, 
international Marxist-Leninist terrorist Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (aka Carlos the Jackal), and more 
recently the former Khmer Rouge head of state Khieu Samphan. 
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conception of crime. His 1968 tract where he develops the concept of rupture 
departs from the claim that every crime is a signal issued to life as a challenge for it 
to change. We find a kindred spirit in Theodore L. Becker (1971: xi) who 
introduces his edited volume on political trials with the suggestion that in a sense 
every trial is political, because ‘courts are government agencies and judges are part 
of the “system”’. While there is some truth in these approaches, they do little to 
explain the persistent ability of ‘political trial’ to signify something, though not 
necessarily just one thing.  
 
defining the genre 
According to a somewhat narrow technical legal definition that is often utilised in 
scholarly work, a political trial is a criminal trial in which the defendant is charged 
with a political offence. We may then ask, what is a political offence? In the 
introduction to An Examination of Trials for Sedition Which Have Hitherto 
Occurred in Scotland, Scottish jurist Lord Henry Cockburn exclaims, ‘To see no 
difference between political and other offences is the sure mark of an excited or 
stupid head’ (1888, 1: 68). The subject of Lord Cockburn’s treatise, sedition, is 
indeed often considered a classic political offence, along with treason and 
espionage. However, the contemporary criminological definition of political crimes 
is not limited to such classic offences against the state, but rather encompasses a 
wide range, including offences perpetrated by individuals with specific political 
affiliations (including state actors), those perpetrated against politically significant 
victims or targets, politically motivated offences, and offences leading to politically 
significant effects or outcomes (Ross 2012). As the scope is thus widened, the 
distinction between ordinary and political offences is blurred to the extent that it 
becomes somewhat difficult to avoid Lord Cockburn’s positive diagnosis.  
Trials involving classic offences against the state are sometimes referred to as 
‘state trials’ in the Anglo-American legal tradition. This designation comes from an 
early English source which has eventually come to be known as Howell’s Complete 
Collection of State Trials (Cobbett et. al. 1809-26). First published in 1719 in four 
volumes by Thomas Salmon, and eventually developed by 1826 into thirty-three 
volumes overseen by several consecutive generations of editors, including Sollom 
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Emlyn, Thomas Bayly Howell, and his son Thomas Jones Howell, State Trials was 
a compilation of trial records annotated with editorial comments. According to one 
interpretation, the definition of ‘state trials’ that effectively emerges in the Cobbett 
and Howell collection is not limited to proper offences against the state such as 
treason and sedition, but allows a broader scope, including trials of politically 
inspired riot and murder, parliamentary privilege proceedings, suspension of habeas 
corpus and the resort to court-martial proceedings against civilians (Binnie and 
Wright 2009: 9). However, according to another commentator, none of the editors 
throughout the decades ever provided a clear distinction between a ‘state trial’ and 
any other trial, and the designation was ‘generally used to indicate a case which had 
been of major political significance, though it was never so strictly defined as to 
exclude the more notorious cases of divorce, bigamy, or abduction. The primary 
aim of such collections however, seemed to be a demonstration that legality and 
justice were far from being identical on every occasion’ (Thomas 1972: 7). Here we 
come back to the definitional problem that saturates much of the work on political 
trials. In this sense, this initial delineation of politically charged crimes can be seen 
as an intriguing contribution to the literature on political trials, with early 
articulations regarding the instrumentalisation of law for political ends,7 and notes 
and commentary, especially those of the Howells, openly promoting libertarian 
checks on governmental abuses of the law.  
The seventeen volume American State Trials compiled by John Davison 
Lawson (1914), in contrast, seems misnamed: though the editor claims it to be the 
US counterpart to Howell’s collection, it is neither confined to offences against the 
state, nor to cases with political implications, instead providing a loose assemblage 
of sensational and controversial criminal trials in US history. The more recent 
Injustice: State Trials from Socrates to Nuremberg by Brian Harris (2006) utilises a 
similarly broad and thus vague definition of the designation. A contemporary 
endeavour that falls more squarely within the Howell genre is the chronologically 
                                                
7 E.g. Emlyn in his 1730 preface to the collection writes on treason trials as ‘the fatal engine so often 
employed by corrupt and wicked ministers against the noblest and bravest patriots, whose laudable 
opposition to their pernicious schemes those ministers are very ready to construe into Treason and 
Rebellion against the Prince; thereby confounding their own and the Prince’s interest together...’ 
(Cobbett et. al. 1: xxvi). 
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organised Canadian State Trials series (1996-2009), currently covering the period 
1608-1914 in three volumes, with additional volumes forthcoming. In the 
introduction to the first volume, the editors, in their attempt to provide a definition 
of ‘state trials’, initially entertain a broad conception, to suggest that perhaps any 
trial that involves governmental interests could be brought under the heading. 
However, they note that this would ‘encompass innumerable kinds of trials relating 
to … state security, of course, but also political corruption, federal/provincial 
disputes over jurisdiction, gender politics, native land claims, and so on’ 
(Greenwood and Wright 1996: 10). Thus they then opt for a more narrow definition 
and limit their scope to ‘state security’ in the existing volumes of Canadian State 
Trials, only covering perceived and actual threats to, and law-related dimensions of 
state security, including but not limited to treason and sedition trials. Notably, a 
definition of the political trial that departs from a narrow interpretation of the nature 
of the offence so as to limit it to trials involving offences against state security 
actually covers the great majority of trials that are generally identified as political, 
especially when we consider that such offences may have been designed to regulate 
the limits of political dissent.8  
Given that the thirty-three volumes of the Howell and Cobbett edition were 
later supplemented by eight volumes of State Trials: New Series edited by Sir John 
Macdonell and published between 1888-98, the massive collection can be 
considered a major publishing feat for nearly two centuries. Donald Thomas (1972: 
2) explains the ‘vogue’ for State Trials not only in terms of ‘a taste for the texture 
of life’ in the 17th and 18th centuries, but also as ‘an instrument of political debate 
and social inquiry’: ‘In its 18th century origins the State Trials collection had been a 
weapon of party politics, while to the late Victorians it remained a classic of 
political education by example’. This combination of privileged insight into a 
milieu and political exposure for pedagogical or ideological/critical ends in fact 
captures something crucial about the motivations behind much of the later literature 
on political trials. This is as true for works that drive at a definition of the genre of 
political trials through compilations of discussions of various trials deemed political 
                                                
8 For a contemporary study that primarily adopts such a narrow ‘political crime’ definition to 
identify political trials, see Posner (2005). 
theorising political trials 34 
 
 
(e.g. Christenson 1991, 1999; Harris 2006), as for those that limit the designation to 
trials of former heads of state (e.g. Laughland 2008) and studies with more 
carefully defined scopes such as a specific period in the history of a particular 
country,9 a certain legal doctrine,10 or a particular piece of legislation,11 thus 
containing the politics of political trials. In all these, we see the attempt to grasp 
and portray something either about how power works (or worked, at a particular 
time and place), or about the overt and covert political dynamics in a society, the 
political culture of a state as crystallised in political trials where power exposes 
itself. In this sense, the key appeal of studying political trials must be that each 
political trial serves as a flash of lightning that momentarily illuminates its milieu.  
 
the theoretical shift 
While there are many studies of political trials in this vein, conceptual work on the 
subject is relatively rare. The rest of my discussion in this chapter is centred on 
what I read as a particularly productive moment of theorising on political trials. 
Read together, Otto Kirchheimer’s 1961 study Political Justice: The Use of Legal 
Procedure for Political Ends, Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report 
on the Banality of Evil of 1963, and Judith N. Shklar’s 1964 book Legalism: Law, 
Morals and Political Trials comprise some of the most theoretically interesting 
work on the subject. These studies were all published in the United States, but their 
concerns were clearly global. They appeared following a period that could perhaps 
be ironically deemed the ‘golden era’ of political trials, namely, the three turbulent 
decades in mid-20th century that witnessed the Moscow Trials of the late 1930s in 
the USSR, the trials of dissidents in the Third Reich, the Cold War trials of 
communists in the US during the 1940s and ‘50s, the show trials around the same 
time in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other Eastern Bloc countries, the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials in the wake of World War II, the trial of Nazi functionary Adolf 
Eichmann in 1961 in Israel, and the famous South African political trials: the 
                                                
9 E.g. Noorani (1976) and Gauba (1946) on political trials in India during the British rule; Pereira 
(1997, 2005) on political trials during Brazil’s military regime; Lobban (1996) on South African 
trials in the 1970s; Hain (1984) on the UK’s political trials of the late ‘70s and early ‘80s. 
10 E.g. Spicer (1981) on conspiracy. 
11 E.g. Belknap (1977) on the Smith Act in the US. 
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Treason trial and Nelson Mandela’s incitement trial. These writings display an 
unprecedented and rarely surpassed rigor in their respective treatments of the 
question of political trials, and it is in these works that we find the first theoretical 
formulations pertaining to what I understand as the performative aspects of political 
trials, something that I explore in detail in Chapter 2.  
First and foremost, these works should be read as highly significant attempts 
to come to terms with and reformulate the legacy of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg. This claim is not necessarily self-evident. Otto 
Kirchheimer’s Political Justice, still the most comprehensive and systematic 
attempt to address, categorise and theorise the role of political concerns in legal 
proceedings, covers several hundreds of pages, two centuries and many countries 
before it gives its main ‘concern’ away, only in the last chapters: How to historicise 
our understanding of the Nuremberg trial12 within a generalised context of political 
justice? A similar movement marks Judith Shklar’s work on what she refers to as 
the social ethos or ideology of legalism: only in the last quarter of her influential 
Legalism are we allowed to understand that the foregoing legal-philosophical 
critique was meant as the groundwork for an attempt to mould a new perspective on 
the Nuremberg trial, one where politics can and must be seen as a key element of 
certain types of legal proceedings. On the other hand, Hannah Arendt’s report on 
Nazi functionary Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Israel is first and foremost that, a 
thorough account of the proceedings. However, it also operates as Arendt’s 
alternative indictment, defence, judgment, and sentencing of the defendant. When 
read as such, one of Arendt’s primary concerns in the text emerges as the attempt to 
lend more of a conceptual substance to the notion of crimes against humanity, 
which had indeed received too narrow an interpretation in the Trial of the Major 
War Criminals before the IMT at Nuremberg.13  
                                                
12 ‘Nuremberg trial’ here refers to the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the IMT.  
13 Article 6(c) of the Charter of the IMT (1945) specifies crimes against humanity as ‘murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not 
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated’ (emphasis mine). In the judgment, 
‘crimes against humanity’ figured in this contingent and peripheral definition, i.e. only in connection 
to war crimes or crimes against peace. It was thus limited to acts committed between 1939-1945: 
‘To constitute crimes against humanity, the acts relied on before the outbreak of war must have been 
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Insofar as they articulate the political with regards to this legacy (explicitly, 
and as I argue, performatively in Arendt’s case), these three studies, taken together, 
represent a key moment in the theorisation of political trials. They constitute a new 
direction in the literature, providing more nuanced articulations and explorations of 
what until then had only been addressed in terms of deviation from the true course 
of justice. This shift was in part a necessity imposed by their very milieu: in the 
dark, dismal aftermath of the unprecedented nature and scale of Nazi crimes, the 
cosmopolitan possibilities opened up by the formulation of ‘crimes against 
humanity’, and the emergence on the horizon of the notion of a ‘world order’ seem 
to have compelled these thinkers to avow, think critically and creatively about, and 
in some cases even advocate for the role of the political in legal proceedings. In 
other words, Nazi crimes and the ensuing trials appear to have forced them to think 
in new ways about the uneasy relationship between politics and law in the space of 
the courtroom, precisely because a retreat into the ideal of the mutual autonomy of 
these two spheres was no longer an option. One of the premises of my study is that 
an understanding of political trials, if it is to have contemporary relevance, must 
begin from this moment of theoretical shift. This is not solely because today’s 
discourses around notions such as ‘the international community’, ‘crimes against 
humanity’, and ‘humanitarian intervention’ implicitly or explicitly evoke the very 
context that these thinkers strove to address; but also because, and primarily for the 
purposes of this study, it is in the works of these three thinkers that we encounter 
the attempt to capture, articulate, and theorise the performative elements of political 
trials.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
in execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The 
Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been 
satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in connection with, any such crime. The 
Tribunal therefore cannot make a general declaration that the acts before 1939 were crimes against 
humanity within the meaning of the Charter, but from the beginning of the war in 1939 war crimes 
were committed on a vast scale, which were also crimes against humanity; and insofar as the 
inhumane acts charged in the Indictment, and committed after the beginning of the war, did not 
constitute war crimes, they were all committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggressive 
war, and therefore constituted crimes against humanity’ (IMT 1946). 
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kirchheimer: setting the parameters  
Otto Kirchheimer’s Political Justice (1961) is an impressive study of the various 
facets of the relationship between politics and the legal form. Mainly focusing on 
the 19th and 20th centuries with occasional forays into the 18th century, Shakespeare, 
and antiquity, this highly comprehensive attempt to address, categorise and theorise 
political trials provides a survey map of the field, as it were, setting out the 
parameters by which to understand any given political trial structurally and 
strategically. The trials are presented in their historical and political context so as to 
emphasise their political function and public effect, and to expose the sometimes 
failed schemes of the authorities involved. The sobriety of the account is staggering 
– the flair of the text is in its intellectual deeds rather than its rhetorical feats. 
Neither is the author’s position expressly stated, only revealed through the very 
quality and rigor of the critical labour constituting the work. Thus the catalytic 
‘problem’ and organising principle of the text becomes recognisable only when this 
critical rigor becomes somewhat compromised, a thitherto absent ambiguity 
emerges, along with the more personalised voice of the author. This is how I read 
Kirchheimer’s introduction of the Nuremberg trial towards the end of his book, 
which in turn resignifies the preceding investigation and analysis as an attempt to 
contextualise this particular political trial. In this section, I present a skeletal 
version of Kirchheimer’s theory of political trials, to then move on in the next 
section to his discussion of the Nuremberg trial, which, though bracketed by his 
general theory, is nevertheless not properly contained by it, thereby obliging the 
reluctant author to the beginnings of a new formulation of the politics of trials.  
Kirchheimer defines political justice as the use of the ‘devices of justice to 
bolster or create new power positions’ (vii) and identifies three main categories of 
political trials:  
1) a politically significant trial involving a common crime; 
2) a regime’s attempt to eliminate its political foe (classic political trial); 
3) defamation, perjury and contempt trials manipulated to bring disrepute 
upon a political foe (derivative political trial)  
The first and the third categories are quite straightforward. In the first, the 
prosecution of a common crime is imbued with political significance due to its 
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politically-tinged motive, content, dramatis personae, context or public effect. One 
famous contemporary example that could be listed under this category is the O.J. 
Simpson trial.14 The third category, the derivative political trial, is ‘a volatile, 
ambiguous, widespread device opening up opportunities for those who are excluded 
from the fruits of political power’ (76), whereby an ordinary member of the public 
may manage to provoke an established political figure into initiating a defamation 
suit. If a trial ensues, the plaintiff’s character and virtues, private life and political 
decisions will come under public scrutiny, providing a forum for his/her lay 
adversaries. The example Kirchheimer offers is Friedrich Ebert’s libel case against 
a German nationalist agitator who called him a traitor (81), another good example 
would be the 1954-55 Kastner trial in Israel.15  
Most of Kirchheimer’s discussion in the book revolves around the second 
category, the ‘classic’ political trial, whereby a regime may attempt to incriminate 
its foe’s public behaviour; use the trial as an opportunity to elicit information that 
sheds unfavourable light on its foe (52); and/or portray it’s foe’s opposition to 
official policies as treason (62) so as to secure judicially-sanctioned repression. The 
classic political trial is sometimes only ‘a skirmish in a continuing battle’, 
sometimes ‘a flourish after decisive action has been taken elsewhere’ (232), and in 
rarer instances a crystallisation of the conflict between the established authorities 
and their foes. Kirchheimer also provides a subcategorisation for the classic 
political trial: an established authority’s political resort to courts may be a matter of 
necessity, choice or convenience (419). As a matter of necessity, it is merely a 
technical device such as when, to follow the example given in the book, a political 
                                                
14 Though there was nothing ‘political’ about the alleged crime of murder itself, its motive, or the 
actors in question in the O.J. Simpson trial, it was a political trial in its public effect and context. 
This is because the defence’s image of the trial pervaded its popular perception, especially among 
the African-American population of the US. In this perspective, the crux of the trial was not 
establishing the defendant’s guilt or innocence vis-à-vis the murder of his wife, but whether a black 
man could find justice in a white legal system. The very context of the trial, a traumatic history of 
racism and ‘white justice’, and the trial’s conjuration of ‘the ghost of the Rodney King trial’ 
(Felman 2002: 62), was an essential element of this public effect. 
15 In this trial, an elderly Hungarian Jew was accused of defaming the Zionist leader Rudolf Kastner 
by alleging that he had collaborated with the Nazis. As the court sought to establish whether his 
claims against Kastner had merit, the defendant became the de facto accuser during the course of the 
trial. Thus his acquittal amounted to a symbolic conviction of Kastner, who appealed the decision, 
but was assassinated before the court reached a ruling. For a thorough and engaging discussion of 
the politics of the Kastner trial, see Bilsky (2004: 19-82). 
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dignitary is assassinated, the assassin is caught, and it is necessary that s/he should 
be tried in court for the crime (419). Even though the standard criminal procedure 
may be applied in such a case, Kirchheimer would deem it different from an 
ordinary murder trial, i.e. political, if only by virtue of the stature of the individuals 
involved (48), in this case that of the victim. The recourse to court as a matter of 
choice connotes the preference of judicial action instead of (or along with) the 
many other methods available to repress a political adversary (i.e. illegal or 
administrative repression). According to Kirchheimer, political trials motivated by 
choice may not always go according to plan (422), as the cooperation of the 
judiciary must be secured in order to legitimise the repression of foes (421). 
Finally, a regime’s motive for launching a political trial may have to do with 
convenience: it may have recourse to a trial in order to create effective political 
images as part of a propaganda campaign to manipulate public opinion (419).  
For Kirchheimer, the image-creating capacity of a legal proceeding is 
essential: characterised by the ‘dramatic configuration of a contest’ and conducted 
under the ‘glaring lights of publicity’, the process is most tellingly utilised in 
political trials, whether for ‘pedagogical effect’ (109), ‘internal mobilisation’ (18), 
or the upper hand in a ‘popularity contest’ of ideologies (233n13). Kirchheimer 
deems a political trial’s image-creating effect vastly superior compared to other 
political strategies: in employing a telling image, the political trial ‘elevates the 
image from the realm of private happenings and partisan constructions to an 
official, authoritative, quasi-neutral sphere’ (422). Furthermore, the political trial is 
more successful than parliamentary proceedings in providing the masses with a 
more intimate sense of political participation: ‘Its rules are intricate. Its immediate 
results may be quite spectacular. Its illusions are sufficiently hidden from the 
onlooker not to disturb his sense of drama and aesthetic enjoyment’ (430). By using 
a complete and effective (though not necessarily meaningful) image, the political 
trial offers a reduced and simplified understanding of history, which further 
enlivens the show (423). The spectacular aspect of a political trial is emphasised 
throughout the text, with a telling choice of words including ‘the show’ (53), 
‘fireworks’ (54), ‘cinerama’ (53), and ‘cinematic episode’ (114). 
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However, it is important to note that Kirchheimer introduces a crucial 
distinction between political trials and show trials: the political trial, no matter how 
carefully staged, always involves an irreducible element of risk for the political 
authorities, threatening to break through the façade and invite alternative 
interpretations of what is actually at stake in the proceedings. This is defined in 
comparison to, for example, the Soviet show trials, where the element of risk was 
fully eliminated, as they were ‘total’ productions in which even the defendants’ 
role, participation and ‘confessions’ were stage-managed and orchestrated. The 
political trial, on the other hand, has to play itself out on a public that is host and 
witness to the process, is preoccupied and identified with it, and perhaps even 
entertained by it. Kirchheimer’s identification of this irreducible risk as the 
essential condition of a ‘political trial’ effectively crystallises his entire 
resignification of the notion, in its distinction from a ‘show trial’. It is important to 
note that this intervention comes in the midst of the Cold War, when the two 
designations, political trial and show trial, were often used interchangeably, and 
mostly reserved for legal proceedings in undemocratic regimes. Thus 
Kirchheimer’s understanding of the ‘risk’ in a political trial proper: the event is shot 
through with uncertainties stemming from legal procedure, political commitments 
of witnesses and interpretation of defendants who might be able to hijack the 
proceedings to create very effective alternative images (118). Another source of 
uncertainty is the very ‘judicial space’16 itself, i.e. the freedom of the judge or jury 
in deciding a case based on their own interpretation and evaluation. While noting 
that any jury is driven by the ‘urge towards spontaneous conformity’ (223) 
therefore structurally conservative; and taking heed of the restrictions on a judge’s 
supposed and championed impartiality (specific political inclinations and 
sentiments that stem from his/her membership to a dominant minority) Kirchheimer 
nevertheless locates a progressive possibility in the space of judgment: ‘the most 
awesome as well as the most creative part of the judicial experience: the 
entertaining of a small but persistent grain of doubt in the purposes of [one’s] own 
society’ (233). So, although bound by the parameters of established authority and 
                                                
16 Kirchheimer’s use of this term does not incorporate any actual spatial/architectural analysis, 
referring solely to the discretion to judge independently.  
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the urge to guard and conserve it, the judge can still partake creatively in the 
political fate of the community.  
This discussion of the ‘judicial space’ is one of the only signs of a positive 
evaluation of the place of the political in legal proceedings in the entire text, and 
unlike the rest of the discussion, this glimmer of possibility is formulated not in 
terms of instrumentalisation of the legal form, but rather in terms of an opening for 
innovation within it. The discussion is also crucial insofar as it introduces a split or 
a differentiated signification in the notion of ‘the political’ as it is deployed in the 
text, whereby it begins to designate something other than expediency. And yet, this 
différance is neither explored nor openly acknowledged within the text, creating a 
tension that hinders the strength of the analysis. We will later see that Judith 
Shklar’s understanding of political trials begins with a diagnosis of precisely this 
problem of the split within the ‘political’ of political trials. But in Kirchheimer, the 
tension created by this as yet unacknowledged split is transferred on to, or reflected 
in his discussion of the Nuremberg trial, a discussion that incorporates the 
performative element in political trials without naming it as such. 
 
judgment on nuremberg 
Notably, Kirchheimer locates the Nuremberg trial in the context of a wider 
discussion on ‘trials by fiat of the successor regime’, i.e. cases in which a new 
regime uses the trial form to publicly pass judgment on the policies and deeds of 
the previous regime, as a way to differentiate and thereby define itself in idealised 
terms: ‘Setting the new regime from the old and sitting in judgment over the latter’s 
policies and practices may belong to the constitutive acts of the new regime’. Thus, 
Kirchheimer asks: ‘Which are the value structures that transcend the lifetime of a 
political regime against which acts of predecessors can be measured?’ (308). 
History’s classic answer to this is the patriotic norm, often formulated in terms of 
treason in the trials of toppled monarchs, i.e. Charles I and Louis XVI, as well as in 
various 20th century cases including the trial of Joseph Caillaux and the Riom 
trial.17 In all these cases, former leaders were accused of acting against the best 
                                                
17 The 1942-1943 Riom trial was an abortive attempt by the Vichy regime to try their predecessors 
on charges of causing the defeat of France by Germany in 1940. The trial was supported by the 
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interests of the nation. However convenient the patriotic norm and similar criterion 
may have proved in various successor trials, they all fall short of evaluating the 
criminality of the deeds of a regime such as the Nationalist Socialist rule in 
Germany, which calls for the necessity to define a universal yardstick, ‘a 
fundamental notion to which all groups and nations must at least submit, if not 
always subscribe’ (319). Thus contextualising it, Kirchheimer goes on to discuss 
the Nuremberg war crimes trial before the IMT in detail as ‘the most important 
“successor” trial in modern history’ (323).  
His treatment of the subject is characteristically thorough: he considers the 
wisdom of the concept of l’état criminel with respect to understanding individual 
responsibility; moves on to a careful discussion of the nature of each of the three 
main charges in the trial (crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity)18 within their historical/political context; and finally responds to four of 
the defence arguments, the rejoinders that ‘retain more than technical interest’ 
(327). Rather than following the order of his argument, I will focus here on three 
aspects of his discussion: a reaffirmation of the possibility of innovation within the 
judicial space; an unequivocal affirmation of the constitutive potential of the 
Nuremberg trial; and an investment in the notion of ‘crimes against humanity’ as a 
universal yardstick, despite and beyond all his reservations.  
Kirchheimer’s reaffirmation, within the Nuremberg context, of innovation in 
judicial space, comes curiously incorporated into his rebuttal of the defence 
argument regarding victor’s justice. His response to the rejoinder that flags the 
prejudicial, partisan quality of the court is almost an exclamation of ‘well, tough 
luck’:  
the rebuttal is simple and unavoidable. It goes straight to the very nature of 
political trials. In all political trials conducted by the judges of the 
successor regime, the judges are in a certain sense the victor’s judges... In a 
somewhat wider sense, all judges, not only those of a successor regime, are 
working under the conditions of the existing legal and political system 
which they are duty-bound to uphold (332)  
                                                                                                                                   
Nazis, who hoped it would also establish for posterity that the responsibility for initiating the war 
rested with France.  
18 Note that he leaves out what he deems to be the ‘unnecessary’ charge of conspiracy, which also 
found a very narrow interpretation in the final judgment, even though it was an important part of the 
prosecution’s case. 
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Enter stage left, a previously absent cynicism in argument. He then goes on to 
relate an anecdote from the London Conference where the Charter for the IMT was 
drawn up: USSR representative Nikitschenko explained their vision for a speedy 
procedure that would guarantee the execution of the convictions as they had been 
previously announced by the heads of the Allied establishments, whereupon US 
representative Justice Jackson took it upon himself to expound on the traditional 
Western position regarding the distinction between the executive power to set up a 
tribunal and organise the prosecution, and the independent role of the trial judges 
evaluating the evidence presented to them. ‘Both the cynical realism of the USSR 
representative and the apparent traditionalism of Justice Jackson’, Kirchheimer 
concludes, ‘overstate their respective cases’ (333). His no-illusions position on the 
matter is: the acknowledgement that it is a successor, i.e. political, trial need not 
rule out an expectation for some level of independence in the judicial space. The 
corroboration for the existence of such independence at the Nuremberg trial came, 
for Kirchheimer, in the form of three acquittals in spite of the protests of the USSR 
team.  
As for his further elaboration on the constitutive potential of a political trial, 
in what I understand to be his only recourse to the first person in the text, 
Kirchheimer states that ‘This kind of hybrid prosecution, which mixes political 
accountability for planning and initiation of aggressive war with criminal 
responsibility for inhuman conduct, has to our eyes a politically justified element’ 
(324). The reference to hybridity here has to do with the question of responsibility 
and the nature of the crimes: the ‘crimes against peace’ formulation is meant to 
establish the responsibility of the governing ranks of the regime for the policy 
course they had taken. The other two charges are devised for establishing personal 
responsibility, directly concerned as they are, with the quality of human action 
‘regardless of the hierarchical level at which it occurred’ (326). The ‘politically 
justified element’ of this hybrid prosecution has to do with the historical moment – 
Kirchheimer is convinced that warfare in contemporary society will necessarily 
lead to the very negation of the human condition, that is, to crimes against 
humanity. Thus he understands the constellation of the three charges as an 
appropriate one for the context that necessitated the elimination of aggressive war. 
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And yet, right after this statement he goes on to explain how the ‘crimes against 
peace’ notion failed to set a precedent,19 as the coalition behind the IMT broke up 
‘before the ink on the Nuremberg judgment had time to dry’:  
Had the noble purpose of the crime against peace charge succeeded, had it 
helped to lay a foundation for a new world order, the uncertain juridical 
foundation of the charge would now be overlooked and the enterprise 
praised as the rock on which the withdrawal of the states’ right to conduct 
aggressive warfare came to rest. (324) 
Nowhere else in the text do we find such an unequivocal affirmation of the 
performative promise of political justice, as it is formulated here in view of its 
failure. Had it not failed, he seems to say, the enterprise could not have been 
discredited on charges of political justice. This is a wonderfully succinct 
articulation of the performative potential of political trials to enact into being their 
own foundation,20 in what Derrida (2002b) would later identify as a ‘fabulous 
retroactivity’. This insight, however, is not integrated into the main body of 
Kirchheimer’s comprehensive theoretical investigation of the subject.  
Finally, Kirchheimer finds in the formulation of ‘crimes against humanity’ a 
universal measure, namely, the answer to his earlier question concerning the 
‘fundamental notion to which all groups and nations must at least submit, if not 
always subscribe’. By way of concluding his discussion on Nuremberg, he suggests 
that the typical infirmities of the trial stemming from its very conditions of 
existence and structure as a successor trial should not hinder us from 
acknowledging its ‘lasting contribution’:  
that it defined where the realm of politics ends or, rather, is transformed 
into the concerns of the human condition, the survival of mankind in both 
its universality and diversity. ...the feeble beginning of transnational 
control of the crime against the human condition raises the Nuremberg 
judgment a notch above the level of political justice by fiat of a successor 
regime. (341)  
We may question the wisdom of this split between political concerns and concerns 
regarding the human condition – why should the realm of politics end where the 
concerns of the human condition begin? What kind of conceptualisation is that of 
                                                
19 See Zolo (2009) for a more contemporary analysis of this failure.  
20 See Chapter 2 of this thesis for a detailed discussion of this dynamic in political trials.  
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the ‘political’? Where does that relegate the ‘legal’ with regards to the ‘political’? 
But perhaps more importantly, the rhetorical strength of this conclusion does not 
quite follow from Kirchheimer’s own analyses concerning the impossibility of 
enforcing a common guideline for crimes against humanity in the absence of a 
‘world authority to establish the boundary line between atrocity beyond the pale 
and legitimate policy reserved for the individual state’ (326). In clarifying the 
difficulty produced by this absence, Kirchheimer gestures towards the various 
policies of cruelty underway in the world at the time of writing, such as the French 
in Algeria, the South African government, and the Hungarian regime – they ‘might 
continue to have a very different viewpoint on the meaning of the concept’ (ibid.), 
he asserts with typical restraint. He further suggests that this may have been a 
reason why the IMT had very limited recourse to the crimes against humanity 
charge, opting instead for the war crimes charge where possible. In that sense, and 
within the universe of Kirchheimer’s critique, the precise content of Nuremberg’s 
‘lasting contribution’ is not actually clear. Kirchheimer does attempt a more 
confident presentation of the matter, suggesting in the lead up to his ‘lasting 
contribution’ flourish that  
those fact situations which we have since come to describe as genocide 
have established signs, imprecise as they might be, that the most atrocious 
offences against the human condition lie beyond the pale of what may be 
considered contingent and fortuitous political action, judgment on which 
may change from regime to regime (341) 
Yet the sheer number of qualifiers in this statement leave hardly any substance, 
other than the veritable reality of horror in the face of atrocity. It is as if atrocity is 
the limit not only of the political but also of critique for Kirchheimer.  
Indeed, in his further and final remarks on Nuremberg in the conclusion of 
the book, we find a slightly different articulation. The lasting contribution of the 
trial, we are told this time, is the image that it created. The permanence of this 
image will not be effaced by any criticism of the trial, nor did it owe its strength to 
the mastery of the tribunal: the record of the Nazi regime was ‘so clear-cut that the 
image produced in court could not but appear a reasonably truthful replica of 
reality’. Remarkably for this otherwise decisively declarative jurist, Kirchheimer’s 
final judgment on Nuremberg comes in the form of a rhetorical question:  
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while it retained many overtones of the convenience type of trial, did the 
Nuremberg trial, with all the hypocrisy and grotesqueness deriving from its 
very subject, not belong very profoundly in the category of a morally and 
historically necessary operation? (423) 
This, it seems to me, is a more truthful presentation of the ‘problem’ that 
Nuremberg posed for Kirchheimer, namely, the quandary of being forced to affirm 
political justice, not in principle, but in the face of atrocities beyond the pale. It 
explains something of the exceptional treatment Nuremberg receives in a book 
dedicated ‘to the past, present, and future victims of political justice’, and 
committed to an incisive critical dismantling of such judicial productions. 
Nevertheless, it is also this exception that seems to have catalysed and informed the 
grand project itself, while allowing (or imposing on it) the beginnings of a critical 
turn in thinking about political trials. As for the task of substantiating ‘crimes 
against humanity’ as a notion and in its promise, Kirchheimer doesn’t quite get 
there, though we will see that Hannah Arendt achieves this with a kindred 
sensibility, and quite eloquently. Kirchheimer’s lasting contributions to the field are 
found in his explorations of the significance of political trials beyond the question 
of deviation from the proper course of justice: his insistence that a liberal 
democracy is the proper home for a political trial with its irreducible risk and 
image-making function; his attribution of the possibility of political creativity 
within the traditional judicial sphere; and his nascent acknowledgment of what I 
formulate as one performative operations of a political trial.  
 
shklar: politics of a trial 
Published only three years after Kirchheimer’s somewhat tormented treatment of 
the Nuremberg trial, Legalism by Judith Shklar (1964) is astonishingly forthright 
about the matter, also situating it within a more general, if not as exhaustive, 
discussion about political trials. The main thrust of the book is an illuminating 
critique of what she refers to as legalism: the ethical attitude that equates moral 
conduct with rule following, and finds various concrete manifestations in 
philosophy, ideology and social institutions. Shklar’s discussion helps us 
understand that the traditional difficulty of thinking creatively and critically about 
political trials is one that is rooted in this widespread ideology, which posits law 
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and politics as mutually exclusive: law is seen as separate from political life, but 
also as superior to mere politics (8); law aims at justice while politics looks only to 
expediency; the former is neutral and objective while the latter is the unpredictable 
product of competing interests and ideologies, and so on (111). According to 
Shklar, the traditional adherents of legalism, ‘in their determination to preserve law 
from politics, fail to recognise that they too have made a choice among political 
values’ (8).  
Indeed, one of the most enlightening aspects of the book is its discussion of 
legalism as a particular political attitude, finding expression in policies 
domestically and internationally. Shklar conceptualises law itself as a political 
action. This, however, does not mean that every form of legal politics is legalistic – 
the question here is ‘what sort of politics can law maintain and reflect?’ (143-44). 
While affirmative of the political function of legalism, its ability to give rise to the 
sort of political climate in which judicial and other institutions flourish, Shklar is 
highly critical of the ideology’s inability to recognise its own function in these very 
terms, its constant denial of its own political contribution: ‘legalism as an ideology 
is too inflexible to recognise the enormous potentialities of legalism as a creative 
policy, but exhausts itself in intoning traditional pieties and principles which are 
incapable of realisation’ (112). For her, political trials in general and the 
Nuremberg trial in particular crystallise this paradox. 
Shklar notes that anyone who suggests that the judicial process is not the 
antithesis of politics, but just one form of political action among others will be 
accused of Vyshinskyism. Her retort is simple, and goes to the heart of the split in 
Kirchheimer’s discussion: ‘There’s politics and politics’ (143). In other words, the 
crux of the matter is not whether or not trials are political institutions, but rather 
what political values they serve (220). Her categorisation of political trials is based 
on the principle of legality, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali: 
there shall be no crime without law, and no punishment without a crime. With 
regards to this principle, she suggests that in a political trial either the law or the 
crime may be missing, or both may be present. Thus her three categories (152-53):  
1) there is law but no criminal act: legally innocent acts will be 
misinterpreted so as to seem criminal; 
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2) there is no law which designates the actual acts performed as criminal: 
laws may be invented on the spot or drawn by analogy, or rules (or their 
interpretation) may be so vague that virtually any public action can be 
construed to appear criminal; 
3) there is both law and criminal act: trials involving espionage, treason, 
sedition whereby the aim is the elimination of a specific sort of political 
enemy.  
After announcing the latter (which neatly corresponds to Kirchheimer’s category of 
classical political trials) as ‘the last and third possibility’, she goes on to state that 
‘There is, however, a very rare situation in which there is no law, no government, 
no political order, and people have committed acts so profoundly shocking that 
something must be done about them’ (153). This is her introduction of the 
Nuremberg trial into the discussion, as a political trial but an exceptional one that 
defies the closure of her own categorisation. Note that this initial formulation of the 
trial’s necessity in terms of the primacy of the atrocity in question echoes the 
devolvement in Kirchheimer’s discussion of the Nuremberg trial, where his 
inability to fully invest in the future of either ‘crimes against peace’, or ‘crimes 
against humanity’ had left him face to face with the atrocity, which in turn became 
the irreducible ground for the necessity of the legal proceedings. 
Analysing the Nuremberg trial in terms of how legalistic ideology and 
politics operated through it, she emphasises that the architects of the trial had to 
come up with various fictions in order to alleviate their own legalistic concerns. 
One such fiction was that an international legal system analogous to municipal law 
existed. Another was that the law was ‘there’ by virtue of various previous war 
conventions.21 And finally that the judgment was going to be an act within a legal 
system, enhancing the strength of that system, contributing to the future of 
international law (146-147). None of this is valid for Shklar. Her alternative verdict 
on the significance of the Nuremberg trial is as follows: As a great legalistic act, 
and insofar as it concerned itself with crimes against humanity, naming them for 
what they were, the trial could help the immediate future of Germany in its 
                                                
21 In the London Conference that produced the Charter for the IMT, Justice Jackson spoke of the 
task as one of ‘codification’.  
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ideological impact. Although the court lacked a strict legal justification, and 
although there wasn’t even a pseudo-legal basis for ‘crimes against humanity’, the 
trial was effective. By taking the form of a fairly executed exercise in legalism, it 
contributed to the legalistic ethos in Germany (151), specifically reinforcing the 
dormant legal consciousness, the traditional legalism of Germany’s professional 
and bureaucratic classes (156). More generally, ‘awakening the Germans to their 
past as a means of influencing their future political conduct’ (193) was of great 
importance in a context where the question of responsibility vis-à-vis crimes 
against humanity was a complicated one, given that Nazism was a well-adhered 
social movement.  
Therefore, in Shklar’s evaluation, based on not whether or not a trial is 
political, but what kind of politics it promotes, the Nuremberg trial as a political 
trial actually served liberal ends, promoting ‘legalistic values in such a way as to 
contribute to constitutional politics and to a decent legal system’ (145).22 Notably, 
none of the other political trials referred to in the book (the Tokyo trial, the 
Moscow trials, US v. Dennis, the trial of the Rosenbergs) are discussed in such 
terms, that is, as serving liberal ends. In fact, her conclusion concerning political 
trials in her ‘Epilogue’ to the book further emphasises Nuremberg as exception: In 
countries where constitutional politics prevail, the political trial ‘can only be a 
destructive device’. In a totalitarian system, political trials are ‘no better and no 
worse than the politics of such an order in general’. But ‘where there is no 
established law and order, in a political vacuum, political trials may be both 
unavoidable and constructive’ (220). 
Shklar’s understanding of ‘constructive’ is quite far from Kirchheimer’s 
sense of what the Nuremberg could have or may have achieved in its ‘constitutive’ 
capacity. For Shklar, the trial held no promise for the world peace to come, for the 
future of international law, or for possible transnational control on atrocities beyond 
the pale. In fact, Shklar prefaces her analysis of the Nuremberg trial by a 
masterfully tight critique of positivist philosophies of international law, where she 
                                                
22 A more contemporary version of Shklar’s argument is found in Osiel (1997) who advocates for 
the value of ‘monumental didactics’ of liberal show trials in the aftermath of administrative 
massacre. For Osiel the illiberal use of courts for liberal ends, particularly for influencing collective 
memory of historical episodes of atrocity, is fully justified.  
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dismantles projections of the ‘autogenesis’ of law on to the international sphere, 
and concludes that:  
Law does not by itself generate institutions, cause wars to end, or states to 
behave as they should. It does not create a community. Only the 
disingenuous misuse of the word ‘autogenesis’, allowing as it does the 
confusion of the validation of rules with their historic causes, origins, and 
force, can permit anyone to believe that law will create world society 
through operative judicial tribunals. (131) 
Nor is there any measure of cosmopolitan solace in the formulation of ‘crimes 
against humanity’ for Shklar. In her particular brand of ‘liberalism without 
illusions’ the performative element of the Nuremberg trial is confined to the 
immediate future of its immediate context: the best we could hope for the 
Nuremberg trial to have achieved is the reinstitution of legalism in Germany, in that 
it was an exercise in restoring order by means of an enactment of orderliness. 
Some of Shklar’s thinking in Legalism fails to follow through properly. What 
is promised as an exceptional take on political trials in general and the Nuremberg 
trial in particular ends up devolving into a discussion of Nuremberg as exception. 
That is, her suggestion that we look at what kind of politics is advanced in a 
political trial does not yield much except in its application to the Nuremberg trial. 
And yet, Shklar’s head-on address of the problem of political trials is nevertheless a 
refreshing intervention, even if only in terms of disrupting legalistic habits of 
thought. Her retort ‘there’s politics and politics’ cuts through some of the 
unnecessary knots that legalistic habits in approaching political trials can get us 
into. In this sense, it reflects back on Kirchheimer’s quandary, in which what 
remained unthought was precisely the shifts in the meaning of the political. The 
problem, however, is her specification of ‘the political’; in other words, it is 
difficult to work with Shklar’s criteria of evaluation without sharing her particular 
political position, which is a certain form of liberalism that takes democratic 
constitutionalism for granted. 
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arendt: a trial of one’s own 
Much of Kirchheimer’s sensibility about politics of trials in general, and 
Nuremberg in particular, including his suggestion that the trial may have signalled 
the feeble beginnings of a desirable transnational control over ‘crimes against 
humanity’, is shared by Hannah Arendt in her work on the 1961 Eichmann trial, 
which appeared in print first as a series of articles in The New Yorker in early 1963, 
and was published as a book entitled Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the 
Banality of Evil ([1963] 1994) in the following months. To argue that it is an 
authoritative contribution to the literature on political trials would be stretching it 
beyond recognition – Arendt’s report is focused on a single trial, it involves neither 
a general theory of political trials, nor even a section dedicated to the subject. But 
though it may not theorise political trials directly, it should nevertheless be read as 
an important address of the question, one that furthers our understanding of 
performative operations within the space of a political trial. Nor would this 
necessarily constitute an over-interpretation, a zealous ‘reading into’ the text of our 
own considerations: Arendt’s account of the trial is anchored by an acute 
understanding of a range of performative possibilities it held, what it could 
effectively constitute by means of its very enactment. Moreover, she had a vision as 
to the best ends this performative potential could serve, one that was at odds with 
both the calculations of the trial’s architects, and the court’s actual conclusions. Her 
so-called ‘report’ is in fact best read as a ‘retrial’, during the course of which she 
reorganises and supplements the evidence presented at the trial, provides her own 
responses to various legal concerns, and passes her own judgment on the trial.23 
Effectively, the report as retrial is the enactment of an alternative performative. 
To give a brief overview of the case: Nazi functionary Adolf Eichmann, 
responsible for overseeing the mass deportation of Jews to extermination camps in 
Eastern Europe, was abducted by Israeli secret service operatives from Argentina, 
where he had been living under a false identity. He was secretly transferred to 
Jerusalem to be tried under Israeli law for crimes committed against the Jewish 
people during World War Two. The affair sparked controversy internationally, and 
                                                
23 Notably, in an essay responding to the controversy caused by the book, Arendt referred to 
Eichmann in Jerusalem as ‘my “sitting in judgment”’ (2003: 22). 
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Israel’s right to try Eichmann was challenged on several legal bases, most 
importantly: the illegality of Eichmann’s abduction (that he was brought to Israel in 
violation of Argentina’s sovereignty); the problem of Israel’s territorial jurisdiction 
(Israel was to try Eichmann, who was not an Israeli citizen, for crimes committed 
outside Israel, against persons who were not Israeli citizens); the problem of 
retrospectivity (Israel was to try Eichmann under its Nazis and Nazi Collaborators 
[Punishment] Law of 1950 for crimes committed before the institution of the law, 
thereby flouting the principle of legality); and the issue of what could be referred to 
as ‘retrospective sovereignty’ that Israel was to try crimes that were committed 
before its own establishment (an interesting bridge between the criticism regarding 
territorial jurisdiction and the one regarding retrospectivity).24 However, Israeli 
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had made up his mind, the trial did happen and 
was quite a happening. For the first time in Israel’s brief legal history, cameras 
were allowed into the courtroom which rendered the trial an early international 
media event (Lahav 1992: 558). The hearings lasted four months, the court, after 
another four months of deliberation, convicted Eichmann on all charges and 
sentenced him to death. Both his appeal and plea for mercy were rejected, and 
Eichmann was hanged in May 1962. 
In an interview he gave to the New York Times, David Ben-Gurion was asked 
‘What do you hope to achieve by bringing Eichmann to trial?’. The diplomatic 
answer most appropriate in the midst of much controversy would perhaps have 
been something along the lines of ‘the truth concerning Adolf Eichmann’s liability 
for Nazi crimes’. Even a vague, unsubstantiated invocation of ‘Justice’ would 
perhaps suffice as a relatively uncontroversial answer to what the trial was 
supposed to achieve. But instead, Ben-Gurion took the bait and explained in detail 
what he aimed to achieve. First, he wanted to ‘establish before the nations of the 
world’ the evils of anti-Semitism: ‘They should know that anti-Semitism is 
dangerous and they should be ashamed of it’ – a warning to potential foes. Second, 
he wanted the Israeli youth, the generation who had grown up since the Holocaust, 
to know the most tragic facts in their history – state-sanctioned historiography. 
                                                
24 Baade (1961), Green (1960), Robinson (1960) and Rogat (1961: 23-32) provide in-depth 
discussions of these issues.  
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Third, he wanted to show the Jewish Diaspora that Judaism always faced a hostile 
world and only the establishment of a Jewish state had enabled the Jews to hit back 
– Zionist propaganda.25 And finally, the trial was to address Israel’s neighbours on 
its unhappy borders: ‘It may be that Eichmann’s trial will help to ferret out other 
Nazis, for example, the connection between Nazis and some Arab rulers’ – a threat 
to actual foes.26 As such, the trial was obviously a political trial of the convenience 
variety in Kirchheimer’s sense, meant to make images for a variety of public 
audiences.27  
One of the central narrative strategies that Hannah Arendt employs in her 
account of the trial is an adversarial set up, not between the prosecution and the 
defence as one would expect, but rather between the prosecutor and the judges. She 
accuses Attorney General Gideon Hausner of ‘love of showmanship’ (4), of 
enjoying ‘all the nice pleasures of putting oneself in the limelight’ (6), and ‘doing 
his best, his very best, to obey his master’, i.e. Ben-Gurion, described in turn as the 
‘invisible stage manager of the proceedings’ (5). On the other hand, the judges are 
‘unstudied’, ‘sober’ and ‘natural’, their responses ‘spontaneous and refreshing’ (4), 
serving ‘Justice as faithfully as Mr. Hausner serves the State of Israel’ (5). Attempts 
on Hausner’s part to turn the proceedings into a show trial that would suit Ben-
Gurion’s vision were to some extent neutralised by the sobriety of the judges, 
Arendt reports.  
Aside from problems of performance, she finds the prosecution’s case 
seriously flawed on a variety of bases. First, it was built ‘on what the Jews had 
suffered, not on what Eichmann had done’ (6). Hausner introduced an endless 
procession of survivors as witnesses, though their testimony on truly atrocious facts 
rarely ever implicated Eichmann. Arendt stresses, over and over again in her 
account, with what Shklar could see as a legalistic insistence, that the sole 
                                                
25 See Rogat (1961) for an intriguing critique of these three pedagogical aims of the trial.  
26 David Ben-Gurion, ‘The Eichmann Case as Seen by Ben-Gurion’, New York Times, 18 December 
1960: SM7, 62. 
27 In a telling anecdote, Arendt recounts how the prosecutor invited witness after witness to testify 
to the horrors that the Jewish people suffered in the Holocaust, without a view to whether the 
evidence presented had anything to do with the deeds of the accused. When the judges objected to 
irrelevant testimonies, the prosecutor would insist and plead with them to let him complete his 
‘general picture’. At one point, the presiding judge was pushed to exclaim ‘we are not drawing 
pictures here’ (Arendt [1963] 1994: 120). 
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legitimate concern of a criminal trial is to determine individual responsibility and 
punishment: ‘Justice demands that the accused be prosecuted, defended, and 
judged, and that all the other questions of seemingly greater import... be left in 
abeyance. Justice insists on the importance of Adolf Eichmann, son of Karl Adolf 
Eichmann’ (5). Second, the prosecutor misunderstood and misrepresented the 
novelty of the crime in question. Rather than recognising in it an entirely new type 
of criminality, directed at blotting out a whole ethnic group from the face of the 
earth, Hausner chose to contextualise it within the long history of anti-Semitism, 
beginning his opening address with Pharaoh in Egypt and Haman’s decree. Arendt 
ruled: ‘It was bad history and cheap rhetoric, worse, it was clearly at cross-purposes 
with putting Eichmann on trial, suggesting that perhaps he was only an innocent 
executor of some mysteriously foreordained destiny’ (19). Third, the prosecution’s 
case was flawed in its representation of the criminal in question, attempting to 
prove him a monster, an evil mastermind, ‘superior of Himmler and the inspirer of 
Hitler’ (211). Arendt’s response to this is her controversial ‘banality of evil’ 
formulation, which she explains as a profound inability to think for oneself, 
namely, from the standpoint of somebody else (48), living instead by borrowed 
clichés that are entirely devoid of reality (53). In addition to these substantive 
contentions, Arendt criticises the prosecution’s case on the basis of its own raison 
d’être. If the aim was to expose the full picture with regards to anti-Semitism and 
the Holocaust, they should have ventured into the complicity of ‘all German offices 
and authorities in the Final Solution – of all civil servants in the state ministries, of 
the regular armed forces, with their General Staff, of the judiciary, and of the 
business world’ (18), rather than being ‘so careful not to embarrass the Adenauer 
administration’ (119). And if it was to serve as a show trial, the prosecution’s case 
should have been properly stage-produced for one: ‘a show trial needs even more 
urgently than an ordinary trial a limited and well-defined outline of what was done 
and how it was done’ (9). 
From the first pages onward Arendt’s audacity is palpable, it is as if she’s 
saying, you have made a fine mess of this trial, let me show you how it is done. 
And indeed, she emerges in the text as a force to reckon with. In most part, 
Arendt’s so-called ‘report’ on the trial is effectively a ‘retrial’. She presents her 
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own prosecutorial case, in which she radically reorganises the evidence presented at 
the trial to specifically pinpoint Eichmann’s responsibility. She draws on evidence 
gathered by the authorities in the preparations for the trial but omitted by the 
prosecutor (such as the 3564-page German transcript of the autobiography that 
Eichmann ‘had spontaneously given the police examiner’ [235]), and she also 
supplements this with her own thorough background research, i.e. the legal, 
political and bureaucratic developments in Nazi Germany to situate Eichmann in 
his immediate milieu. As if that weren’t enough, and in a move that was to spark 
the greatest controversy, Arendt presents a case for the defence as well:  
The facts for which Eichmann was to hang had been established ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ long before the trial started, and they were generally 
known to all students of the Nazi regime. The additional facts that the 
prosecution tried to establish were, it is true, partly accepted in the 
judgment, but they would never have appeared to be ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ if the defence had brought its own evidence to bear upon the 
proceedings. Hence, no report on the Eichmann case, perhaps as 
distinguished from the Eichmann trial, could be complete without paying 
some attention to certain facts that are well enough known but that Dr. 
Servatius [defence counsel] chose to ignore. (56) 
This is how she introduces her discussion of Eichmann’s collaboration with Jewish 
functionaries and well-known Zionist leaders, devoting a substantial section to 
Jewish collaboration in the expulsion of the Jews from Germany before the war 
(56-67), and a separate discussion of Jewish collaboration in the ‘Final Solution’ 
(117-126).  
Consistent with the general form of her retrial disguised as a report, Arendt 
also provides her own judgment of Eichmann. She crafts it in response to a 
thorough analysis, and again, supplementation of the actual judgment passed by the 
District Court of Jerusalem: Arendt expresses her approval of the court’s refusal to 
follow the prosecutor’s ‘general pictures’, instead strictly addressing itself to 
weighing the charges brought against the accused (253-54). She also acknowledges 
the various difficulties the judges faced in handling certain aspects of the evidence 
(208-209, 219). Arendt then summarises the court’s response to the various 
objections brought to its jurisdiction point by point, and often unsatisfied by the 
court’s arguments, she provides, in detailed and lengthy arguments, her own 
justifications regarding jurisdictional concerns that have been posed (254-267). 
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This includes, among other feats, the jurisprudential dismantling of the passive 
personality principle which the actual judgment relied on (260-61), and a 
fascinating, if odd, reformulation of the principle of territoriality (262-63). Before 
formulating her own judgment on Adolf Eichmann, Arendt passes her verdict on 
the court’s judgment: the failure of the court, she explains, consisted in its not 
coming to grips with three fundamental issues (274). First of these was the problem 
of impaired justice in the court of the victors, which comes with the usual crisis of 
inequality between prosecution and defence in preparing for the trial (274-75). The 
second problem according to Arendt, was the court’s inability to provide a valid 
definition of the crimes against humanity (275) – a point I discuss in more detail 
below. Thirdly, the court failed to arrive at a clear recognition of the new criminal 
who commits this crime, who is ‘terribly and terrifyingly normal’ (276). 
Then in the final few pages of her epilogue, Arendt goes on to pass her own 
judgment on Eichmann, in a startling second person address, beginning with ‘You 
admitted that the crime committed against the Jewish people during the war was the 
greatest crime in recorded history, and you admitted your role in it’ (277-78).28 
Then, after various considerations concerning collective guilt, individual 
responsibility, the irrelevance of determining psychological disposition or motives, 
Arendt concludes her judgment and sentences Eichmann to hang:  
And just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share 
the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other 
nations –as though you and your superiors had any right to determine who 
should and who should not inhabit the world– we find that no one, that is, 
no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth 
with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang. (279)  
This stark address is Arendt’s substantiation of the notion of ‘crimes against 
humanity’, for which the judgment of the Jerusalem court could not provide a valid 
definition in her opinion. In focusing primarily on ‘crimes against the Jewish 
people’, the court failed to recognise in the crimes that Eichmann was accused of, 
an unprecedented crime, different from known crimes not only in degree of 
                                                
28 Judith Butler (2012: 151-180) provides an intriguing reading of Arendt’s judgment on Eichmann, 
emphasising its performative aspect and highlighting what I identify in terms of ‘retrial’, albeit 
solely with regard to the eventual moment of judgment: ‘Something is being written and displayed 
in a book. The book of justice is being written and shown in Arendt’s own text’ (161). 
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seriousness but also in essence (267). Arendt bases her interpretation of crimes 
against humanity on the now traditional, albeit ‘modern’, conception of criminal 
law, whereby a crime is first and foremost a breach of the law of the community. A 
criminal proceeding, therefore, is not carried out in the name of the victim, but in 
the name of the community whose law has been breached. Criminal justice is aimed 
at restoring order to the community, rather than enacting vengeance for the victim 
(261). Crimes against humanity are crimes against the human condition of diversity 
and plurality for Arendt, precisely because the desire to disappear a people from the 
face of the earth is an attack upon ‘human diversity as such, that is, upon a 
characteristic of the “human status” without which the very words “mankind” or 
“humanity” would be devoid of meaning’ (269). Therefore, the crime of murder 
and the crime of genocide are not of the same order, ‘the point of the latter is that 
an altogether different order is broken and an altogether different community is 
violated’ (272).  
In one sense, the very formulation of ‘crimes against humanity’ becomes the 
performative foundation of this ‘altogether different community’. The necessity to 
address the atrocity, an unprecedented form of political violence and an 
unprecedented crime, through law, results in the performative production of not 
only the law that retrospectively censures the atrocity as crime, but also of the 
community which the law is understood to stem from. In other words, it is the 
crime in its novelty that produces the law and the community, but law’s dynamics 
of performativity can allow it to cast this entire operation as its own. This is why, as 
part of this discussion, Arendt argues that the only proper court to try these crimes 
is an international criminal court, in the absence of which the Israeli authorities 
could have called for one upon capturing Eichmann, or they could have rendered 
the court in Jerusalem an international one. According to Arendt, another option 
altogether was that after the District Court of Jerusalem passed its judgment and 
sentenced Eichmann, Israel could have waived its right to carry out the sentence, 
turning instead to the United Nations to ‘make trouble’ by ‘asking again and again 
just what it should do with this man whom it was holding prisoner; constant 
repetition would have impressed on worldwide public opinion the need for a 
permanent international criminal court’ (270). The repetition of such a demand 
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would potentially result in the performative production of such a court and with it 
the ‘altogether different order’ and ‘altogether different community’.29  
What Arendt does not analyse in her report is the performative that the 
court’s judgment did manage to enact, though she seems to have been well aware of 
it. This was the performative institution of Israel as the indisputable representative 
of world Jewry.30 Here is how it went: In the judgment, the District Court of 
Jerusalem states that its jurisdiction is based on a dual foundation. The first is 
Israel’s right and, it is argued, obligation under international law, to try Eichmann 
due to the universal character of the crimes in question. The second is Israel’s right 
based on the specific character of these crimes as being designed to exterminate the 
Jewish people. With regards to the latter, the judgment quotes two authorities on 
the necessity to establish a close and definite connection between the crime and the 
prosecutor: Hyde and Dahm. Hyde wrote:  
In order to justify the criminal prosecution by a State of an alien on 
account of an act committed and consummated by him in a place outside of 
its territory... it needs to be established that there is a close and definite 
connection between that act and the prosecutor. (qtd. in DCJ 1962: 810)  
Dahm stated: ‘Penal jurisdiction is not a matter for everyone to exercise. There 
must be a “linking point”, a legal connection that links the punisher with the 
punished’ (qtd. in DCJ 1962: 829). The judgment then links these arguments to 
Grotius’ views on the right to punish (830):  
Grotius holds that the very commission of the crime creates a legal 
connection between the offender and the victim, and one that vests in the 
victim the right to punish the offender or demand his punishment. 
According to natural justice the victim may himself punish the offender.  
Then the judgment explains that these were crimes committed against the Jewish 
people and argues that ‘if there is an effective link (and not necessarily an identity) 
between the State of Israel and the Jewish people, then a crime intended to 
                                                
29 Repetition is a key element of performativity in Judith Butler’s conceptualisation, as I discuss in 
the next chapter. 
30 Cf. Rogat (1961: 16-17): ‘By trying Eichmann, and thus stressing crimes against Jews, instead of, 
or at least in addition to, crimes against humanity as a whole, Israel also took for granted its 
leadership of world Jewry and its right to speak for all Jews. And it simultaneously said, even to the 
most emancipated Diaspora Jew, “We’re doing this for you, and in your name. You will be regarded 
as involved in the trial. You have to think about and take up a position about your Jewishness”.’  
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exterminate the Jewish people has a very striking connection with the State of 
Israel’ (831). What is the effective link between Israel and the Jewish people? The 
judgment tells us that it ‘needs no explanation’: 
The State of Israel was established and recognised as the State of the Jews. 
The proclamation of 14 May 1948 opens with the words: ‘It was in the 
land of Israel that the Jewish people was born,’ dwells on the history of the 
Jewish people from ancient times until the Second World War, refers to the 
Resolution of the UN assembly of 29 December 1947 which demands the 
establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz Israel, determines ‘the natural right 
of the Jewish people to be, like every other people, self-governing, in its 
sovereign State’. (ibid.)  
They conclude: 
It would appear that there is hardly need for any further proof of the very 
obvious connection between the Jewish people and the State of Israel: this 
is the sovereign State of the Jewish people. (ibid.) 
Note the language of self-evidence: to argue the ‘very obvious’ connection that 
‘needs no explanation’ the judgment refers to Israel’s foundational document, the 
Proclamation, which as a performative foundation itself constitutively depends on 
this same logic of self-evidence (cf. Derrida 2002b). So the sole foundation given 
for establishing this obvious, self-evident link between the State of Israel and the 
Jewish people is a pure performative.  
Arendt does not discuss this particular operation of the trial in these terms, 
though she does mention that Israel regarded any calls for an international tribunal 
for Eichmann as a belittlement of its sovereignty: 
for Israel the only unprecedented feature of the trial was that, for the first 
time (since the year 70, when Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans), 
Jews were able to sit in judgment on crimes committed against their own 
people, that, for the first time, they did not need to appeal to others for 
protection and justice, or fall back upon the compromised phraseology of 
the rights of man – rights which, as no one knew better than they, were 
claimed only by people who were too weak to defend their ‘rights of 
Englishmen’ and to enforce their own laws. (271) 
For Arendt this constitutes a fundamental misunderstanding of the substance of 
‘crimes against humanity’, and the Israeli authorities’ inability to grasp the promise 
that a proper address of such crimes could hold for the future, even if the address 
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must be formulated in ideal terms. She notes that this trial will therefore be no 
precedent, even though there is a definite need for one, because once the 
unprecedented (i.e. genocide) has appeared, it may become a precedent for the 
future, thereby necessitating a proper address. Had the Eichmann trial staged the 
performative that Arendt envisioned (and enacted in her text), by calling into being 
an international tribunal and/or by properly substantiating crimes against humanity, 
it would have served as such a foundation. I would slightly amend her position to 
say that the Israeli position is better read in terms of neither misunderstanding, nor 
the ‘inability to grasp’ but rather a competing performative that does effectively 
function as a foundation, though not for what Arendt had envisioned.  
It has been argued (Felman 2002, Douglas 2001) that Arendt’s approach to 
the Eichmann trial is properly legalistic in Shklar’s sense, that her insistence on the 
strict separation of the legal and the extralegal within the space of the trial, her 
obstinate definition of the scope of the trial in terms of doing justice to the accused 
and nothing else, was a sign of her inability to grasp the other significant functions 
the trial served. I believe this approach misses the point. Arendt is in fact fully 
aware of the limitations of a legalistic approach to the problem at hand,31 as well as 
the various dimensions of the ‘political’ at stake, including her own political vision. 
Her argument in favour of strict adherence to procedural concerns in the 
proceedings is not an argument for closing the legal form onto itself. On the 
contrary, it is for grounding what is novel on a solid platform, in other words, for 
allowing innovation where no precedent exists, precisely on the basis of adherence 
to certain other formal precedents. In this sense, Arendt’s contribution can be read 
as a full appreciation of how a performative functions in J. L. Austin’s sense, as I 
discuss in detail in the next chapter: certain conventions have to be in place for a 
performative to be felicitous.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
31 In the first letter she wrote from Jerusalem to Karl Jaspers, she complained about the prosecutor’s 
‘overly legalistic’ argument, which was ‘full of nonexistent precedents, on which the prosecutor 
focuses instead of stressing the unprecedentedness of the case’ (Arendt and Jaspers 1992: 434). 
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between atrocity & performativity  
Though Kirchheimer, Shklar, and Arendt shared the same milieu, read and 
referenced one another’s works, and exchanged letters, the style and substance of 
their approach to the question of political trials could not be more varied. 
Kirchheimer’s historical and theoretical rigor is complemented by sober caution in 
his writing, lending the work an authoritative and principled credibility that may 
camouflage the deep ambiguity of his evaluation of the Nuremberg trial. In contrast 
to Kirchheimer’s troubles around the admissibility of political concerns in a trial, 
Shklar’s work is marked by the ease of a sceptical distance that refuses to invest in 
what holds out a promise for both of the other writers: the future of international 
law vis-à-vis crimes against humanity. Her conclusions may not be very tight on 
every point, but Shklar’s critique is invaluable in that it helps us to be attuned to the 
more legalistic undercurrents in existing thinking on political trials, accounting for 
some of the tension in Kirchheimer’s discussion of the Nuremberg trial. Arendt’s 
work on the Eichmann trial, on the other hand, is a thorough research project 
disguised as a journalistic report, marked by an acutely incisive, daring and fast-
paced wit, clarity of vision, and precision of argument. It is a record of not only 
what happened at the trial, but also of what should have happened. Arendt rectifies 
omissions in legal argument, evidence, and the scope of the trial, effectively 
providing us with a retrial, with no pretence of modesty. The book is important for 
understanding political trials in what it does as much as in what it says.  
Taken together, these three works constitute a crucial moment in thinking 
about political trials. The imperative to think and to think well is an almost tangible 
aspect in each of these works, concerned as they are with one form of doing justice 
in the face of thought defying atrocities, namely the legal response to the deeds of 
the Nazi regime. The urgency becomes even more manifest as each writer 
acknowledges in his or her own way the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of 
properly addressing the atrocities within the legal idiom. Each legal formulation of 
the Nuremberg trial falls to pieces in Kirchheimer’s hands, who still feels obliged 
to confirm the moral and historical necessity of the operation. ‘There are no 
civilised responses that are fitting,’ Shklar admits, ‘and certainly no legal norms 
that can cope with what the Nazis did to Europe’ (167). ‘The Nazi crimes, it seems 
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to me,’ Arendt wrote to Jaspers in 1946, ‘explode the limits of the law’ (Arendt and 
Jaspers 1992: 54). 
Kirchheimer’s hesitation and Shklar’s scepticism about legal innovation may 
point to the limitations of their thought in the face of an unprecedented form of 
political violence. In other words, atrocity serves as a limit to critique in their 
accounts of the politics of political trials. On the other hand, it seems to me that 
Arendt’s thought strove to precisely go beyond the atrocity. It is significant in this 
sense that her often quoted exclamation about Nazi crimes exploding the limits of 
the law, which I have quoted here as well, was a private thought communicated to a 
friend, rather than one elaborated in public writings. And when she did invoke this 
thought again in a public essay she wrote in 1964, she couched it in the past tense:  
At the time the horror itself, in its naked monstrosity, seemed not only to 
me but to many others to transcend all moral categories and to explode all 
standards of jurisdiction. (Arendt 2003: 23) 
The frustration we read in Arendt’s work on the Eichmann trial is thus the 
frustration of one who has identified a direction for legal innovation to go beyond 
the ‘speechless horror’ before the atrocity, a horror ‘in which one learns nothing’ 
(ibid), only to find a more parochial performative operation at work in the trial, 
indexed to the atrocity in pursuit of less worthy political aims. 
We can easily trace the influence of Kirchheimer, Shklar and Arendt in later 
writings on political trials, particularly in the works of liberal thinkers who attempt 
to formulate, and in some cases advocate for the politics of trials beyond 
considerations of expediency.32 The point of departure that Kirchheimer, Shklar 
and Arendt provide for this thesis is somewhat different. As my foregoing 
discussion suggests, I am particularly interested in the incipient formulation of the 
performative operations of trials that we find in these three works, which allows a 
particularly keen thinking of the politics of political trials. Kirchheimer’s 
recognition of the ability of law to enact its own foundations into being is an 
apprehension of both the promise and the threat of the performativity of law, which 
                                                
32 Cf. Osiel (1997), Teitel (2000), Douglas (2001), Felman (2002), Bilsky (2004, 2010) among 
others. See my Conclusion for a brief discussion of the more problematic contemporary liberal 
uptakes of the 1960s critical work on political trials.  
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explains something about his cautious hesitation.33 Arendt’s insistence on 
substantiating the notion of ‘crimes against humanity’ so as to reformulate 
humanity as legal community, and her critique of the parochial nationalism 
operative in the Eichmann trial displays a similar awareness of the performative 
promises and threats of a political trial. Notably, Shklar departs from the positions 
taken by the other two concerning the key performative function of the political 
trial, in refusing to ‘believe that law will create world society through operative 
judicial tribunals’ (131), a belief that she attributes to legalism. However, the 
performative potential she does recognise is noteworthy in itself, as it brings the 
question of performance and enactment into play. Her idea that legalistic rituals like 
the Nuremberg trials will reanimate Germany’s legalistic culture resembles the 
structure of ideological conversion that Slavoj Žižek (1989: 38) formulates with 
reference to Blaise Pascal: go through the motions of faith, and the faith will come. 
In Shklar’s understanding, the performance of the trial itself was going to 
performatively recreate the culture of legalism that was destroyed during the Nazi 
era.  
In the next two chapters, I attempt to further develop the insights that 
Kirchheimer, Shklar and Arendt offer into the dynamics of performativity in 
political trials. In doing so, I primarily turn not to the literature on political trials, 
but rather to theories of performativity, beginning with the work of ordinary 
language philosopher J.L. Austin who coined the term ‘performative’. Notably, 
Austin was a contemporary of Kirchheimer, Shklar and Arendt’s. Most of Austin’s 
important work on performative utterances were published contemporaneously with 
the three works I have discussed here, immediately after his early death in 1960. 
But even if these political theorists may have had access to the vocabulary of 
performativity, it was only after the uptake of Austin’s theory by poststructuralist 
thinkers that performativity began to yield its fruits as a grammar of thought that is 
particularly valuable for studying law, politics and their intersections. Nevertheless, 
just as we can read performativity into Kirchheimer, Arendt, and Shklar’s work on 
political trials in retrospect, so too we can read a preoccupation with the politico-
juridicial into Austin’s theory of performativity, as I discuss in detail in the next 
                                                
33 Cf. Felman (2003: 12-13): ‘Now, threats, too, constitute a sort of negative promise’. 
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chapter. In that sense Austin’s keen interest in how things were done with words in 
law foreshadows later poststructuralist inquiries into the performativity of the 
juridical. In the next chapter I attempt to tease out the significance of the overlap 
between theories of performativity and critical legal thought for studying political 
trials.  
  
 
 
2 
performativity, performance, political trials 
 
You are more than entitled to know what the word 
‘performative’ means. It is a new word and an ugly word, 
and perhaps it does not mean anything very much. But at 
any rate there is one thing in its favour, it is not a profound 
word. 
J. L. Austin (1970: 233) 
 
 
 
 
English analytic philosopher J. L. Austin’s term ‘performative’ has been revised, 
rethought, rearticulated and reworked in various ways since its coinage, not only by 
his successors in that same tradition of philosophy such as John R. Searle and 
Jerrold Katz, but also, and much more influentially for critical theory, by Jacques 
Derrida, Shoshana Felman, Judith Butler, and Eve Sedgwick among others. It 
would not be an exaggeration to say that the term has had an eventful history as the 
subject and scene of some polemic and controversy – I have in mind, for example, 
the exchange between Derrida and Searle in Glyph, and the various outraged 
responses to Butler’s reworking of the term for gender theory. Then again, a certain 
amount of intimacy with theories of performativity begets the sense that there is 
something quite outrageous about the notion itself. Felman (2003) has masterfully 
traced this ‘scandal’ as already part and parcel of not only Austin’s coinage but also 
the very style of his thought. I endeavour here to bring something of that scandal to 
bear on our understanding of political trials. This chapter and the next are intended 
to explore the grounds and potentials of this transference.  
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I begin the chapter with a brief introduction to Austin’s theory of 
performative utterances. Intriguingly for the purposes of this thesis, a close reading 
of his investigation of the performative reveals a stark opposition between the 
status in his theory of theatrical uses of language on the one hand, and that of legal 
uses of language on the other. Austin clearly devalues the theatrical while elevating 
legal uses of language over and above ordinary language, his main object of study. 
This privileged status of the legal field with regards to performativity, Austin’s 
preoccupation with how things are done with words in law, and his fascination with 
legal language to the point of making something of a fetish of it is quite significant, 
especially given that later philosophical work, such as by Derrida and Butler have 
also worked with the notion of performativity to articulate something about law. 
Indeed, as Derrida has noted, ‘the juridical is at work in the performative’ (2000: 
467). My take on Austin’s term and its implicit challenge to think the operations of 
the juridical anew is to explore what theories of performativity may teach us about 
political trials and also, trials in general. In one sense, this is an attempt to build on 
the insights that Otto Kirchheimer, Judith Shklar and Hannah Arendt’s work on 
political trials afford with regards to their performative operations, but one that 
relies on a thorough engagement with theories of performativity to tease out more 
fully their relevance for understanding legal proceedings. The argument here goes 
beyond the question of how performative speech acts are utilised, feature or figure 
in trials. Instead I am interested in demonstrating that performativity as a model for 
configuring and understanding the relationship between value and fact, force and 
convention, being and appearance, linguisticity and materiality can help us 
understand how political trials function, somewhere between sovereignty and 
legality, politics and (in)justice. 
The questions of performance and performativity are often intertwined in a 
political trial, presenting themselves as coupled and at times indistinguishable. I 
attempt to formulate an explanation for this coupling by rethinking their relation as 
they overlap in the trial. Here the importance of conventionality for the theory of 
performativity, and the inclination of performatives to masquerade as constatives 
serve as key. Reading Butler’s conceptualisation of conventionality as a sedimented 
historicity alongside Derrida and Costas Douzinas’ formulations of the 
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performativity of law, I propose that the embodied conventions of the trial bolster 
the masquerade whereby its performative operations masquerade as constatives, 
allowing law to operate as if it were fate. Political trials lay bare the performative 
operations that are more difficult to discern in ordinary trials. 
 
introducing the performative: fetishes & parasites 
Coined by J. L. Austin, the term ‘performative’ takes centre stage in his William 
James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955, posthumously edited and 
published as How To Do Things With Words (1975). That this volume has come to 
serve as the definitive resource for Austin’s speech act theory is somewhat curious, 
for the work is not quite conclusive and certainly not as clearly articulated as those 
that Austin himself prepared for publication. The lectures begin with his famous 
distinction between constative and performative utterances, the former being the 
classical ‘statement’ of analytic philosophy, describing some state of affairs or 
stating facts, either truly or falsely. Performative utterances, on the other hand, will 
be seen to be actions in themselves when looked at closely, even though they may 
be initially mistaken for statements. They do not describe, report or constate 
anything, but rather enact in their very utterance, the reality they purport to 
describe. Austin’s classic examples include ‘I do’ (as uttered in the course of a 
marriage ceremony), ‘I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow’, ‘I promise I will be 
there’, and so on. In this sense, the immediate referent of a performative utterance 
does not exist outside or prior to itself –although importantly, its frame of reference 
does– nor is the performative utterance the outward expression, report or sign of an 
inward spiritual act (1975: 10); the utterance does rather than describes, producing 
or transforming a situation. Consequently, performatives cannot really be said to be 
true or false, even though they may fail or succeed in other respects. To such failure 
or success Austin refers in terms of the ‘infelicity’ or ‘felicity’ of an utterance.  
Therefore instead of truth-conditions, performatives have conditions of 
felicity, which Austin sets out in six rules (14-15). The first rule concerns the 
existence of a conventional procedure that allows the performative to do what it 
does. The second rule is about the appropriateness of the persons invoking the 
procedure and of the circumstances in which the procedure is invoked. The third 
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and fourth rules concern the execution of the procedure: ‘it must be executed by all 
participants both correctly and completely’ (15). The fifth and sixth rules have to 
do with thoughts, feelings and the follow-up actions of the participants in the 
procedure. Austin discusses these six rules under the rubric of ‘the doctrine of the 
Infelicities’ and provides a thorough categorisation of potential failure: breaches of 
the first four rules constitute ‘misfires’ and that of the last two rules ‘abuses’. A 
‘misfire’ can be a ‘misinvocation’ (rules 1 and 2), or a misexecution (rules 3 and 4), 
and so on. 
Austin lays out the hazardous path of performativity in such detail that his 
categories of failure eventually begin to overflow their boundaries. Midway into the 
lectures he goes on to undo the clean-cut constative/performative distinction by 
considering in what way some infelicities that are proper to performatives can also 
afflict the constatives, and in turn, how performatives can be said to be true or false 
in certain ways. Timothy Gould (1995) incisively interprets this particular move in 
Austin as a strategy 
to drag the fetish of true and false into the same swamp of assessment and 
judgement in which we find the dimension of happiness and unhappiness 
that afflicts our performative utterances (...) to seduce us away from the 
reassurances of that dichotomy into a larger appreciation of the common 
miseries of utterance – whether constative or performative. (23-24) 
Indeed, towards the end of his lectures, Austin does confess a desire to ‘play Old 
Harry with two fetishes which I admit to an inclination to play Old Harry with, viz. 
1) the true/false fetish, 2) the value/fact fetish’ (151). Thus the performative/ 
constative distinction is put aside in favour of seeking ‘more general families of 
related and overlapping speech acts’ (150). Using the tripartite classification of the 
locutionary as the act of saying something, the illocutionary as the act in saying 
something, and the perlocutionary as the act by saying something, Austin attempts 
to formulate the beginnings of a new doctrine pertaining to all the possible forces of 
utterances, or as he puts it elsewhere, of ‘what one is doing in saying something, in 
all the sense of that ambiguous phrase’ (1963: 33). But rather than entirely fulfilling 
this promise in How To Do Things With Words, he suffices with a preliminary 
classification of verbs with regards to their potential force in speech acts.  
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Instrumentalised thus as a provisional category to ‘clear up some mistakes in 
philosophy’ (1970: 252) and later suspended as an ultimately untenable designation 
by its coiner himself, the term ‘performative’ has nevertheless gained quite a lot of 
currency in theoretical jargon ever since. Interestingly, one often encounters it in a 
forgetfulness or disavowal of its origins in ordinary language philosophy, instead 
used merely as the adjectival form of ‘performance’, to refer to something like 
‘theatrical’. That ‘performative’ of all terms is afflicted with such forgetting of 
origins is something of a philosophical irony.1 The shift in usage may have to do 
with the term’s reinterpretation in performance studies through the prioritisation of 
embodied behaviour over language. Nevertheless, it is important to critically reflect 
on what Andrew Parker and Eve Sedgwick (1995: 1) have identified as ‘one of the 
most fecund, as well as the most under-articulated’ areas in theoretical writings 
around performativity: ‘the oblique intersection between performativity and the 
loose cluster of theatrical practices, relations and traditions known as performance’. 
As I hope to show in this chapter, the trial proves a particularly rich object of study 
for exploring this intersection between performativity and performance, especially 
when we take as our point of departure an insistence on the distinction between the 
two terms. 
The conflation of the performative with the theatrical is one that Austin 
would have taken issue with, as indicated by the few appearances that theatre 
makes in How To Do Things With Words. For example, before going on to detail 
the myriad ways in which a performative utterance can be infelicitous, he remarks, 
by way of a methodological exclusion (22):  
…a performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow 
or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or 
spoken in soliloquy. This applies in a similar manner to any and every 
utterance–a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such 
circumstances is in special ways –intelligibly– used not seriously, but in 
ways parasitic upon its normal use–ways which fall under the doctrine of 
the etiolations of language. All this we are excluding from consideration.  
                                                
1 Cf. Shoshana Felman (2003: 44): ‘the very performance of the performative consists precisely in 
performing the loss of footing: it is the performance of the loss of the ground’ (44); or Jacques 
Derrida (1988: 12): ‘What would a mark be that could not be cited? Or one whose origins would not 
get lost along the way?’ 
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We encounter this off-hand reference to theatrical and other recitational 
performance then and again in the work, always as an example of the ‘non-serious’, 
‘parasitic’ uses of language. Notably, the theatrical here is a very limited 
designation, referring to actors on stage, playing parts, reciting lines. Parker and 
Sedgwick call attention to the world of associations evoked by Austin’s choice of 
the word ‘etiolation’: 
What’s so surprising, in a thinker otherwise strongly resistant to moralism, 
is to discover the pervasiveness with which the excluded theatrical is 
hereby linked with the perverted, the artificial, the unnatural, the abnormal, 
the decadent, the effete, the diseased. (5) 
Indeed, here the age-old ‘antitheatrical prejudice’ (Barish 1981) seems to be in full 
swing, even if Austin’s lectures are peppered with references to Greek tragedy and 
Shakespeare. A close reading of Austin’s oft-cited passage reveals, however, that it 
is not necessarily theatre per se that he finds it necessary to exclude from 
consideration, but citational uses of language more generally. Further, Austin’s 
seeming ascription of an ontological privilege to non-citational uses of language2 
may also be read as a strategic move, since the greater part of his project, his 
thorough and entertaining discussion of infelicities, involves the exploration of how 
such ‘serious’ uses of language can be hollow in their own particular ways. So it is 
as if the ‘non-serious’ theatrical or citational is excluded so as to be able to better 
highlight the failures of utterances that populate the higher rungs of Austin’s 
hierarchy.  
When we look for a wider sense of performance as embodied practice, we 
find that Austin pays some, though fleeting, attention to it. He glosses over the 
importance of tone of voice, cadence and emphasis in making utterances (1975: 
74); as well as gestures accompanying the utterance of words such as winks, 
pointings, shruggings and frowns (76), but there is hardly any ‘performativity’ 
attributed to such bodily functions. Their significance is reduced to the speech 
situation, mentioned only in their immediate and direct relation to speech acts, 
                                                
2 One of the key matters that Derrida (1988) takes issue with in his reading of Austin is precisely 
this distinction (and thus hierarchy) that Austin introduces between citational and non-citational 
utterances. Derrida flags that all language is citational, and that citationality is the very condition of 
iterability. I discuss Derrida’s take on Austin in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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which remain at the centre of his inquiry. Even then, Austin does not offer a 
discussion, not even for characteristic humorous effect, of situations where the 
bodily performances accompanying an utterance may reverse or nullify the latter’s 
performative force. The potential for such performance related ruptures in contexts 
of convention will be relevant for considering the overlap between performativity 
and performance in the scene of a trial, as I discuss in Chapter 3. 
 
juridifying the performative: the scene of law 
H.L.A. Hart, speaking of Austin as a colleague and friend in an interview he gave 
in 1988, said ‘he was naturally interested in law. He would have made a formidable 
QC’ (Hart and Sugarman 2005: 273).3 Indeed, reading Austin, one gets a palpable 
sense of how intrigued he must have been by legal uses of language. He explicitly 
acknowledges the insights that legal language affords into ordinary language, in his 
essay on excuses4: ‘it is a perpetual and salutary surprise to discover how much is 
to be learned from the law’ (1970:188). The categories, distinctions and precautions 
Austin finds in law’s idiom afford him a certain analytic clarity which he draws on 
to explore the workings of ordinary language, including the role, function and 
problems of performative utterances: ‘Examples are more easily seen in the law; 
they are naturally not so definite in ordinary life, where allowances are made’ 
(1975: 36). Many such remarks throughout the lectures gesture towards law as a 
kind of solid ground, as opposed to the ‘boggy’ consistency of ordinary language in 
which Austin finds himself ‘floundering’.5 Hart, who admits to being 
‘tremendously impressed’ by Austin’s work on performatives and cites him among 
the primary sources of influence for his brand of legal positivism,6 recognised this 
                                                
3 The two men were in close contact from 1945 when Hart took up a position in Philosophy at 
Oxford University where Austin was a major force to reckon with. Hart was immediately drawn into 
Austin’s circle, attending his weekly seminars for ‘philosophy hacks’, and later jointly teaching 
seminars with him on a variety of topics (Lacey 2006). 
4 This he deems a topic ‘both contentious and practically important for everybody, so that ordinary 
language is on its toes: yet also, on its back it has long had a bigger flea to bite it, in the shape of the 
Law’ (1970: 185-86).  
5 See Sedgwick (2003: 16-17), for her elegant discussion of the language of texture in Austin. 
6 The influence of Austin’s speech act theory in Hart’s first academic paper (1949) is almost 
tangible from the first sentences onward. Hart accounts for this influence further in the introduction 
to his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (1983: 2-3). In turn, it has been suggested that the 
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clearly when he stated that in Austin’s idea of performative utterances, ‘the law 
came into its own’ (Hart and Sugarman 2005: 274).  
Thus, if theatrical and other citational uses of language are relegated to the 
status of parasite in Austin’s paradigm, legal uses of language come across as 
particularly privileged. Austin recognises that ‘many of the “acts” which concern 
the jurist are or include the utterance of performatives’ (19). He further notes that 
the legal profession is particularly attuned to the peculiarities of the performative 
(19), ready with a terminology to cope with them (24), and takes special 
precautions to avoid the many varieties of infelicity to which such speech acts are 
exposed (22). Austin draws some of his most felicitous examples of the 
performative from legal scenarios. Further, the primacy of legal language in 
Austin’s project survives the abandonment of the performative/constative scheme. 
In his later tripartite classification of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary 
force of utterances, Austin chooses to focus mostly on the illocutionary. An 
illocutionary act is the force of an utterance in saying something, so this category is 
the new counterpart of the earlier definition of performative utterances. By way of 
an explication, Austin provides a list of verbs that, when used in the first person 
singular present indicative active form, have explicit illocutionary force.7 A quick 
glance at this list indicates how many of the conventional utterances that are 
quintessential to law and legal proceedings include verbs with explicit illocutionary 
force: acquit, convict, find (as a matter of fact), hold (as a matter of law), appoint, 
dismiss, order, command, sentence, fine, pardon, plead, press, quash, annul, repeal, 
and the list goes on (1975: 153-63). Austin classifies such verbs under five 
categories, the first three of which are primarily used in legal language: verdictives 
‘typified by the giving of a verdict, as the name implies, by a jury, arbitrator or 
                                                                                                                                   
influence was mutual: ‘Herbert’s legal input to seminars with Austin almost certainly contributed to 
the latter’s development of his famous “speech act theory”’(Lacey 2006: 145). Although Austin 
himself dates the origins of his speech act theory to 1939 (1975: vi), that is, six years before meeting 
Hart, the recurrent references to the law in How To Do Things With Words and an explicit 
acknowledgment of Hart in a footnote for providing the term ‘operative’ (as in, ‘operative clause’) 
as the possible legal counterpart of the performative, do point to a fruitful exchange. 
7 These verbs in this mode (first person singular present indicative active) also yield what Austin 
had defined earlier as the explicit performative. When I am not referring to Austin’s particular 
discussion and classifications, I use illocutionary speech act and performative utterances 
interchangeably in the rest of this discussion. 
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umpire’; exertives, ‘the exercising of powers, rights, or influence’; and 
commissives ‘typified by promising or otherwise undertaking’ (150).  
Hence at first glance, law seems to be a fertile resource for many of Austin’s 
examples, utilised liberally for purposes of illustration. But upon more careful 
reading, it becomes clear that law for Austin actually serves as a privileged order of 
language vis-à-vis performativity. The evaluative scheme that Austin identifies for 
determining the force of these utterances corroborates this interpretation. If we 
recall the doctrine of the infelicities, according to Austin, the felicity of a 
performative utterance depends primarily on the existence of an accepted 
conventional procedure, the appropriateness of the circumstances for invoking such 
procedure, whether the person invoking the procedure has the genuine authority to 
do so in the given circumstances, and whether the procedure is executed by all 
participants correctly and completely (14-15). So already in this initial evaluative 
configuration, it is as if we find ourselves in a scene of law. In detailing 
conventionality, circumstances and authority as conditions of felicity, Austin 
predictably draws his examples from law, but chooses unusual ones: When he 
discusses the question of convention, he invokes the practice of talaq in Islamic 
law, namely a husband’s ability to effect a divorce by repeatedly pronouncing ‘I 
divorce you’ (27). In attempting to clarify the issue of authority, Austin makes an 
interesting allusion to social contract theory (29). And when he explains the 
possible mismatch between convention and circumstance, he does so with reference 
to how lawyers work with the notion of precedent (32).  
While law serves as a key paradigm for Austin’s conceptualisation of the 
performative, his work has in turn been utilised in legal studies, albeit not very 
extensively. In addition to H.L.A. Hart, a relatively early uptake is by the Swedish 
jurist Karl Olivecrona (1962) who advocated for a critical approach to legal 
language that could capture the fact that it does not mirror reality but shape it, and 
discussed legal performatives as part of his analysis. In later work, Olivecrona 
(1971) coined the term ‘performatory imperatives’ for conceptualising certain 
performative legal formulations as imperatives without addressee. Further, 
Olivecrona understood performative utterances as ‘the language of magic’ (1962: 
175) and thus as providing a clue for the historical link between the modern 
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languages of law and ancient law’s magical formulae (1971: 231). Another 
Scandinavian legal realist, Alf Ross, also engaged with Austin’s work on speech 
acts, most extensively in an article entitled ‘The Rise and Fall of the Doctrine of 
Performatives’ (1972) where he proposed to replace the term ‘performative’ by 
‘normative’, and to bring a definition of ‘legal acts’ and ‘conventional acts’ under 
this new concept of ‘normative acts’.  
Later utilisations of Austin’s speech act theory in its relevance to law are 
found across the wide terrain of law and language scholarship, but here John R. 
Searle’s revision of Austin tends to dominate. Work by linguists provide technical 
analyses of legal speech acts (e.g. Kurzon 1986) and offer specific taxonomies of 
the legal use of performatives (e.g. Cao 2009). On the other hand, some legal 
scholars who engage with speech acts downplay their jurisprudential significance 
(e.g. Rodriguez-Blanco 2013). Timothy Endicott (2002: 946) goes so far as to 
suggest that ‘it is a dangerous mistake’ to think that the theory of performatives is 
important to legal theory, though does not explain what exactly the danger is. Such 
hasty dismissal proves injudicious when we consider, for example, the work of 
legal philosopher Marianne Constable whose imaginative uses of speech act theory 
may have something to do with the fact that she chooses to bypass the Searlian 
inflection of Austin. In her earlier work, Constable (2008) introduced a shift to the 
debate on the Miranda warning given by the police to suspects in the United States, 
by reading it as a speech act that effects a transformation in the circumstances of 
speech and notifies the suspect of this transformation. Understood as such, the 
Miranda warning serves as an opening to justice that takes account of the 
problematic speech conditions of pre-trial interrogation, and preserves the trial as 
the proper site of speech and as the site of proper speech. In her more recent work 
Constable (2014) inquires into claims of law as performative and passionate 
utterances, the latter being Stanley Cavell’s development of Austin’s idea of the 
perlocutionary act. This approach allows her to both appreciate the conventionality 
of legal speech acts, and to go beyond that framework to consider the 
unconventional legal appeals to right and justice, and the question of law’s hearing.  
A particularly inspiring line of thinking on performative utterances and law 
could be traced back not to legal theorists but to Austin’s fellow philosophers 
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Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler, whose reformulations of performativity with 
regards to the juridical have fed into legal scholarship in diverse ways. Even though 
remarks on law and performatives are found scattered across Derrida’s oeuvre, 
often with unsignalled cross-references, his most influential texts on the subject are 
‘Force of Law’ (2002a) and ‘Declarations of Independence’ (2002b) with key 
resonances between the two texts. The former is Derrida’s reading of Walter 
Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’, prefaced by a consideration of the relationship 
between deconstruction and justice. Here Derrida proposes that law is founded 
performatively, thus the ground of law is ungrounded, and this ultimate 
groundlessness of law in turn yields its deconstructability. He suggests that any 
critical reflection on law should take into account its intrinsic structure whereby 
‘[t]he very emergence of justice and law, the instituting, founding and justifying 
moment of law implies a performative force, that is to say always an interpretative 
force and a call to faith’ (241). ‘Force of Law’ has been alive as a key reference in 
critical legal studies since it was first delivered at a symposium at the Cardozo 
School of Law in New York in 1989.8  
In ‘Declarations of Independence’, Derrida offers a brief reading of the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence, drawing on the concerns of his earlier piece on J.L. 
Austin’s speech act theory, ‘Signature Event Context’ (1988), such as the instability 
of the constative/performative distinction, and the vagaries of signature. He points 
out the undecidability that makes the Declaration what it is: Is this the constative 
statement of an already existing independence, or is it the performative enactment 
of that independence? He further discusses the aporias of signature in the 
document: the representatives sign the declaration on behalf of the people, but the 
latter do not exist as such prior to the signing, the people come into being in the act 
of the signature. This Derrida identifies as a ‘fabulous retroactivity’ operative in the 
instituting performative. Although much shorter than ‘Force of Law’, the analysis 
of performativity we find in this text has also found important resonances in critical 
legal thought.9  
                                                
8 The symposium papers are collected in Cardozo Law Review 11: 5-6 (1990), some directly 
respond to Derrida’s essay.  
9 See, for example, Jacques De Ville (2008) who teases out the significance for constitutional theory 
of Derrida’s emphasis on performativity in ‘Declarations of Independence’.  
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Judith Butler’s most direct engagement with law and Austin’s theory of 
performativity is found in Excitable Speech (1997), her contribution to US debates 
on the legal regulation of injurious speech, including hate speech, flag and cross 
burning, pornography, and coming out as gay in the US army. This is a work that 
questions how speech acts, what it means to call for the legal regulation of speech, 
and what kinds of ideological and political investments such calls involve. As a 
compelling critique of left liberal legalism, Excitable Speech complicates the scene 
of the juridical through the theory of performativity. Although not as explicit about 
its relation to law, Butler’s earlier work on gender also involves a thinking of the 
juridical. In the preface to the 10th year edition of Gender Trouble, Butler ([1990] 
1999: xiv) explains that her formulation of gender performativity was inspired by 
Derrida’s reading of Kafka’s parable ‘Before the Law’:  
There the one who waits for the law, sits before the door of the law, 
attributes a certain force to the law for which one waits. The anticipation of 
an authoritative disclosure of meaning is the means by which that authority 
is attributed and installed: the anticipation conjures its object.  
Interestingly, the text by Derrida (1992) that Butler refers to is not one in which he 
explicitly engages with performativity as such. This may point to the significance 
of the theory of performativity more as a grammar of thought than as a vocabulary 
of thought. Butler’s acknowledgment here is also notable for indicating that her 
thinking of performativity was at once, and from the beginning a thinking of law, 
the subject ‘before’ the law, and the question of subjectivisation. Her theorisation 
of performativity has also been taken up in legal studies in fascinatingly diverse 
ways.10 
 
                                                
10 A thorough account of Butler’s uptake in legal studies is beyond my purposes here. However, for 
examples indicating the diversity of legal scholarship that followed from Butler’s formulation of law 
and performatives: See Elena Loizidou (1999) who engages with Butler’s theory of gender 
performativity for a critical reflection on rape law. In her monograph Judith Butler: Ethics, Law, 
Politics (2007) Loizidou elaborates in more detail on the potentials that Butler’s theory of gender 
performativity holds for critical legal thought more generally. Ritu Birla (2011) approaches Butler’s 
work on performativity from an engagement with colonial law’s dual production of the modern 
economic subject and the pre-modern cultural subject, and reads Butler as a ‘unique legal theorist’ 
whose theorisation of performativity cuts across and identifies the slippages between law as logos 
(‘neoliberal market sovereignty’ in Birla’s field) and law as nomos (convention). Martha Merill 
Umphrey (2011) draws on Butler to offer an incipient theorisation of the performativity of trials. 
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constating the performative: masquerade as metaphor     
There is one seldom noted moment in Austin which I find to be particularly 
suggestive for thinking about the relationship between law and performativity. 
Early on during the very first of his lectures in How To Do Things With Words, in a 
section aptly entitled ‘Preliminary Isolation of the Performative’, Austin warns 
against the capacity of performatives to disguise themselves as constatives: 
The type of utterance we are to consider here is (…) one of our second 
class – the masqueraders. But it does not by any means necessarily 
masquerade as a statement of fact, descriptive or constative. Yet it does 
quite commonly do so, and that, oddly enough, when it assumes its most 
explicit form. Grammarians have not, I believe, seen through this 
‘disguise’, and philosophers only at best ‘incidentally’. (4) 
Thus the performative is said to often masquerade as a descriptive or constative 
statement, seeming to display a relation of externality to its reference, and thereby 
deceiving us into ascribing it a ‘truth value’ in such disguise. This is because the 
explicit performative, the most classic of Austin’s examples in the form of first 
person present indicative active, partakes in the structure of a statement. A judge’s 
utterance of the words ‘I sentence you to four years of imprisonment’ at the end of 
a criminal trial may come across as a statement in form but it is not so in fact – we 
are warned not to be deceived by appearances. Even though Austin holds the legal 
use and scrutiny of language in high esteem, a curious footnote that he appends to 
this passage tells us that he thinks jurists do not necessarily fully grasp the 
philosophical implications of their pragmatic distinctions: 
Of all people, jurists should be best aware of the true state of affairs [i.e. 
the disguise whereby performatives masquerade as constatives – B.E.]. 
Perhaps some now are. Yet they will succumb to their own timorous fiction 
that a statement of ‘the law’ is a statement of fact. (4fn2)11 
The implicit suggestion here is that statements of law are often performative 
utterances. So just as performatives can be distinguished from constatives, 
statements of law can be distinguished from statements of fact. As experts dealing 
                                                
11 Also, later on in the text: ‘Only the still widespread obsession that the utterances of the law, and 
utterances used in, say, “acts in the law”, must somehow be statements true or false, has prevented 
many lawyers from getting this whole matter much straighter than we are likely to - and I would not 
even claim to know whether some of them have not already done so’ (19). 
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in performatives, jurists are in a privileged position to see what all grammarians 
and most analytic philosophers have failed to see: they should be able to understand 
that what seems to pass as a statement of fact is sometimes the very production of 
that fact, the enactment, as it were, of the factual order in question. Jurists must 
understand this, Austin seems to suggest, because this is the ordinary mode in 
which law operates. 
Austin’s idea that performatives disguise themselves as constatives is quite 
significant, and his use of the metaphor of ‘masquerader’ to describe this operation 
is noteworthy. First of all, the metaphor brings the excluded theatrical through the 
back door into Austin’s theory, as part and parcel of his initial definition of the 
performative. The performative, we are told, is that which often disguises or passes 
itself off as constative. So there is always already a staging involved in the 
performative, whereby it disguises the fact of its enactment. The performative both 
stages its referent, and stages itself so as to look as if it is merely stating rather than 
staging its referent. The staging is thus doubled so as to conceal the fact that there is 
any staging involved. 
Further, ‘masquerade’ happens to be charged with theoretical associations 
and resonances in thinking about law and performativity. It is interesting that 
neither Jacques Derrida nor Judith Butler, both of whom have recast Austin’s rather 
restricted, though admittedly rich, notion of the performative in divergent and 
astounding ways, make much of this stage entrance, its introduction by the master 
of ceremonies as a ‘masquerader’.12 And yet, the idea that performatives are 
disguised as constatives, as well as the word masquerade do resonate through both 
of their works, especially powerfully in Butler’s Gender Trouble ([1990] 1999), 
where an extended discussion of the way masquerade figures in Joan Riviere and 
Jacques Lacan provides part of the groundwork for Butler’s notion of the 
performativity of gender (55-73). It is here that she offers an initial, albeit 
seemingly provisional, version of what she later elaborates in terms of gender 
performativity: ‘masquerade may be understood as the performative production of a 
sexual ontology, an appearing that makes itself convincing as a “being”’ (60).  
                                                
12 Butler (1997: 51, 81,175n11) does draw attention to it in Excitable Speech but only as a way to 
bring a wider set of utterances (i.e. subjunctive ones, or instances of hate speech) under the rubric of 
the ‘performative’. See also her brief mention in Butler (1990a: 1717).  
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In Derrida, the echo of the masquerade is fainter, though it affords further 
ripples of reverberation. In ‘Force of Law’, Derrida cites a passage by Montaigne 
by way of introducing the ‘performative force’ of the ‘instituting, founding, and 
justifying moment of law’, the ‘call for faith’ that lies at the foundation of law in 
the form of a performative: 
Even as women, when their naturall teeth faile them, use some yvorie, and 
in stead of a true beautie, or lively colour, lay-on artificiall hew… 
embellish themselves with counterfeit and borrowed beauties; so doth 
learning (and our law hath, as some say, certain lawfull fictions, on which 
it groundeth the truth of justice). (qtd. in Derrida 2002a: 240) 
Makeup, mascara, masking, masquerade... Though obviously intrigued by this 
analogy to quote it at length, Derrida does not do much with it except to go on to 
briefly evoke a definition of law as a ‘masked power’ (241). He does, however, 
question what a legitimate fiction is, and what it may mean to found the truth of 
justice.13 
Interestingly, we find these ‘lawfull fictions’ reverberating back in Austin in 
the footnote quoted above, where he states that jurists ‘will succumb to their own 
timorous fiction that a statement of “the law” is a statement of fact’ (1975: 4fn2). 
The phrase ‘timorous fiction’ here is an intriguing choice of words by one known to 
be meticulous with them, and could be read as encapsulating a summary criticism 
of natural law theory:14 jurists anxiously seeking to conjure a factual basis of law 
where there is none, a truth to law or outside it, which in turn will serve as its origin 
and foundation. This fictive operation is said to be timorous, marked by fear, 
nervousness, and lack of confidence. Is the intimated fear produced by the 
knowledge that there ultimately is no such factual basis? Are we to understand that 
jurists choose to take shelter in a fiction rather than acknowledging and thus 
braving the performativity of law? A reading of Austin’s ‘timorous fiction’ along 
these lines is further echoed in Derrida’s essay, where Montaigne’s ‘lawfull fiction’ 
is interpreted in terms of ‘the fiction necessary to found the truth of justice, and the 
                                                
13 A similar inquiry is at work in Derrida’s ‘Before the Law’ (1992), to which the latter part of 
Montaigne’s quote provides the epigraph. And as I have alluded to above, elsewhere, Derrida (1988, 
2002b) discusses in more detail the effects of the disguise of performatives as constatives. 
14 Olivecrona (1962: 190; 1971: 234) briefly signals towards the potential utilisation of Austin’s 
work on performatives for a critique of natural law. 
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supplement of artifice called for by a deficiency in nature, as if the absence of 
natural law called for the supplement of historical or positive (that is to say, an 
addition of fictional) law’ (2002a: 240). The language of supplement is noteworthy 
here, lest we forget that the supplement for Derrida (1997) not only augments but 
also supplants – it is an operation at once of addition and replacement.  
We encounter a variation on the theme of ‘fiction’ vis-à-vis ‘nature’ in 
Butler’s early work where she casts gender performativity in terms of the function 
by which the truth-effect of an essence to gender is produced, and thus gender 
naturalised:  
The tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete 
and polar genders as cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of its 
own production. The authors of gender become entranced by their own 
fictions whereby the construction compels one’s belief in its necessity and 
naturalness. (1990b: 273)  
For Butler, then, the cultural fictions of gender are so convincing that they not only 
hold their authors enthralled and in thrall, but also efface their own fictive origins. 
The logic of Derrida’s supplement is thus at work here as well. The collective 
agreement to sustain the fictions masquerades as the law of nature.  
These echoes and resonances across the three thinkers yield an interesting 
pattern which in turn can be understood to characterise performativity. The 
masquerade in these constellations serves as an inconspicuous trope linking the 
respective discussions of Austin, Butler and Derrida, and a nexus around which 
performativity is laid out in terms of a special configuration of the relation between 
fact and fiction, nature and artifice. In Austin’s case, the masquerade whereby a 
performative is likely to pass as a constative destabilises the very category of the 
latter as the distinction becomes increasingly unsustainable in myriad ways by the 
end of the lecture series. Butler poses the key question of ‘What is masked by 
masquerade?’ to Joan Riviere’s 1929 essay, only to conclude that rather than 
connoting an order of farce that is subordinate to and superimposed on a true order 
of being, masquerade names the very operation which produces the truth effects of 
‘genuine’ gender identities. In Derrida, there is no extended discussion of the 
mascara, though the trajectory of his essay tells us that this make-up, rather than 
supplementing or enhancing ‘nature’, masks its performative foundation – thus the 
performativity, performance, political trials      81 
 
 
make up becomes a mask behind which lies not a face but a play of forces. 
Masquerade as metaphor thus marks performativity as a threshold operation, 
passing as constative, and obscuring and collapsing a strict delineation between 
being, appearance, and becoming.  
 
law & the force of convention 
Admittedly, Austin is not entirely accurate in his assessment of the failure of jurists 
to appreciate that the statements of law are not statements of fact. As far back as 
1605, Flemish jurist Leonardus Lessius wrote about promise (promissio) and 
donation (donatio) as being ‘practical signs, actuating what they mean’ (qtd. in 
Visconti 2009: 394). Further, the positivist tradition from Jeremy Bentham and 
J.L.’s namesake John Austin onward can be read as recognising at some level the 
performative quality of law. Nevertheless, suppose that one of the imaginary jurists 
with whom Austin is in conversation in his brief footnote were to respond, offering 
the rejoinder that statements of law do not resemble performative utterances as 
much as they resemble constative statements, in the sense that there is a law out 
there –whether in the form of statute or precedent, whether based on a conception 
of sovereign command or normative system–, a law that exists prior to individual 
legal statements, and to which such statements correspond, very much in the same 
way that constatives correspond to facts that are outside and prior to themselves. 
Thus, the jurist would say, a statement of the law constates existing law, which is 
its ‘factual’ referent. If such a conversation were to take place, would Austin still 
accuse our imaginary jurist of succumbing to a ‘timorous fiction that statements of 
“the law” are statements of fact’? Would he say that it is misguided to speak of a 
law ‘out there’, existing prior to its utterances, rather it is each and every individual 
statement of the law that reinstates and reifies the law? (cf. Derrida 2002a) Would 
he thus claim that what purportedly derives from law in fact performatively brings 
it into being? 
Probably not. Austin’s response would more likely be a corrective, a fine-
tuning of terminology, something along the lines of: To say that existing law 
constitutes the ‘fact’ to which individual legal utterances pertain truthfully or 
falsely would be to say that a judge’s ‘I sentence you to four years of 
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imprisonment’ describes something already extant in the law, as if you were always 
already sentenced to four years of imprisonment, perhaps even before your trial or 
your alleged crime, but in any case, sometime before the judge made the utterance, 
and the judge was merely stating this fact. Applied to utterances of the law, the 
constative model produces this kind of absurdity (unless we literally believe in 
something like fate), whereas thinking through the same scene in performative 
terms would help us better understand the dynamics involved.15 Thus Austin would 
presumably counter-propose that existing law should not be understood as the fact 
out there which then determines the truth or falsity of statements of law, but rather 
as a context of convention that determines their felicity. It is the very 
conventionality of law, or law as convention, that renders the performative model 
key for the legal field. Here is, Austin would say, not only an established code of 
procedure and set of conventions, but also often the appropriate authority with 
which to invoke them, crucial elements determining the felicity of a performative. 
Thus it is legal conventions and legal authority that would render the judge’s 
sentence a felicitous performative, enabling him/her to indeed send you to prison 
for four years with his/her very utterance in the right circumstances.  
Notably, the seemingly absurd scenario produced by the constative reading of 
the sentencing scene (i.e. you were always already sentenced to four years of 
imprisonment) corresponds to the way in which law operates as if it were fate. In 
other words, the constative fallacy vis-à-vis law that Austin complains about 
actually explains something about the way law works, how it operates precisely to 
produce such fallacy. We find a clue of this in Derrida’s reading of the Declarations 
of Independence, when he writes of the ambiguity of the structure of the law-
instituting U.S. Decleration of Independence: ‘This obscurity, this undecidability 
between, let us say, a performative structure and a constative structure, is required 
to produce the sought-after effect’ (2002b: 49). Thus the masquerade of legal 
                                                
15 There is a line of debate in legal theory in this vein, in response to Hart’s (1949) work on 
ascription which was clearly inspired by Austin on performatives. Hart’s early claim that legal 
language was primarily characterised by ascription of legal consequences to actions rather than 
descriptions of these actions was challenged by scholars such as P.T. Geach and George Pitcher who 
proposed that legal performatives, such as the passing of sentence, involved and were premised on 
factual referents, such as findings of fact in a trial (Schauer 2006: 855n5). Later, Hart (1983) agreed 
with his critics though without fully explaining why. See also Endicott (2002).  
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performatives as constatives, or in Derrida’s words ‘the whole game that tends to 
present performative utterances, as constative utterances’ (51) is not accidental, but 
rather necessary. 
We find a more thorough account of this in Costas Douzinas’s essay on ‘The 
Metaphysics of Jurisdiction’ (2007). Douzinas writes of the ‘common metaphysical 
structure that regulates jurisdiction’, the latter (juris-diction) understood as both the 
speech that institutes law, that is, the saying of law or the diction that speaks the 
law, and what the instituted law speaks (22). These two aspects of law’s speech ‘are 
inescapably intertwined’ (ibid). The metaphysical structure of jurisdiction involves, 
according to Douzinas, two different axes that are rendered indistinguishable: ‘the 
universal and the particular as well as the performative and the constative. Their 
cohabitation helps confuse the four poles of the two dyads’ (24). It is precisely this 
confusion, the indistinguishability that upholds the metaphysics of jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the glimpse of ‘the gap between particular and universal or between 
performance and statement’ is also a glimpse of the potential failure of law’s claim 
(27). A grasp of these gaps allow ‘both violence and critique [to] launch themselves 
in law’ (ibid).  
In Douzinas’s account, the legal counterpart of what Austin discusses in 
terms of the constative fallacy, or the masquerade is a product of judicial 
organisation, one that is particularly effective in liberal democracies: 
In our liberal and democratic societies, forgetting the gap is the more 
common form: judicial interpretation and judgement are organised in a 
way that conceals the original performance of the law in favour of its 
reasoned and coherent statement. (ibid.) 
This emphasis on organisation, reasoning and coherence is important. The 
masquerade is at its most convincing when the system appears as efficacious and 
thus as felicitous as possible. Note, however, that Douzinas maps the distinction he 
makes between the diction that institutes law and the speech of instituted law onto a 
distinction between ‘performing’ (performatively instituting) law and constating 
existing law. So the performative and the constative appear as two separate 
instances. The mapping, however, need not be so neat. As Derrida reminds us, law 
produces its desired effect through the destabilisation of the distinction between 
performatives and constatives. Just as instituting performatives are often disguised 
performativity, performance, political trials      84 
 
 
as constatives, each ostensible ‘statement’ of law, no matter how ‘reasoned and 
coherent’, can be said to share in the force of the instituting performative that lies at 
the origin of law. Thus ‘statements’ of law do not only conceal the instituting 
performative that founds law, but also bolster instituting violence with their own 
performative violence which they also disguise beneath the masquerade of 
constating existing law.   
We find yet another, if more roundabout, clue of the operation of law as 
producing the constative fallacy in Judith Butler’s (2012) reading of Benjamin’s 
‘Critique of Violence’. Here she hones in on Benjamin’s brief discussion in his 
essay of the myth of Niobe, and finds there both an account of legal subjectivisation 
and one concerning the link between law-instituting and law-preserving violence. 
According to the myth, Niobe, a mortal, bragged about her fourteen children, and 
claimed that she was better than Leto, the goddess of fertility who only gave birth 
to two. Offended and furious, Leto sent her children, Apollo and Artemis, to punish 
Niobe by killing her sons and daughters. Benjamin writes ‘But their violence 
establishes a law far more than it punishes the infringement of a law that already 
exists’ (Benjamin 1996: 248). Artemis then turned Niobe into a rock from which 
her tears streamed eternally. Butler finds a key to Benjamin’s Gordian essay in this 
image of the petrified subject whose punishment is not a response to the 
infringement of already existing law, but is rather the very institution of law. It is a 
law-making violence that transfers the burden of that violence (the killing of 
fourteen children) onto the subject as a petrifying guilt: ‘To be a subject within 
these terms is to take responsibility for a violence that precedes the subject and 
whose operation is occluded by the subject who comes to attribute the violence she 
suffers to her own acts’ (Butler 2012: 79). The anger of the gods institutes itself as 
fate and law. Further, it is not only the fabulous retroactivity of the law-instituting 
performative that operates as if it were fate, but also law-preserving violence as 
well. As Butler writes, ‘In the end, it would seem, the model of law-instating 
violence, understood as fate, a declaration by fiat, is the mechanism by which law-
preserving violence operates as well.’ (72) 
To further explore the significance of the operation of law as if it were fate 
(or the masquerade of legal performatives as constatives), we may link the 
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foregoing to Butler’s insightful account of conventionality in relation to 
performativity in Excitable Speech (1997). Here she trains her gaze on not only the 
force of convention but also the ‘logic of iterability’ which is inherent in 
convention and yet ‘governs the possibility of social transformation’ (147). Since 
her main interest lies in sketching the potentials as well as the limits of 
performative agency, she provides a keen reading of the vagaries of the relation 
between the performative and its context of convention. This relation is almost 
always one of institution (each performative utterance reinstitutes the convention) 
but it is not necessarily so, also offering a possibility of rupture and insurrection. 
Herein lies the scandal of the theory of performativity: the very theorisation itself of 
how performatives work includes the recognition of not only performative failure 
(infelicities) but also performative contradiction and subversion. The theory holds 
out the possibility of rupture in the horizon of conventionality whereby a reiteration 
need not necessarily function as a reinstitution. Thus the context of convention need 
not be figured as an immovable mover, but rather understood in its contingency, as 
a process of ‘historical sedimentation’ (1990b).  
For Butler, each performative utterance that draws on ‘the force of reiterated 
convention’ is a ‘condensed historicity’. This points to the particular temporality of 
performatives that Butler explains with reference to their ‘ritual or ceremonial’ 
form identified by Austin: 
they work to the extent that they are given in the form of a ritual, that is, 
repeated in time, and, hence, maintain a sphere of operation that is not 
restricted to the moment of the utterance itself. The illocutionary speech 
act performs its deed at the moment of the utterance, and yet to the extent 
that the moment is ritualized, it is never merely a single moment. The 
‘moment’ in ritual is a condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and 
future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that constitute 
and escape the instance of the utterance. (1997: 3) 
In this account, the performative utterance extends itself both into the past and the 
future. It stretches into the past insofar as it owes its conditions of being and felicity 
to a historical sedimentation of conventionality, and into the future insofar as it 
constitutes a reinscription (or potentially, transformation) of that conventionality. 
Butler’s temporalisation of the role of convention in the theory of performativity 
renders the latter a powerful analytical instrument for law, posing ‘context as more 
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than just the historical and empirical framework for law, contemplating it instead as 
the historicity of law itself, of law understood as ever-shifting convention, or the 
always already situated norms that become sites for citation’ (Birla 2011: 90). This 
temporal figuration of the performative also explains something about the 
masquerade of performatives as constatives. What creates the constative 
expectation or the masquerade can be understood as a temporal horizon seemingly 
entirely saturated by convention. In other words we can propose that legal 
performatives often pass as constatives because law as convention often passes as 
inevitable.  
 
the polit ical trial: performativity & performance 
Theories of performativity can be utilised to account for what transpires in a 
criminal trial on a number of levels. The most obvious is a literal Austinian 
approach concerning the language used in a trial: many of the key utterances in the 
course of a trial are performative utterances. We already get a flavour of this from 
the various examples that Austin uses. Objecting, finding (as a matter of fact), 
holding (as a matter of law), convicting, acquitting, sentencing are often effected 
through explicit or implicit performative utterances in the trial. In a sense, trials not 
only contain but are sustained by performative utterances. They provide the skeletal 
structure through which a trial plays itself out, the mainstays on which the linguistic 
rituals of trials are built.16 But beyond this immediate, and perhaps rather 
inconsequential, observation, we may draw on work on law and performativity to 
identify other dynamics of performativity operative in a criminal trial that are 
essential to its functioning. 
In this sense, the status of the criminal trial as a key instance of law-
preserving violence in the modern state is necessary to take into account. While the 
trial is not the only medium through which the state acts to exercise its monopoly of 
violence, it remains, along with various choreographies of policing, one of the most 
                                                
16 For a lucid illustration of this, see Marianne Constable’s (2011: 637-39) reading of Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
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visible features of law-preserving violence. Thus despite its ‘demise’,17 the trial can 
be understood as an essential medium through which the legal system continues to 
stage itself as if it were fate. On the basis of my discussion in the previous section, I 
would like to propose that the criminal trial is felicitous to the extent that it 
effectively disguises its performative operations as constative. These masquerading 
operations include the establishing of the facts, the interpretation of law, and the 
application of substantive law to the facts of the case. The necessary paradox is that 
although these have to be disguised in the trial as a series of constative functions, or 
perhaps in order that they are successfully disguised as such, the trial has to be 
performed. It has to take its course, play itself out, preferably without any seeming 
or at least overwhelming prejudice on the part of those who are to arrive at a verdict 
at the end of the process, so that the outcome is not fully foreseeable in advance. 
This quality of live performance, the process of making a case, representing, 
defending, arguing, challenging, evaluating narratives of fact and matters of law in 
the setting of a forum is part of what lends the trial its authority to pass as 
inevitable, as fate. Hence the necessity to submerge the trial in an avalanche of 
conventionality.  
I would further like to propose that the political trial can be defined as a legal 
proceeding whose performative structures are publicly exposed. In other words, 
trials that are identified by their public audience as political tend to afford critical 
insight into the performative structure of proceedings, otherwise disguised in the 
daily grind of the courtrooms. As I discuss in more detail below, the exposure of 
the performativity of a trial is usually due to a crisis of masquerade, that is, a failure 
in one of the several ways in which performatives ordinarily disguise themselves as 
constatives in the course of a trial. The fact that the question of trial performance 
often comes under scrutiny in political trials, and accusations of theatricality (‘show 
trial’, ‘circus’, ‘kangaroo court’, etc.) begin to fly around may be closely connected 
to this exposure of performativity. When the conventions of trial performance 
cannot bolster the sense of inevitability, they begin to stand out in their 
theatricality.  
                                                
17 Namely its gradual replacement by administrative handling of offenders, plea-bargaining, and, 
perhaps in a more laudable turn, restorative justice initiatives – see discussion in Duff et. al. (2004: 
3-17) of the continued significance of the trial, despite its increasing rareness. 
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It is here that we may begin to think, as Sedgwick and Parker have 
encouraged, about the overlap between performativity and ‘the loose cluster of 
theatrical practices, relations and traditions known as performance’ in the space of 
the trial. In other words, we may ask: How and to what extent does the 
hyperconventionality of trial performance assist the masquerade whereby the 
performative functions of a trial parade as constative? The rigidity of performance 
practices extends over every nook and cranny of the stage of the criminal trial: the 
organisation of space, the distribution of bodies in space, the regulation of their 
movement, the required bodily gestures, the ordered proceedings, the prescriptions 
and restrictions of clothing, the authorisation of speech, the formalised language, 
and so on. Could it be that the rather anachronistic conventions governing a trial’s 
performance work to reinforce a perception of its absolute inevitability? Everything 
was performed as it ought to have been, thus the outcome is what it ought to be. 
Could this appearance of necessity, in turn, bolster the masquerade whereby the key 
performative functions of the trial pass as constative? In other words, can the 
overlap between performance and performativity in a trial be identified in terms of 
the production of an appearance of inevitability? This would mean that the 
conventions of embodied performance in a trial assist in disguising its performative 
operations.  
One such operation has to do with the truth-seeking function of the trial, 
which notably involves a performance of constating. The trial authorises a fact-
finding mission that is both institutional and collective in character, the latter more 
pronouncedly in jurisdictions that employ juries. In the adversarial jury trial, there 
is further a special emphasis on live oral testimony which is understood to enhance 
the truth-seeking function of the trial (Auslander 1997; Mulcahy 2008; Leader 
2010). Witness testimony occurs live in the trial as a performance of recollection 
(Auslander 1997: 20). Its authenticity is then subject to scrutiny on two main 
accounts: demeanour and confrontation (Leader 2010). The attention to demeanour 
calls for a performance of credibility: it calls on the body of the witness to verify 
truthfulness, much like in trials by ordeal where it was believed that the accused’s 
body under ordeal would ‘speak’ the truth. In turn, the principle of confrontation 
provides the discursive complement to the embodied truth of demeanour, and 
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renders the adversarial trial an agonistic space of conflict over narrative and 
meaning. In inquisitorial systems where there is less of an emphasis on live 
testimony and more so on the documentation of the case, the case file acquires a 
similar function of enacting the truth of the trial.18  
The forensic narrative produced as to what has happened beyond reasonable 
doubt is then taken as authoritative: it shapes the very language of the public 
discourse around the event, so that, for example, the ‘alleged/ly’ in public reports is 
dropped after factual details are decided on in a criminal trial. The trial thus 
produces a privileged account for historiography. This explains, to some extent, 
recourses to the criminal trial in collective attempts to negotiate the past, for 
example, in transitional justice scenarios or post-conflict societies:  
the appeal of the courtroom lies … in the stability of its order, in discourse 
that is limited both temporally and lexically according to the rhetorically 
imposed turns for speaking and the fixed validity of words, coded 
according to the place from which they are uttered, as compared to the 
amorphous talk, or rather noise, by which we are normally surrounded 
(Vismann 1999: 279) 
The usual cacophony of the public sphere is filtered through a highly formalised 
and stylised orchestration in the trial, which lends a particular weight to its findings. 
The historiographical privilege is also why political powers have been known to opt 
for criminal trials in attempts to authorise their version of events as official history 
(Koskenniemi 2002; Douzinas 2012). Curiously, the constative function of the 
criminal trial is often referred to as ‘establishing’ the facts, a verb that not only 
conveys the constative sense of ‘confirming’ and ‘validating’, but also the more 
performative function of ‘instituting’. The potential gap between the truth and its 
representation in the trial has been captured by a distinction between ‘substantive’, 
that is, actual truth and ‘formal legal truth’, namely ‘whatever is found as fact by 
the legal fact finder’ (Summers 1999: 498). That the story could have been told 
otherwise always remains a possibility, but a felicitous trial is partly so because it 
has successfully banished this possibility from public perception, to the extent that 
the performativity of the retelling, of the establishing of facts is shrouded in the 
constative function of describing the facts. 
                                                
18 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the role of the case file in Turkey’s Ergenekon trial.  
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Often in political trials, the potential gap becomes visible. The trial may fail 
to fully convince the public that the facts that it has ‘established’, its performance 
of the constative is indeed constative, congruent with reality; or to put it more 
simply, if it has failed to assure that its representation of what happened is truthful. 
The trial may occasion suspicions that facts have been manipulated through forged 
or fabricated evidence, false testimony and the like, so as to ‘frame’ the defendants. 
It may be that the evidence is suspected to be fabricated not during but before the 
trial by the police, the intelligence service, or a third party. Even then, how this 
evidence is handled in the trial, how it is substantiated or invalidated becomes a 
focus of attention, revealing something about the performative operation involved 
in the finding of facts. A famous example is the 1951 trial and conviction of Ethel 
and Julius Rosenberg in the United States, on charges of conspiracy to commit 
espionage during wartime. An effective public campaign was launched only after 
their conviction, dividing international and domestic public opinion regarding their 
culpability at the time of their execution in 1953, and for many decades after. While 
subsequent evidence has suggested that Julius Rosenberg was indeed involved in 
espionage for the USSR, it is still contested whether this involved the transmission 
of any useful information on the atomic bomb, which was the actual reason for the 
capital sentence, and whether Ethel Rosenberg was involved in espionage at all.19 
Further, it remains the case that their conviction at the time was secured on the 
basis of false evidence (Schneir 2010). The history of political trials provide many 
other examples in this vein. The publicity of suspicion pertaining to the truthfulness 
of fact-finding in a political trial occasions an exposure of the fact-finding 
mechanism’s contingency, which is usually shrouded in performances of 
orderliness and solemnity.  
Another key performative operation of the criminal trial can be identified as 
the application of laws to the case at hand, which raises the classic jurisprudential 
question of fit between the facts of a case and existing law. While this is an issue 
that has engaged thinkers of law from at least Aristotle onwards, political trials 
                                                
19 Sam Roberts, ‘Figure in Rosenberg Case Admits to Soviet Spying’, New York Times, 11 
September 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/12/nyregion/12spy.html; Sam Roberts, ‘Father 
Was a Spy, Sons Conclude With Regret’, New York Times, 26 September 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/nyregion/17rosenbergs.html. 
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problematise it in particularly pronounced ways. In perhaps the majority of political 
trials, neither the facts, nor the law itself is in question, but the legal interpretation 
of the facts are. That is, the trial may not necessarily be beset by suspicions or 
claims that facts are being fabricated, the point of contestation and controversy is 
rather the legal spin that the prosecution puts on them. So that, for example, various 
coincidences are prosecuted as ‘conspiracy’ (Chicago Conspiracy Trial, USA, 
1969-70); a public criticism of ceaseless war is cast as ‘discouraging the people 
from military service’ (the trial of superstar Bülent Ersoy, Turkey, 2008); or what 
may well be deemed performance art is legally interpreted as ‘hooliganism 
motivated by religious hatred’ (Pussy Riot Trial, Russia, 2012). In such cases, there 
is again the suspicion that the defendants are ‘framed’ but this time the frame itself 
becomes visible and exposed as potentially problematic. 
The starkest exposure of the frame occurs in trials concerning acts of civil 
disobedience: the facts of the defendants’ acts are not in dispute, nor is their 
illegality – the defendants attempt to call the laws themselves into question as either 
irrelevant or illegitimate. Existing laws are contested with an appeal to justice, in 
the name of higher laws or principles – constitutional or moral (Veitch 2006). On 
the flipside of civil disobedience cases, we have the kind of political trials that 
Kirchheimer, Shklar and Arendt were primarily concerned with. In successor 
regime trials, the commonsensical temporal relation that is expected from an 
ordinary legal proceeding is overturned. Rather than the anticipated canny order of 
a narrative arc proceeding linearly from law to breach to trial to judgment, the 
prosecution may be understood to retrospectively institute the law where there was 
none. As Kirchheimer and Arendt fully grasped, when felicitous, this type of 
political trial institutes law, it is a constitutive moment that seemingly draws on 
legal conventions, but in fact founds a new order of conventionality. Thus, how 
faithfully procedural conventions are performed, how closely courtroom etiquette is 
followed and what kind of a theatrics of justice is displayed tend to be absolutely 
crucial in these kinds of cases for their felicity. In a sense, loyalty to procedure and 
conventions of performance replaces the necessity for preceding legal authority. 
What is exposed in a stark light in civil disobedience and successor regime 
trials can be said to be at work in every criminal trial whereby the very event of the 
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trial can be said to relate to its larger context, the particular legal system of which it 
is an instance, performatively. As Martha Merill Umphrey (2011: 120) suggests:  
trials are law-making (not just law-applying or law-interpreting) events 
because of their performativity … they not only enact law, both theatrically 
and linguistically, in their very doing, but also performatively constitute 
the law they enact.  
Thus a trial should be understood not as a statement of law, but rather a 
reinscription of law that not only draws on precedent and legislation but also effects 
their further sedimentation. However, operative in the representational strategies 
involved in both the retelling of the facts in a manner that can be legally 
assimilated, and the further performative function of applying legal rules and 
standards to this retelling is what Shoshana Felman has referred to as a ‘cognitive 
view of language’, which disguises these processes as a series of transparent 
congruities. In Felman’s characterisation of the cognitive view, ‘the question of 
knowing is confused with the question of judging; the illocutionary act of 
judgement is experienced as a pure constative or cognitive’ (2003: 14). The strict 
procedural restrictions and the stringent conventions governing the performance of 
the trial allow law to stage its illocutionary operations as pure constatives whereby 
law seemingly exercises a masterful cognition of itself, the crime and the criminal. 
Notable in this regard is Ross Charnock’s linguistic analysis of judgments that 
overrule precedents (2009: 413):  
Common law judges are not simply reluctant to overrule explicitly; they 
often go to the extent of denying, contrary to the evidence, that their 
overruling decisions imply a change in the law at all. They claim instead 
that these decisions are mere declarations of the true state of the law, in the 
face of misapprehensions derived from mistaken decisions in earlier cases.  
So even in the most obvious performative operation of overruling, recourse is often 
sought to a constative masquerade. 
Butler’s work incites an understanding of how the masquerade masks in law: 
legal performatives masquerade as constative owing to the sedimented 
conventionality of law. Derrida and Douzinas, on the other hand, offer an insight 
into what the masquerade masks in law: it masks the performative violence that lies 
at the foundation of law. According to Douzinas, the metaphysical structure of 
performativity, performance, political trials      93 
 
 
jurisdiction that is based on a confounding of the legal performative and the 
constative is at its most vulnerable in trials where there is an explicit challenge to 
jurisdiction. The examples he gestures towards are the Nuremberg and the 
Yugoslav war crimes tribunals, which ‘resorted to the sheer fact of their 
establishment by the victorious or the powerful to get around the challenge of their 
jurisdiction’ (2007: 27). These are indeed limit cases since the concurrence of 
jurisdiction as the speech that institutes law and jurisdiction as what the instituted 
law speaks is rendered explicit, there is hardly any constative masquerade in sight. 
Yet jurisdictional challenge can have a similar effect of exposing the performativity 
of law in other (political) trials where the concurrence may not necessarily be so 
clear from the outset.  
Leora Bilsky (2010) discusses jurisdictional objection in political trials in 
relation to the problem of what she terms ‘boundary drawing’, that is ‘identifying 
how criminal law actually participates in delineating the boundaries of citizenship, 
of who belongs and who does not belong to a political community of discourse’ 
(99). She suggests that this function of law is most apparent in constitutional cases, 
whereas modern criminal law presumes the boundaries as given, and is not 
necessarily engineered to accommodate debates concerning the delineation of 
political community. Criminal law ‘presupposes the existence of a political 
community over which it has authority’ and ‘assumes that the issue of effective 
sovereignty has been settled’ (ibid). The authority of the court can be challenged 
technically during the preliminary jurisdiction stage of the hearings, but then it is 
generally assumed that law has sufficient built-in provisions to handle such 
challenges (ibid). Kirchheimer is characteristically astute on this issue when he 
writes that jurisdictional objections ‘give the trial an air of legal finesse and 
propriety without ever putting the regime that is staging the trial in any untoward 
danger. The rejection of the jurisdictional objection is a foregone conclusion’ 
(1961: 332n44). Paradoxically, most political trials adjudicate actions that involve a 
challenge to such foreclosure of the political. The criminalisation (and therefore the 
attempted depoliticisation) of these political challenges thus doubles the political 
foreclosure on the scene of the trial. Emilios Christodoulidis (2004) formulates this 
in terms of ‘the objection that cannot be heard’. In Christodoulidis’ account, the 
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circumscription of the political by the court, its limitation of the political to 
constitutional processes means that there isn’t a genuine communicative or dialogic 
space of articulation available in the trial as some theorists of trials propose (cf. 
Duff 1986; Burns 1999).  
The strategy of rupture developed by the French-Vietnamese lawyer Jacques 
Vergès, for example, is about sustaining the jurisdictional challenge throughout the 
trial, rather than limiting it to the jurisdiction stage proper in which a ‘division 
between participation and legitimation can be made’ (Bilsky 2010: 103). The 
refusal to enter into dialogue with the court about the facts of the case or the points 
of law is meant to convey a defiance of the socio-political order, which can be 
understood as an attempt to expose the performative violence that institutes and 
preserves law. The tu quoque objection, often encountered in political trials, has a 
similar effect and can be conceived as boiling down to a jurisdictional challenge as 
well: 
If the State that calls to account those who commit such crimes (against 
humanity) is also their perpetrator, its legitimacy to judge them is 
withdrawn and its attempt to monopolise them can be nothing but a 
political-ideological move. (Christodoulidis 2009: 8) 
The ‘who are you to judge’ allows an exposure of the founding violence of the 
jurisdiction that claims authority over those it brings to its justice. Thus while 
‘every trial explicitly or implicitly addresses the power of the court to judge’ 
(Douzinas 2007: 27), this structure is particularly pronounced in political trials.  
A perspective that draws on theories of performativity for studying trials will 
afford an analysis of ordinary, everyday criminal trials as not only reinscribing and 
reinventing the legal system, but also continuously promising it. As Felman’s 
discussion of Molière’s Don Juan alongside J. L. Austin’s theory of performative 
speech acts, The Scandal of The Speaking Body, shows, the act of promising is not 
only one performative act among many, but in fact the very quintessence of 
performativity,20 as every promise is a promise of the constative, a pledge of 
congruity between the now-speech and the act-to-come, in a perverse relation to 
                                                
20 Cf. Cavell (2003) who suggests even further that for Austin promising was the fact of speech 
itself, ‘as if an “I promise” implicitly lines every act of speech, of intelligibility as it were a 
condition of speech as such’ (xiii). 
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temporality. In Felman’s words, ‘every promise promises constancy above all, that 
is, promises consistency, continuity in time between the act of commitment and the 
future action’ (2003: 20). The performativity of a criminal trial is in one sense the 
promise, or possibly, the threat of consistency and continuity, two key principles of 
modern law. Thus each trial can be said to performatively postulate a pledge of 
noninterruption of the legal system, a postulation that further assists in the 
operation of law-preserving violence as if it were fate. 
 
  
 
 
3 
sovereign infelicities 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I offered one way of interpreting conventional trial 
performance in relation to performativity within a more general account of the 
relevance of theories of performativity for law and trials. Taking my cues from a 
number of dynamics that are particularly well exposed in political trials, I proposed 
that the hyper-conventionality of trial performance assists in the masquerade 
whereby law’s performatives pass as constatives. In this chapter, I further engage 
with performative theory to conceptualise the vagaries of what may be referred to 
as ‘sovereign performatives’ and explore the significance of this conceptualisation 
for studying trials. Part of this chapter is taken up with the scrutiny of the status of 
sovereign agency in J.L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler and Shoshana 
Felman’s theories of performativity. My understanding is that these theories 
crucially imply a critique of sovereignty: the very grammar of performativity 
necessarily poses a challenge to the idea of an unfettered, absolute sovereignty. 
This is due to two key conditions of performativity: conventionality (or iterability) 
and performance (embodied practice). The analysis of performativity allows the 
conceptualisation of the ‘political’ in political trials beyond its overdetermination in 
terms of expediency or sovereign agency, that is, beyond its ‘intentional’ and 
‘willed’ status. I offer the groundwork for this analysis and its relevance for 
studying political trials in this chapter with reference to three cases, before going on 
to offer more detailed case studies in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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three scenes 
Let me begin, then, with scenes from three unrelated political trials to which I will 
return at the end of this chapter. 
The first is relatively well known: The 1969-1970 Chicago Conspiracy Trial1 
was the trial of eight activists charged with the conspiracy to cross state lines to 
incite a riot.2 In effect, it was an extension of the government’s ‘law and order’ 
response to the massive protests in Chicago in August 1968, organised to coincide 
with the Democratic National Convention, and brutally repressed by the Chicago 
police. The defendants included local organisers, student organisers, a Christian 
pacifist, ‘Yippies’ Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, and most famously, the co-
founder and chairman of the Black Panther Party (BPP), Bobby Seale. Represented 
by radical lawyers such as William Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass, the 
defendants opted for a spectacularly disruptive approach to the proceedings. The 
anti-authoritarian Yippies were already well known for guerrilla theatre, and 
Hoffman and Rubin took the trial as an occasion to improvise. In addition to 
staging several acts during the trial, they generally played havoc with courtroom 
conventions, and their co-defendants played along: they refused to rise with the 
comings and goings of the judge, shouted insults at him, refused to address him 
with the usual ‘Your Honour’, cracked jokes, laughed out loud, and so on.  
Bobby Seale had other reasons to be disruptive: from the beginning of the 
trial he insisted that none of the defence attorneys present represented him. He 
would either be represented by the BPP lawyer Charles R. Garry, or represent 
himself. Garry was initially the chief attorney on the defence team, but had to go 
through a surgery that coincided with the beginning of the trial. Judge Julius J. 
Hoffman refused to allow a six-week delay to accommodate this, and Garry had to 
leave the team, passing the lead to Kunstler. Seale refused to acknowledge Kunstler 
as his attorney, and demanded his constitutional right to represent himself. Judge 
Hoffman denied him the right on the basis of a technicality. Kunstler respected 
Seale’s decision and did not attempt to represent him. This left Seale in direct 
confrontation with the judge. During the first few weeks of the trial Seale 
                                                
1 United States v. Dellinger et al., Criminal No. 69-180 (N.D.Ill.) 
2 This was an offence under the 1968 Federal Anti-Riot Act, passed in April of that year as a 
response to inner city race riots of the mid-1960s. 
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continuously disrupted the proceedings with the demand to represent himself and 
attempts to cross-examine the witnesses. By the fifth week of the trial, with the 
antics of the other defendants in the background, the confrontation between Judge 
Hoffman and Seale escalated to the point where the judge ordered Seale to be 
bound and gagged. This was initially on a simple folding chair with handcuffs and a 
towel gag, and when that proved ineffective, he was bound on a wooden ‘throne’ 
chair with heavier straps, a massive gag and adhesive tape. For two days, on the 
30th and 31st of October 1969, the hearings proceeded with the only black defendant 
on trial bound and gagged in the courtroom, struggling with the straps and his 
speech muffled by the gag.3  
The second scene is a small moment from the early days of Saddam 
Hussein’s 2005 Dujail trial at the Iraqi Special Tribunal. Presiding over the 
proceedings was Rizgar Mohammed Amin, who would later be replaced due to his 
perceived lack of authority. The following exchange took place between Hussein 
and Amin, and it was recorded on video:4 
HUSSEIN: I only say this so that the defendant-  
JUDGE: [quietly] He's the prosecutor, not the defendant.  
HUSSEIN: Excuse me?  
VOICES IN COURT: The prosecutor.  
HUSSEIN: The prosecutor, eh [makes head gesture]... The prosecutor and 
the witness should listen...  
Saddam Hussein makes a slip of the tongue, and refers to the ‘defendant’ during a 
hearing where he is the chief defendant. But he means neither himself, nor a co- 
defendant, he’s referring to someone else. The judge interrupts to correct him and 
says somewhat sheepishly, ‘he’s the prosecutor, not the defendant’. For a split 
second Hussein does not understand why he has been interrupted, then does, the 
shadow of a smile crosses his face, and makes a gesture with his head as if to say 
‘whatever, same difference’. The footage cuts to the judge who inexplicably returns 
the smile before Hussein continues to speak.  
                                                
3 For detailed accounts of the trial, see Schultz (2009), Lahav (2004) and Hoffman (2000: 186-209). 
4 ‘Saddam Hussein on Trial: Saddam Hussein Is Too Great to Be Defended Even by Saddam 
Hussein; I Was Beaten by the Americans’, Memri TV video, 9:34, archived 27 May 2013, broadcast 
by Al-Jazeera TV in 2005, http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/976.htm. 
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The third one is also a brief moment, from a trial that concluded in March 
2013 at Woolwich Crown Court in the United Kingdom. This was the third trial of 
two students, Alfie Meadows and Zak King, who had been involved in the 2010 
protests against the austerity programme and extortionate tuition fee hikes 
introduced by the government. Meadows had made the news at the time, as he had 
to undergo emergency brain surgery after being hit on the head with a police baton 
while kettled during the 9 December 2010 protest in London’s Parliament Square. 
The chances were slim, but he miraculously survived without brain damage and 
was subsequently charged with violent disorder. There seemed to be a cynical 
calculation at work: a conviction would secure the police against misconduct 
charges, and in any case, a prosecution would delay any civil action against the 
force. Meadows and King were in the criminal justice system for a while, because 
their first trial ended with a hung jury in April 2012, with three other co-defendants 
acquitted. Their retrial in November 2012 was aborted due to insufficient time 
scheduled for the hearings. 
As in the previous two trials, in the third and final trial the prosecution 
brought to the witness stand several police officers on duty that day at the 
demonstration. In his cross-examination of the first two police witnesses, one of the 
defence attorneys established that yes, the batons must be used only as a last resort; 
no, they should not be used to hit people on the head; yes, the police receives 
extensive training to this effect, because hitting someone on the head with a police 
baton can cause death. The third police witness was Superintendent Woods who 
had served as Bronze Commander on the day of the protest.5 He was cross-
examined in a similar vein, which seemed to irritate him. When asked whether he 
considered baton strikes an absolute last resort, he answered ‘The absolute last 
resort is getting a machine gun out.’ As he said this, he was pointing an imaginary 
machine gun directly at the jury members and pretending to shoot.  
 
 
                                                
5 This is part of the Gold (strategic) – Silver (tactical) – Bronze (operational) command structure 
created by the Metropolitan Police Service following the Broadwater Farm Riot in 1985. Though the 
command structure was created for emergencies and has been taken up by other emergency services, 
the police now uses it mainly proactively for policing public events. 
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sovereign spectacles 
In his vivid discussion in the opening chapters of Discipline and Punish, Michel 
Foucault (1979) inquires into the gradual disappearance of punishment from public 
view. For Foucault, this disappearance signifies a historical shift in the modality of 
power, namely, a passage from predominantly sovereign to predominantly 
disciplinary power. He comments in passing, however, that the judicial spectacle, 
once so powerfully staged by the sensational public torture and execution of the 
condemned, is now transferred onto the post-Revolutionary public trial. Although 
this is a specifically French genealogy (in common law, criminal trials were always 
public), the insight is valid across modern law: sovereign power, associated with 
pomp and circumstance, is still operative in the courtroom, in the very spectacle of 
the trial, albeit bound up with a more recent mode, disciplinary power, which 
corresponds to an all-surveying gaze that aims at the knowledge of the criminal 
through expert testimony and the like. 
That the courtroom remains a privileged stage for the spectacle of sovereignty 
is particularly conspicuous in political trials. The dynamics of national sovereignty 
that were played out in Adolf Eichmann’s trial, discussed in some detail in the first 
chapter of this thesis, serve as a lucid example. Further, the idea of the trial as 
sovereign spectacle is something of a commonplace in writings on political trials. 
Otto Kirchheimer’s (1961) discussion of a regime’s recourse to the image-making 
capacity of a trial captures the importance of legal spectacle for claims to 
sovereignty. In her article on ‘terror’ trials that involve political perspectives of 
radical difference, Leora Bilsky (2010: 108) writes that it is unlikely that national 
courts will relinquish such cases to be tried by international courts, as these trials 
‘are often viewed as the very symbol of their sovereignty (the right to adjudicate 
those who claim unrestricted “war” against the state and its citizens)’. While similar 
remarks are found across the various genres of writing on political trials, the same 
dynamic can be discerned in ‘ordinary’ criminal trials as well, at least in principle. 
Here it is pertinent to note that the modern, liberal democratic rationale for the 
publicity of trials draws not only on the defendant’s right to a fair trial, but also on 
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the public’s right to know (Radin 1932; Mueller 1961).6 In other words, the 
principle of publicity is formulated partly in terms of popular sovereignty and the 
public’s interest in seeing justice done in its name. Trials are thus conventionally 
figured as spaces where sovereignty plays itself out to itself.  
This, in turn, corresponds to an aspect of the shift of sovereign spectacle from 
public punishment to the public trial that Foucault writes about. In Foucault’s 
account, the juridico-political function of the spectacle of public execution was to 
reconstitute a momentarily injured sovereignty (1979: 48). Since law emanates 
directly from the sovereign, a crime, besides its immediate victim, is an attack on 
the will and the body of the sovereign himself. The public spectacle of punishment 
was meant to redress that injury. In the passage from absolute monarchy to popular 
sovereignty, the form of this operation is preserved via the general theory of the 
contract: law is the bond, the contract of society; a crime is a breach of this pact; 
hence besides its immediate victim, the crime is an injury to the body politic whose 
law is breached. Trials and punishments are meant to redress this injury to the 
community at large rather than avenge the victim. We have seen the effects of this 
modern (albeit traditional) conceptualisation of criminal justice in Arendt’s 
understanding of crimes against humanity.  
 Yet a further aspect of interest in Foucault’s discussion of the spectacle of 
sovereignty is its very ambiguity: 
the terror of the public execution created centres of illegality: on execution 
days, work stopped, the taverns were full, the authorities were abused, 
                                                
6 While the institution of public trials in France in 1791 was very much a product of the 
revolutionary zeitgeist of rights and popular sovereignty, the twofold rationale does not seem to 
have the same historical purchase in common law. According to Max Radin’s (1932) work on the 
genealogy of the principle of publicity, the earliest rationalisations of the public character of English 
trials are found in Thomas Smith’s 1565 treatise De Republica Anglorum, with particular emphasis 
neither on the defendant nor the public audience, but rather on the witnesses and the need for 
testimony to be public. This is fleshed out further by Matthew Hale circa 1670, and later by 
Blackstone citing Hale, preserving the emphasis on witnesses – the idea being that false accusations 
are more likely to be made in private than in public. So during the period when the majority of 
criminal prosecutions were brought by private persons rather than public authorities, the openness of 
courts was understood not necessarily to guarantee a fair trial to the defendant (who, as Radin 
details, was otherwise greatly disadvantaged by the procedure) or to fulfil a public function, but 
rather to immunise criminal procedure from its abuse by private persons (calumniators). This finds 
contemporary resonance in the idea that publicity protects criminal procedure from its abuse by the 
administration or the judiciary. 
sovereign infelicities 102 
 
 
insults or stones were thrown at the executioner, the guards and the 
soldiers; attempts were made to seize the condemned man, either to save 
him or to kill him more surely; fights broke out, and there was no better 
prey for thieves than the curious throng around the scaffold. (63) 
Foucault further discusses the political risk that this ambiguity created through its 
consolidation in social solidarity among the spectators, against the sovereign. He 
writes, ‘out of that uncertain festival in which violence was instantaneously 
reversible, it was this solidarity much more than the sovereign power that was 
likely to emerge with redoubled strength’ (ibid). In noting that the spectacle of 
power is transferred onto the public trial, Foucault does not go into much detail, but 
we know from political trials that this ambiguity too is partly transferred on to the 
public trial. Kirchheimer captures this well in his discussion of the ‘irreducible risk’ 
whereby the image-creating capacity of the legal procedure can be usurped to 
create effective ‘counter-images’. In other words, the sovereign spectacle can turn 
on itself.  
However, Kirchheimer’s account of this ambiguity in trials is premised on a 
particular conceptualisation of agency. We see this in the various reasons that he 
gives for the irreducible risk: political commitments of witnesses who may not play 
along with the prosecution’s vision for the trial; the interpretation of defendants 
who may successfully hijack the proceedings to make counter-images, and ‘the 
judicial space’, that is, the freedom of the judge or jury in deciding a case based on 
their own interpretation and evaluation, with relative independence from the 
sovereign agency of the state (1961: 118). Thus potentially pitted against the 
sovereign who wills the spectacle of the trial are various participants of the trial 
also figured as sovereign agents who are fully present to themselves, and whose 
acts perfectly coincide with their wills and intentions. While the analysis has some 
merit for trials involving particularly self-conscious political conflicts between 
prosecution and defence, it is important to be attuned to the subtler, unintentional, 
accidental, spectral, unconscious ways in which the sovereign spectacle can unravel 
in the trial. This would then call for an alternative formulation of the political in 
political trials beyond its overdetermination in terms of the intentions and designs 
of the parties. Since the idealised coincidence of spectator and sovereign in the 
modern criminal trial does not allow as clear a crystallisation of parties to the 
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conflict as Foucault describes with regards to public punishment, such an 
attunement may be helpful in discerning the politics of seemingly ordinary trials as 
well. Here performative theory’s problematisation of the notion of ‘sovereign 
performatives’ will be of assistance in conceptualising the potential ambiguity of 
legal proceedings.  
 
sovereign performatives? 
Butler coins the phrase ‘sovereign performatives’ in one of her essays in Excitable 
Speech, as part of her critique of certain jurisprudential writings on hate speech 
which turn to theories of performativity to argue how some forms of speech must 
be seen as injurious conduct. She identifies in these theories the attribution of a 
certain efficacy to individual acts of speech, an efficacy that is ‘modelled on the 
speech of a sovereign state, understood as a sovereign speech act, a speech act with 
the power to do what it says’ (1997: 77). Interestingly, this kind of sovereign 
speech is fantasised by those writing on hate speech precisely when contemporary 
power is no longer primarily sovereign in character. Thus, Butler pits the 
Foucauldian analysis of waning sovereignty up against the recourse to theories of 
performativity in conjuring this figure of the sovereign utterer of hate speech, who 
is understood to be invested with the ‘power of absolute and efficacious agency, 
performativity and transitivity at once (it does what it says and it does what it says 
it will do to the one addressed by the speech)’ (77). Butler then questions whether 
we have in these theories something like a nostalgia for sovereign power, a fantasy 
of its return: 
The emphasis on the performative phantasmatically resurrects the 
performative in language, establishing language as a displaced site of 
politics and specifying that displacement as driven by a wish to return to a 
simpler and more reassuring map of power, one in which the assumption of 
sovereignty remains secure. (78) 
Butler proposes instead a departure from the conceptual model of sovereignty in 
reformulating performativity, and rethinking agency and resistance from a non-
state-centred perspective. However, in doing so, she seems to preserve a version of 
the notion of ‘sovereign performatives’ to describe ‘the performative power of 
state-sanctioned legal language’ (81). She retains this notion in order to distinguish 
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from it the (hate) speech of citizens. Legal language, therefore, is preserved as a 
field where ‘one has the power to make happen what one says’ and the example she 
appends to this is predictable: ‘as a judge backed by law in a relatively stable 
political order has the power to do’ (82).7 
In her introduction to the same collection, Butler provides a critical account 
of Althusser’s theory of interpellation, especially taking issue with the examples he 
uses to elaborate his theory. According to Butler, the analogy that Althusser 
formulates between his example of the policeman who hails ‘Hey, you there!’ and 
his other example of God naming Peter and thereby transforming him into a 
subject, models his theory of interpellation on the figure of the divine voice: ‘In 
claiming that social ideology operates in an analogous way to the divine voice, 
Althusser inadvertently assimilates social interpellation to the divine performative’ 
(31). Butler argues for an account of ideology that does away with this figure of the 
divine voice. The divine power of naming must be dissociated from the otherwise 
useful notion of interpellation, because: 
the voice is implicated in a notion of sovereign power, power figured as 
emanating from a subject, activated in a voice, whose effects appear to be 
the magical effects of that voice. In other words, power is understood on 
the model of the divine power of naming, where to utter is to create the 
effect uttered. Human speech rarely mimes that divine effect except in the 
cases where the speech is backed by state power, that of a judge, the 
immigration authority, or the police, and even then there does sometimes 
exist recourse to refute that power. (32) 
She does not go on to theoretically address the ‘recourse to refute that power’. Nor 
does she seem interested in offering a deconstruction of this notion of the 
‘sovereign performative’. Instead she counters it again with its historicised outside, 
i.e. with the Foucauldian critique, and thus pursues the question of conceptualising 
interpellation ‘after the diffusion of sovereign power’ (34). In a way, ‘sovereign 
performative’ can be said to remain a thing in her theory, at least instrumental as a 
term, to signify speech backed by state-power, typically the speech of a judge. She 
does, however, gesture towards a deconstruction of this notion in a brief aside that 
follows her discussion of Althusser, by suggesting that even the speech of the 
                                                
7 Cf. J.L. Austin (1975: 88): ‘If you are a judge and say “I hold that…” then to say you hold is to 
hold; with less official persons it is not so clearly so’.  
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policeman who hails the person on the street is governed by conventionality. That 
is, his ostensibly sovereign speech is effective only due to its citational dimension, 
a ‘historicity of [linguistic] convention that exceeds and enables the moment of its 
enunciation’ (33). This is an allusion to Derrida’s discussion of performative 
speech acts in ‘Signature Event Context’, even though Butler does not go on to 
fully unpack the allusion at this moment in the text. 
It would be stretching the argument to propose that Butler leaves untouched 
the notion of a sovereign performative. However, I find it interesting that the term 
remains somewhat operative even in her work, if only to reveal something about a 
fantasy of power, though nevertheless used to refer to the performative speech of, 
say, ‘a judge backed by law in a relatively stable political order’. There is 
something ever so slightly reminiscent here of Austin’s gestures towards legal 
language to highlight that which is not ideally efficacious in ordinary language, the 
so many ways in which the latter can fail, implying the former won’t ever really do 
so.8 And while Butler is justified in conjuring this image of a judge whose speech 
can indeed be said to amount to conduct leading to injury (as hate speech is 
fantasised to be), unleashing the force of law on the body of the addressee of his or 
her speech act, we may want to explore the structural potential of fissure even 
within such ostensibly fully sovereign performatives. Thus, in addition to wanting 
to sully Austin’s fetish, I want to extend the implications of Butler’s work on the 
performative to question the very possibility of a ‘sovereign performative’ other 
than as fantasy – even in that most efficacious site of performativity, the trial.  
The intrinsic challenge that the idea of performativity poses to the notion of 
sovereignty is closely linked to two issues: the question of conventionality (or what 
Derrida refers to in terms of ‘iterability’); and the simple fact that performatives are 
performed. With regards to the latter, it seems wise to take Austin at his word when 
he writes ‘a word never –well, hardly ever– shakes off its etymology and its 
formation’ (1970: 201) or, indeed, when he states specifically with reference to his 
coinage of ‘performative’ that ‘its etymology is not irrelevant’ (1975: 7). The 
etymological relevance he had in mind was perhaps simply a wish to emphasise 
that performatives ‘perform’, but it seems crucial to be attuned to the fact that they 
                                                
8 See my discussion in Chapter 2 on the status of legal language in Austin’s work. 
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are also performed. Thus, an understanding of performativity that takes into 
account the question of performance is key here, and it is not unrelated to the 
question of iterability. Ironically, precisely such an attempt to think the 
performance of performativity and the performativity of performance (Judith 
Butler’s work) seems to have incited in its uptakes an uncritical conflation of the 
two notions, that is, the use of the term performativity in referring primarily to 
forms of theatricality. In the following sections, I first explore the theoretical 
implications of this conflation in terms of an inability to grasp the critique of 
sovereign agency that the conceptualisation of performativity involves. Then I trace 
this critique back to Austin’s work by challenging Derrida’s reading of Austin with 
the help of Stanley Cavell and Shoshana Felman. I then explore the further 
elaborations of this critique in Derrida, Felman and Butler’s works, before moving 
on to consider the implications of all this for rethinking the politics of political 
trials. This I do by returning to the three scenes I have sketched at the beginning of 
this chapter. 
 
(mis)reading the performative: the theatrical turn 
The use of ‘performative’ to refer to forms of theatricality is understandably quite 
widespread in performance studies publications from the 1980s onward. Yet the 
conflation encountered in critical thought should perhaps be traced back to Judith 
Butler’s reconfiguration of the term in Gender Trouble, its reception and, to some 
extent, misinterpretation. Notably, in this work, Butler formulates gender 
performativity without a single reference to J. L. Austin or his speech act theory.9 
And yet framed in terms of signs, discourse and even ‘inscriptions’ on the surface 
of the body, the idea of gender performativity is clearly not divorced from the order 
of language and signification. In other words, gendered corporeality is partially 
linguisticised in this work, in the sense that it is thought through in terms of 
                                                
9 Nor is Austin to be found in a 1990 essay she published soon after Gender Trouble, though here 
she provides an intriguing and itinerant genealogy to the notion of performativity, mentioning John 
Searle in passim, but drawing mainly on the phenomenological theory of acts (Marleau-Ponty, 
Husserl) and its feminist uptake by Simone de Beauvoir (Butler 1990b). Austin gets a brief mention 
in a short comment piece published the same year (Butler 1990a), and finally surfaces in Butler’s 
oeuvre more fully, first towards the end of Bodies that Matter (1993), and later more extensively in 
Excitable Speech (1997). 
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discursive functions maintaining the truth-effects of the categories of gender and 
sex (Sedgwick 2003: 8). So although there are no references to speech act theory in 
Gender Trouble, certain affinities and common concerns are not difficult to find. 
Further, it is possible to read Austin into Butler’s book at the very least in terms of 
a common spirit of playful inquiry, given the two authors’ recourse to 
performativity in a shared inclination to bedevil the fetishes of truth/falsity and 
fact/value. Gender Trouble’s version of gender performativity is hardly bereft of 
linguistic significations of the term, but even more importantly, by paying close 
attention to gendered acts and gestures, and suggesting that such corporeal 
performance has the effect of reifying an ontology of gender, the work initiates a 
unique way to link the linguistic and theatrical connotations of ‘performative’. For 
Butler, gender performance is performative not only in that it is theatrical, but also 
in the sense that it operates in the same mode as a performative utterance: 
masquerading as constative, purporting to represent a truth to gender that is external 
or prior to it; while in effect enacting and fabricating that truth through its very 
performance.  
While Butler thus offered us, in her early work on gender, one significant 
way in which the performativity of corporeal performance can be thought as 
separate but related terms, a common misreading of her proposal turns precisely on 
a conflation of the two terms. This confusion could perhaps be attributed to Butler’s 
discussion of drag, clearly introduced as a marginal example of gender 
performativity, but often misread as paradigmatic. In Butler’s discussion, through 
its amplifications and exaggerations, that is, by the very means of its avowed 
artifice, drag can shed light on quotidian, normalised versions of gendered 
enactments which disavow their artifice. It is as a limit case of sorts that drag helps 
us understand the performativity of gender, the function by which certain ‘ordinary’ 
and ‘obvious’ bodily performances reify an ontology of gender. Instead, Gender 
Trouble has been widely interpreted to offer drag as the very measure and standard 
of gender performativity, leading many a commentator to dismiss her 
reconfiguration of performativity as a manifesto on the subversive power of 
crossdressing. And because a certain degree of theatrical excess is integral to drag, 
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Butler’s notion of ‘gender performativity’ has often been reduced in its reception to 
‘gender performance’, thus deprived of its philosophical connotations.  
It is interesting to watch what happens to the question of the subject in this 
reduction of performativity to theatricality. Some readers have envisioned Butler’s 
scene as a puppet show of sorts, a complete debunking of agency, with ‘discourse’ 
as a mystified matrix of power pulling the strings. For instance, in an early response 
to Butler’s work, Seyla Benhabib wrote: ‘If we are no more than the sum total of 
the gendered expressions we perform, is there ever any chance to stop the 
performance for a while, to pull the curtain down, and let it rise only if one can 
have a say in the production of the play itself?’ (1995a: 21).10 Then again, others 
who read gender performativity solely in terms of theatrical performance 
understand it to involve an absolutely voluntaristic notion of agency. This was a 
common reading in the early 1990s, but it oddly persists to this day. A recent 
analysis in this vein is offered in passing by Susie Orbach (2009), who writes with 
specific reference to Gender Trouble: 
It has become a feature of postmodernist thought to … see embodiment, 
like femininity and masculinity, as something we achieve through 
performing or enacting the body we want to have. In this kind of 
theorising, it is believed that the body can be anything we want it to be (74) 
The much celebrated American literary critic J. Hillis Miller takes all this to a new 
level, magically combining these two types of theatrical misreadings into a 
caricature of sorts:  
‘Performativity,’ it now appears, means, among other things, the 
assumption that human beings have no innate selfhood or subjectivity but 
become what they are through more or less forced repetition of a certain 
role…It is an exhilarating theory because, apparently, it blows the gaff on 
the familial, social, ideological, and political forces that have made me 
what I now think I am by forcing me to repetitive performances of that 
role. Once I understand that, the way is open to change society so I can be 
different, or even, so it appears, to take my identity into my own hands and 
‘perform’ myself into becoming some other person, some other gender, or 
some mixture of genders, or one person or gender today and another person 
or gender tomorrow. (2007: 225) 
                                                
10 In a later essay included in the same volume, Benhabib admits to having overlooked the speech 
act theory signification of Butler’s usage of performativity (1995b: 109). 
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Miller is well aware of speech act theory in this article, dedicating a significant 
portion of it to Austin. But he not only claims that Butler’s notion of performativity 
has nothing to do with Austin’s (227), but attributes it to ‘performance theory’. It 
may be helpful here to bear in mind that Miller admits to depending on the 
Wikipedia entry for this ‘reading’ of Gender Trouble.  
Needless to say that neither of these forms of theatrical reductionism, that is, 
neither the puppet show nor the scene of spontaneously-willed and absolutely-
intentional play-acting, nor even a fanciful combination of the two, can properly 
stage Butler’s crucial reconfiguration of performativity. In the former misreading, 
some phantasmic notion of ‘discourse’ is afforded sovereign status, as the 
inexorable and invincible puller of strings (as fate, perhaps); in the latter, 
sovereignty is bestowed upon the subject as the power to turn every whimsical 
desire into reality. When the two are combined, as in Miller’s version, the scene 
becomes one of a tug-of-war between discrete sovereignties. The theatrical 
misreadings notably correspond to either the eradication of the political or its 
overdetermination.  
 
derrida’s austin: sovereign pretensions 
It turns out that theatrical reductionism is not the only route towards a voluntaristic 
(mis)reading that bestows the subject of performativity with absolute sovereignty. 
Such an account could persist even after the recognition of the term’s origins in 
speech act theory, especially if one read Austin as Derrida does in his essay 
‘Signature Event Context’ (1988: 1-23). This fascinating essay concisely weaves 
much that seems disparate together into an illuminating whole, and Derrida’s 
extremely influential musings on Austin actually take up less than a third of the 
entire piece. Central to the essay is the notion that iterability introduces into 
language, as its very condition of possibility, a ‘logic that ties repetition to alterity’ 
(7). One of Derrida’s key movements here is to carry the predicates that constitute 
the classical concept of writing over to speech. In other words, certain 
characteristics of writing that are deemed distinctive, such as the potential non-
presence of the subject who has produced the writing, or the force of rupture that 
severs the writing from its context (from its milieu of production and from the 
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intentional investments of its author) while allowing it to continue functioning, are 
made to bear on speech itself. Thus Derrida turns to Austin’s speech act theory to 
trace in what ways presence and intention are always already compromised in 
speech, and how the parasitism classically attributed to writing is the very condition 
of language, even in its spoken form.  
Characteristically, Derrida hones in on two exclusions that Austin explicitly 
acknowledges: the exclusion of the general infelicities that afflict all actions and the 
exclusion of citational uses of language. Both of these appear as provisional 
exclusions in Austin, who says ‘some very general high-level doctrine might 
embrace’ the first subject of exclusion, and also that the second ‘might be brought 
into a more general account’ (1975: 21-22). Derrida finds Austin’s deferral of such 
a general theory ‘highly significant’ (1988: 16). But he seems to take one hasty 
step: he interprets the first exclusion as Austin’s failure to perceive the possible 
infelicity of a performative as a structural possibility. For Derrida, it will not suffice 
to grant an accidental status to the infelicities that Austin discusses under the two 
main headings of ‘Misfires’ (utterance of a performative without the requisite 
conventional procedure, or by a person without the requisite authority, or in 
circumstances inappropriate to the conventional procedure, or without executing 
the procedure correctly, or without executing it completely) and ‘Abuses’ (insincere 
performative utterances). Instead ‘the value of risk or exposure to infelicity’ should 
be ‘interrogated as an essential predicate or as a law’ (15) of performative 
utterances. While Derrida’s suggestion that failure is integral to the structure of the 
performative and thus the theory should take it into account as such is intriguing, it 
is actually not so clear that Austin refuses to do so. Derrida’s mistake is to quote 
Austin’s first exclusion as evidence of his refusal to think infelicity as a structural 
possibility. This then allows him to claim that by virtue of the former exclusion, 
Austin retains the speaking subject’s intention as the organising centre in his 
scheme of the performative utterance: ‘a free consciousness present to the totality 
of the operation’ of the felicitous performative utterance, and ‘an absolutely 
meaningful speech [vouloir-dire] master of itself’ (15). 
However, this reading of Austin as centralising intention in his account of 
performative utterances has been ably contested by Stanley Cavell (1994: 85-88), 
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who points out that the first exclusion is not an exclusion of infelicity as a 
necessary condition of performatives, but the exclusion of a different, a more 
general kind of unhappiness that afflicts all actions, including but not limited to 
speech acts. To understand what Cavell means when he suggests that Derrida did 
not fully understand Austin on this point, it will be useful here to quote in full the 
passage where Austin announces his first exclusion: 
Well, the first thing to remember is that, since, in uttering our 
performatives we are undoubtedly in a sound enough sense ‘performing 
actions’, then, as actions, these will be subject to certain whole dimensions 
of unsatisfactoriness to which all actions are subject but which are distinct 
–or distinguishable– from what we have chosen to discuss as infelicities. I 
mean that actions in general (not all) are liable, for example, to be done 
under duress, or by accident, or owing to this or that variety of mistake, 
say, or otherwise unintentionally. In many such cases we are certainly 
unwilling to say of some such act simply that it was done or that he did it. I 
am not going into the general doctrine here: in many such cases we may 
even say that the act was ‘void’ (or voidable for duress or undue influence) 
and so forth. Now I suppose some very general high-level doctrine might 
embrace both what we have called infelicities and these other ‘unhappy’ 
features of the doing of actions –in our case actions containing a 
performative utterance– in a single doctrine: but we are not including this 
kind of unhappiness – we must just remember, though, that features of this 
sort can and do constantly obtrude into any particular case we are 
discussing. (21) 
Austin makes a clear distinction here between the various ways in which human 
action can fail on the one hand, and the specific infelicities that afflict 
performatives (i.e., Misfires and Abuses) on the other. He says his theory embraces 
the latter, though not the former. Derrida’s account, however, collapses this 
distinction, flagging this passage as evidence of Austin’s disavowal of infelicity as 
the very structural possibility of the performative. Thus, according to Derrida, 
Austin’s procedure  
consists in recognising that the possibility of the negative (in this case, of 
infelicities) is in fact a structural possibility, that failure is an essential risk 
of the operations under consideration; then in a move which is almost 
immediately simultaneous, in the name of a kind of ideal regulation, it 
excludes that risk as accidental, exterior, one which teaches us nothing 
about the linguistic phenomenon being considered. (15) 
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Derrida is not very convincing on this point, especially given Austin’s outright 
prioritisation of infelicities in his discussion of the performative to the extent that 
the book can be read ‘as an amusing catalogue of such failed performatives’ (Butler 
1997: 16). Indeed, the performative attains its very definition through its countless 
failures in Austin, whose humorous rhetoric only reinforces this sense of the 
performative as a perpetual comedy of errors. A reading in this vein is offered by 
Shoshana Felman (2003) who draws attention to the performativity of Austin’s 
theorising itself, his humorous exposure of his own failure to provide a solid 
ground for the notion of the ‘performative’. This ‘self-subversion, this self-
transgressive character of the Austinian performance’ (43), according to Felman, 
only goes to show that ‘for Austin, the capacity for failure is situated not outside 
but inside the performative, both as speech act and as theoretical instrument. 
Infelicity, or failure, is not for Austin an accident of the performative, it is inherent 
in it, essential to it’ (45).11 
Concerning the exclusion of the more general unhappinesses that afflict all 
human actions (the exclusion that Austin does admit to in this passage) Cavell has 
suggested that this is not an exclusion in Derrida’s sense, i.e. a constitutive outside 
to his theory of performativity, but rather a reference to elsewhere where he does 
discuss it in detail. In other words, it is not that Austin ‘rejects and defers’ (Derrida: 
16) the question by saying ‘I am not going into the general doctrine here’, but 
rather means ‘I have discussed it elsewhere and it must be born in mind’. Indeed, 
for anyone familiar with Austin’s ‘A Plea for Excuses’, this reference should be 
obvious. In this essay, Austin proposes to imagine the variety of situations in which 
we make excuses, that is, the myriad ways in which intentionality falters, fails, or is 
altogether absent: ‘If we have a lively imagination, together perhaps with an ample 
experience of dereliction, we shall go far, only we need system: I do not know how 
many of you keep a list of the kinds of fool you make of yourselves’ (1970: 186).  
Derrida’s charge that Austin’s ordinary language philosophy involves 
‘pass[ing] off as ordinary an ethical and teleological determination’ of which ‘the 
transparency of intentions’ of the speaking subject is a key element (17), and his 
                                                
11 For Felman’s astute discussion of Austin’s critics’ failure to take his constant joking seriously, 
also see pp. 94-96.  
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diagnosis to the effect that Austin’s discussion of infelicities delineates the 
‘teleological jurisdiction of an entire field whose organising centre remains 
intention’ (15) seem to be undermined also by the very status of intention in How 
To Do Things With Words. One significant moment is Austin’s discussion of the 
type of infelicities that he refers to as Abuses, the subcategories of which are 
insincerities and infractions or breaches. These infelicities arise when the procedure 
is ‘designed for use by persons having certain thoughts, feelings, or intentions, or 
for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant’ 
(15) and the persons invoking the procedure in fact do not have such thoughts, 
feelings or intentions (i.e. I say ‘I congratulate you on your performance’ while 
thinking it was a flop), or they do not intend to carry on with the necessary 
consequential conduct (i.e. I say ‘I promise I’ll be there’ while having no intention 
to go), or even if they had the necessary thoughts, feelings intentions at the time 
and for consequential conduct, they fail to conduct themselves subsequently (I say 
‘I bet you sixpence it’ll rain tomorrow’, I sincerely think it will, and I intend to 
claim my sixpence from you if it does or pay you if it doesn’t, but it doesn’t rain 
tomorrow and I fail to give you the sixpence). Even with this category of Abuses, 
the crux of which seems to be the intentions of the speaker, it would be a mistake to 
conclude that intentionality is centralised in Austin’s account. Significantly, when 
discussing Abuses, Austin repeatedly emphasises that such infelicities do not render 
the act void, so that I have still congratulated you, promised you, and entered a bet 
with you, regardless of my thoughts, feelings, intentions or future conduct. This is 
precisely why the constative model falls short of capturing performative utterances 
– ‘I congratulate you on your performance’ is not the description of an inward 
spiritual act of me congratulating you, it may indeed be anything but. Austin’s 
classical example for this key failure of the constative model is derived from 
Hippolytus’ utterance in Euripides’ play, ‘my tongue swore to, but my heart did 
not’. Austin writes: 
It is gratifying to observe in this very example how excess of profundity, or 
rather solemnity, at once paves the way for immodality. For one who says 
‘promising is not merely a matter of uttering words! It is an inward and 
spiritual act!’ is apt to appear as a solid moralist standing out against a 
generation of superficial theorisers: we see him as he sees himself, 
surveying the invisible depths of ethical space, with all the distinction of a 
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specialist in the sui generis. Yet he provides Hippolytus with a let-out, the 
bigamist with an excuse for his ‘I do’ and the welsher with a defence for 
his ‘I bet’. Accuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying 
that our word is our bond. (10) 
Thus rather than centralising intentionality, Austin’s theory of the performative 
emphasises its irrelevance in key scenarios.  
To Cavell’s suggestion that Derrida did not read Austin’s work on excuses, I 
would add my own suspicion that Derrida’s reading of How To Do Things With 
Words was distorted by French linguist Emile Benveniste’s rigidifying revision of 
Austin’s notion of the performative in a 1963 paper, where Benveniste disapproves 
of Austin for ‘[setting] up a distinction and then immediately [going] about 
watering down and weakening it to the point of making one doubt its existence’ 
(Benveniste 1971: 234). He thus took it upon himself to resuscitate the 
performative, in the meantime rendering it somewhat unrecognisable.12 Notably, it 
was Benveniste who adopted and popularised Austin’s notion of the performative 
in French thought (Cassin 2009: 349), soon after Austin introduced his coinage into 
French (as ‘performatif’) at a colloquium held at Royaumont (Austin 1963). While 
there is no explicit reference to Benveniste’s paper in ‘Signature Event Context’, 
the influence of his rendition can be traced in Derrida’s employment of certain 
phrases, as well as the key focus of his inquiry around ‘citationality’. The challenge 
that Derrida poses to conceiving of the performative in terms of the ‘pure 
singularity of the event’ (Derrida 1988: 17), and to its description as a ‘singular and 
original event utterance’ (18), or as ‘the most “event-ridden” utterance there is’ (19) 
is less an argument against Austin than against Benveniste’s version of Austin. In 
fact, the word ‘event’ is never once used in Austin’s lectures as part of a description 
of the performative. While Austin continuously emphasises the conventionality, the 
ritual or ceremonial character of performative utterances, it is Benveniste who 
reduces the performative to its presumed singularity, uniqueness, eventness and 
unrepeatability, when he writes, for example,  
The performative utterance, being an act, has the property of being unique. 
… in short it is an event because it creates the event. Being an individual 
and historical act, a performative utterance cannot be repeated. (236) 
                                                
12 For a succinct and thorough account of Benveniste’s revision of Austin, see Felman 2003: 9-11. 
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Benveniste further proposes that utterances that have become cliché cannot be 
considered performative, thus potentially excluding many of Austin’s paradigmatic 
examples.  
Significantly, Benveniste also refuses to take into account the theory of 
infelicities, which forms the very crux of Austin’s discussion: ‘we shall neither 
examine the considerations of the logical “unhapinesses” which can overtake and 
render inoperative either type of utterance, nor the conclusions Austin was led to by 
them’ (234). Thus the exclusion that Derrida attributes to Austin, the allegation that 
Austin excludes the risk of infelicity ‘as accidental, exterior, one which teaches us 
nothing about the linguistic phenomenon being considered’ (Derrida 1988: 15) 
much more appropriately describes Benveniste’s move here. In fact, Benveniste 
even ends up arguing that failed performatives are not performatives at all – that, 
for example, a performative uttered by a person without the requisite authority is in 
fact not a performative: 
anybody can shout in the public square, “I decree a general mobilisation,” 
and as it cannot be an act because the requisite authority is lacking, such an 
utterance is no more than words; it reduces itself to futile clamour, 
childishness or lunacy. A performative utterance that is not an act does not 
exist. (Benveniste 1971: 236) 
If failed performatives are not performatives, what could they be? Futile clamour, 
childishness or lunacy, all of which in turn can apparently be said not to exist. By 
rending the performative from its context of conventionality and excluding the 
theory of infelicities in this curious manual for how to do all or nothing with words, 
Benveniste effectively attributes an absolute presence, absolute intentionality and 
absolute sovereignty to s/he who utters performatives. Indeed, without these 
absolutes, the performative is not one according to Benveniste. My sense is that 
Austin would have argued against this rendition, and not only because it is 
absolutely devoid of humour. In this sense the presuppositions that Derrida 
criticises in Austin (absolute intentionality, absolute presence and uniqueness) 
would be more appropriately directed to Benveniste’s explicitly ‘corrective’ 
reading of Austin. 
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reintegrating the theatrical 
Even if Derrida’s charge against Austin concerning the centrality of intentionality is 
something of a misfire itself, his proposal for ‘decentring intentionality’ in Austin’s 
theory is interesting for other reasons, as it involves the reintegration of the 
excluded ‘citational’ into the conceptual framework of the performative. Focusing 
on Austin’s second exclusion, namely his passage on the ‘not serious’, ‘parasitic’ 
uses and thus ‘etiolations’ of language (i.e. utterances by an actor on stage, 
introduced in a poem or spoken in soliloquy) Derrida suggests that this quality of 
being a quotation, this citationality is not only a possibility available to every act of 
utterance, but in fact the necessary condition of all language. Language is 
conditioned by a structural iterability. Allowing a general theory of what Derrida 
calls ‘this structural parasitism’ of all language will help construct a differential 
typology of forms of iterability whereby ‘we will be dealing with different kinds of 
marks or chains of iterable marks and not with an opposition between citational 
utterances, on the one hand, and singular and original event-utterances, on the 
other’ (1988: 18). Thus, Austin’s excluded parasite (practices that involve 
recitation) is to be brought in as part and parcel of a general scheme. The 
interesting move here is that such an inclusion comes to have bearing on Austin’s 
first exclusion as well, at least in the way Derrida reads the first exclusion as 
centralising intentionality. In such a differential typology that embraces the fully 
citational utterance, the category of intention, according to Derrida, ‘will not 
disappear; it will have is place, but from that place it will no longer be able to 
govern the entire scene and system of utterance’ (ibid). Notably, an absolute 
intentionality, one which is thoroughly present to itself and to the utterance it 
animates cannot be part of this typology. The very iterability necessarily 
conditioning language disallows, or rather, renders impossible this kind of full 
saturation. Indeed the iterability of language serves as a structural unconscious that 
is present to each and every utterance, placing it beyond the utterer’s intention, full 
consciousness or ultimate control. So Derrida is flagging the impossibility of such 
‘singular and original event-utterances’, while proposing to include Austin’s 
excluded citational as part of the differential typology. This typology that would 
range between the two also exposes their impossibility and the impossibility of 
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their ultimate opposition: there are neither fully citational utterances, nor singular 
and original event-utterances –neither the puppet show, nor sovereign play-acting, 
as it were– but only gradations therein.  
Judith Butler’s notion of performativity shares with Derrida this differential 
understanding of intentionality, as an element that neither fully disappears from the 
scene, nor fully governs it. In an illuminating study that does much to clarify the 
often misread relationship between linguisticity and materiality in Butler’s work, 
Elena Loizidou (2007) suggests that Derrida fails to dislocate intentionality as the 
organiser of iteration, whereas Butler ‘breaks this attachment with the “I” (or 
intention)’ (34-35). It seems to me, however, that Butler and Derrida are in 
agreement concerning the status of intention in their respective understandings of 
performativity. Derrida’s theory of the general iterability of all language does 
indeed displace intentionality as the sovereign organiser of speech (something he 
mistakenly attributes to Austin), by introducing a ‘structural unconscious’ that 
governs every utterance. Butler, in turn, follows Derrida quite closely on this, as 
she explicitly acknowledges her debt to Derrida’s reformulation of intentionality 
vis-à-vis performativity in her essay ‘For a Careful Reading’, quoting and then 
closely echoing Derrida: ‘The category of “intention”, indeed, the notion of “the 
doer” will have its place, but this place will no longer be “behind” the deed as its 
enabling source’ (Butler 1995: 134).13 
The key difference between Butler and Derrida in their respective 
appropriations of the notion of the performative has to do with the body. While 
Derrida in his account of the performative argues against Austin’s exclusion of the 
theatrical, it is not bodily performance that he wishes to bring into the scene, but 
rather the general condition of citationality. This is actually very faithful to the 
structure of Austin’s exclusion, since as I’ve highlighted in Chapter 2, the latter 
excludes the theatrical on the basis of its citationality rather than its materiality or 
status as bodily performance, while not giving much thought to the latter 
dimension. Thus in Derrida’s appropriation, the performative remains linguistic, 
and in self-conscious irony, the closest he comes to the question of materiality is 
                                                
13 Cf. Derrida ‘the category of intention will not disappear; it will have its place, but from that place 
it will no longer be able to govern the entire scene and system of utterance’ (1988: 18). 
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through the figure of the signature. In contrast, Butler, as explained above, 
addresses performativity in relation to bodily gestures, signs, and signification 
practices. While this may be obvious as an essential movement for her account of 
the performativity of gender, it is crucial to note that she retains the significance of 
the bodily even when she directly addresses and problematises speech acts as such. 
Hence much of Excitable Speech is dedicated to thinking through ‘the speech act 
itself as a nexus of bodily and psychic forces’ (1997: 141) in various aspects and 
several different contemporary contexts.14 
Derrida’s exclusion of the bodily is especially striking when we note that the 
emphasis on citationality is an occasion for him to introduce a concept of the 
unconscious. Significantly, in ‘Signature Event Context’ this is not an embodied 
unconscious of fears, desires and instincts, but rather a ‘structural unconscious’ that 
derives from the necessary citationality of all language. Thus the historical 
sedimentations that language carries by virtue of its citationality do not ever allow 
the subject of speech to fully consciously instrumentalise language. Rather, in each 
utterance, something of the structural unconscious of language speaks beyond the 
conscious intentions of the speaker. An implied conclusion would be that perhaps 
in each utterance, language speaks something of the subject’s unconscious. But this 
latter conclusion is not quite tangible in ‘Signature Event Context’, and even if it is 
implied, it is certainly not explored. Granted, in ‘Limited Inc a b c…’, his 
polemical rejoinder to John R. Searle’s unfortunate response to ‘Signature Event 
Context’, Derrida personalises this ‘structural unconscious’ as part of his rhetoric of 
ridicule (1988: 75). But compared to the status of the unconscious in Shoshana 
Felman’s (2003) contribution to speech act theory, Derrida’s gesture here seems to 
be towards a more disembodied (‘structural’) sense of the unconscious. 
Felman, on the other hand, directly addresses the question of the role of the 
body in speech act theory in her book The Scandal of the Speaking Body, where she 
stages a dazzling encounter between Molière’s Don Juan, J. L. Austin’s speech act 
theory, and psychoanalysis. For Felman, it is crucial to be attuned to the fact that 
the speech act is both linguistic and bodily at once, thus obliterating the distinction 
between the two: 
                                                
14 See especially her Introduction and Chapter 4.  
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The act, an enigmatic and problematic production of the speaking body, 
destroys from its inception the metaphysical dichotomy between the 
domain of the ‘mental’ and the domain of the ‘physical’, breaks down the 
opposition between body and spirit, between matter and language. ‘A 
body,’ Lacan says, ‘is speech arising as such’. (Felman 2003: 65) 
It is by its very virtue of being a bodily act that speech always brings the 
unconscious into play, which in turn poses an irreducible risk to the felicity of any 
and every speech act.15 This is what Felman refers to as the ‘scandal’ of the 
speaking body, which ‘consists in the fact that the act cannot know what it is doing’ 
(67). Thus, compared to Derrida’s more circuitous route to the role of the 
unconscious in the theory of the performative utterance, Felman identifies it as 
already evident in the very phraseology of speech act theory itself.  
The notion of a ‘sovereign performative’ is untenable in both Judith Butler’s 
and Shoshana Felman’s schemes, precisely because a performative speech act is 
performed. As bodily performance, something of the sovereign status of speech is 
always already undone. This undoing of sovereign speech is also found in Jacques 
Derrida’s treatment of the performative, although it is not occasioned by the body 
as such. Instead the impossibility, strictly speaking, of a ‘sovereign performative’ in 
Derrida’s treatment is an effect of iterability as the necessary condition of any and 
all language – so it is not this or that particular body’s desires, fears or anxieties as 
such that undermines sovereign speech, but rather how language works as 
language, how it structurally lends itself to the unconscious of the speaker. The 
distinction may seem slight, but it is crucial. Butler’s work on performativity is 
further intriguing because it not only addresses the speech act as bodily (Felman), 
and the necessary citationality of linguisticity (Derrida), but also bridges these two 
insights to explore the citationality of bodily practices.  
 
undoing sovereignty 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the conceptualisation of performativity 
involves a particular model of (political) agency as well as a challenge to the 
possibility of an unhampered sovereignty. Derrida, Felman and Butler, following 
                                                
15 Similarly for Stanley Cavell (1994: 87), the endless failures to which human action is exposed has 
to do with the body.  
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Austin, formulate this challenge as arising out of two conditions of performatives: 
conventionality (iterability) and performance (the performative as speech act). In an 
initial attempt to explore the significance of this vein of analysis for studying trials, 
I would like to return to the three political trial scenes that I have described at the 
beginning of this chapter, with more detailed case studies of other trials following 
in the next two chapters.  
 The episode I described from the Chicago Conspiracy Trial serves as a 
particularly lucid example of the challenge posed to sovereign performativity by 
iterability or conventionality. Recall that in Chapter 2, I discussed the significance 
of conventions for legal proceedings. Admittedly, the conventionality of a trial is in 
one sense what promises its justice: along with strict rules of procedure, courtroom 
etiquette has evolved partly with a view to the doing of justice. In a criminal trial, 
justice is owed to the accused as much as to the victim, thus conventions are ideally 
meant to protect subjects from the arbitrary imposition of punishment as a form of 
sovereign violence. In a political trial, although these same conventions may be 
followed, they may well serve to undo the sovereign will at work in the 
proceedings. This applies first and foremost to the most classical type of political 
trial where authorities take recourse to legal proceedings to eliminate their foes – 
ostensibly a sovereign performative par excellence. As I have discussed earlier in 
this chapter, Otto Kirchheimer (1961: 118) identifies a number of ways in which 
the sovereign performative is risked in the political trial, having to do with the 
political commitments, intentions and wills of participants other than the 
prosecutor. I had suggested that this formulation of risk is one that bestows 
sovereign agency not only to the will behind the proceedings but also to the 
contenders for sovereign performativity, and I sought recourse to theories of 
performativity for alternative conceptualisations of agency. Notably, however, there 
is another reason Kirchheimer identifies for the ‘irreducible risk’ and this is not 
premised on a notion of sovereign agency: uncertainties stemming from legal 
procedure itself. In Kirchheimer’s account, if allowed to follow its own course, a 
trial’s outcome, how it eventually plays out may be determined by the strict 
conventionality required procedurally. Thus conventionality, a defining feature of 
any legal proceeding, lodges an unpredictability at the heart of the trial. Just as it 
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may serve to unravel sovereign claims in the trial, this unpredictability is also the 
trial’s structural promise of justice, no matter what the political will behind the 
effort is.  
A common dynamic linked to this uncertainty in political trials is the 
mobilisation of the legal conventions by persons, often defendants, who are 
unauthorised to do so. Thus the ‘irreducible risk’ of the political trial becomes the 
risk of untethering the court’s conventions from the sovereign agency of the state, 
allocating the force of the performative outside its control. The fact that 
conventions can be wielded by various participants in the trial beyond the 
intentions of the political will subtending the proceedings is nothing exceptional if 
the counter-mobilisation remains within the boundaries of what would be 
considered an ‘effective defence’. But another dynamic is at work in a trial like the 
Chicago Conspiracy Trial where conventions were taken up beyond the limits of 
authorised conduct to the point of effective subversion of the entire proceedings. 
The resultant image could not be reduced to any participant’s intentions or strategy, 
but instead can be understood as a revelation of law’s structural unconscious.  
In his repeated attempts to exercise his right to represent himself, Bobby 
Seale ventured, for example, to cross-examine all witnesses for the prosecution. He 
would thus strategically disrupt the proceedings, but crucially, he would speak only 
when he would have been allowed to speak had he been granted the right to defend 
himself. This careful deployment of convention lent his unauthorised speech a 
veritable authority. As Judith Butler suggests, ‘being authorised to speak’ and 
‘speaking with authority’ are not necessarily equivalent, and further ‘it is precisely 
the expropriability of the dominant, “authorised” discourse that constitutes one 
potential site of its subversive resignification’ (1997: 157). That Seale spoke with 
authority in the courtroom was indeed corroborated by another scene: As the 
conflict between Seale and Judge Hoffman mounted, the spectator seats were filled 
with increasing numbers of young Black Panthers. When Judge Hoffman cautioned 
the audience, Seale told him that ‘they would not take orders from “racist judges” 
but he could convey the orders’ (Schultz 2009: 58). Surprisingly, Seale was taken 
up on his offer on the following day, when the marshals asked him, in the name of 
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the judge and themselves, to caution the Panthers in the audience, and Seale agreed 
to do so (61). 
Increasingly frustrated with the progress of the trial, Seale also began directly 
usurping the judge’s speech: 
THE COURT: Let the record show that the defendant Seale has refused to be 
quiet in the face of the admonition and direction of the court. 
MR. SEALE: Let the record show that Bobby Seale speaks out in behalf of 
his constitutional rights, his right to defend himself, his right to speak in 
behalf of himself in this courtroom. 
THE COURT: Again let the record show that he has disobeyed the order of 
the court. Bring in the jury, Mr. Marshal. 
MR. SEALE: Please do  
(…) 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, good morning. 
MR. SEALE: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen of the jury.16  
Then, later: 
THE COURT: Let the record show that the defendant --  
MR. SEALE: Let the record show you violated that and a black man cannot 
be discriminated against in relation to his legal defense and that is exactly 
what you have done. You know you have. Let the record show that.  
THE COURT: The record shows exactly to the contrary.  
MR. SEALE: The record shows that you are violating, that you violated my 
constitutional rights. I want to cross examine the witness. I want to cross 
examine the witness.  
THE COURT: … I admonish you, sir, that you have a lot of contemptuous 
conduct against you.  
MR. SEALE: Admonish you. You are in contempt of people's constitutional 
rights. You are in contempt of the constitutional rights of the mass of the 
people of the United States. You are the one in contempt of people's 
constitutional rights. I am not in contempt of nothing. You are the one who 
is in contempt. The people of America need to admonish you and the 
whole Nixon administration. (381) 
These instances, later cited at length by the trial judge as part of specifications for 
contempt charges, were allowed precisely by the citationality of legal procedure as 
its inherent possibility. By mimicking, and indeed parasitising conventional legal 
speech, Seale revealed and deployed its structural infelicity. The unauthorised 
usurpation of the speech of authority worked to destabilise authority. Responding to 
                                                
16 United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 378 (7th Cir. 1972), LexisNexis. 
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Bourdieu’s emphasis on the decisive factor of social power in determining the 
efficacy of a speech act, Butler questions whether the context of legitimacy must be 
figured as necessarily immovable:  
is there a sure way of distinguishing between the imposter and the real 
authority? And are there moments in which the utterance forces a blurring 
between the two, where the utterance calls into question the established 
grounds of legitimacy, where the utterance, in fact, performatively 
produces a shift in the terms of legitimacy as an effect of the utterance 
itself? (146) 
The performativity of Seale’s speech in the trial can be understood to precisely 
reconfigure the terms of legitimacy. 
In this respect, the culmination of this entire affair in the binding and gagging 
of Seale is extremely revealing: Judge Hoffman had already intimated during the 
previous day that he may take recourse to such a measure on the basis of a recent 
precedent.17 On the day, Seale continued insisting on his right to cross-examine the 
witnesses, and when denied, pointed to the portraits hanging on the courtroom wall 
behind the judge and said ‘You have George Washington and Benjamin Franklin 
sitting in a picture behind you, and they was slave owners. That’s what they were. 
They owned slaves. You are acting in the same manner, denying me my 
constitutional rights being able to cross examine this witness’ (US v. Seale, 383). 
When the judge reminded Seale of what ‘might happen to you’, Seale responded: 
‘Happen to me? What can happen to me more than what Benjamin Franklin and 
George Washington did to black people in slavery? What can happen to me more 
than that?’ (ibid). The binding and gagging took place very soon after this 
exchange, revealing and re-enacting some aspect of the foundational violence of 
slavery in the trial. The locus of this re-enactment was the very body of the 
defendant who spoke of the continuity between law-instituting and law-preserving 
violence, and the re-enactment was triggered by his speech. In this sense, although 
he was the victim of what William Kunstler called out as ‘this medieval torture’ 
                                                
17 United States ex re. Allen v. State of Illinois, 413 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1969), LexisNexis. Here the 
Court of Appeals had ruled that despite his ‘disruptive and disrespectful conduct’ the defendant 
should not have been excluded from the courtroom, but that the ‘proper course for the trial judge 
was to have restrained the defendant by whatever means necessary, even if those means included his 
being shackled and gagged’ (235).  
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(385), Seale’s performatives were among the most felicitious in that courtroom. 
Moments after he spoke of the legacies of constitutive violence, it materialised 
before everyone’s eyes. This is of course not to say that he intentionally brought it 
onto himself, but precisely the unauthorised mobilisation of conventionality 
destabilised the spectacle of sovereignty to reveal the performative violence 
instituting and perpetuating that conventionality. In other words, what surfaced in 
the spectacle of a black man bound and gagged in a US district court in the second 
half of the twentieth century was the very structural unconscious of law. 
If the Chicago Conspiracy Trial thus visibly stages the structural infelicity 
that stems from the conventionality of trial performance, the other two scenes I 
introduced at the beginning of this chapter are illustrative of the exposure of 
sovereign performatives to infelicity due to the vagaries of embodied performance. 
Saddam Hussein’s Al Dujail trial was, by all means, a classic political trial: a 
former head of state tried by fiat of the successor regime. It was meant to institute 
law retrospectively, to recast as crime what had passed as legitimate under 
dictatorial prerogative. Hussein, like most defendants in classic political trials, 
chose to play havoc with the very conventions of the trial, and the fact that this was 
a ‘special’ tribunal facilitated his performance. His aim, a classic political defence 
strategy, was to advance his own counter-images so as to challenge the legitimacy 
of the trial and its performative outcomes. But perhaps we find the most succinct 
exposure or unravelling of the trial’s sovereign performativity in that scene of the 
slip of the tongue as a result of which the distinctions between the positions of 
witness, prosecutor and defendant became muddled in a particularly telling way. 
This happens beyond the intentions of Hussein himself, in an unconscious lapsus, 
which is then addressed by the judge first in a significantly tentative way: in 
offering a corrective, Amin speaks quietly, hesitantly, as if not entirely certain 
himself, or as if he doesn’t want to overemphasise the point. The judge assumes 
that when Hussein spoke of the ‘defendant’, he was referring to the prosecutor – but 
we don’t know, Hussein may have been referring to the witness. This would render 
the judge’s corrective even more interesting, making him the unwitting author of 
the complete reversal of positions. Simultaneously as Hussein masters his slip, he 
also discerns the humour in it, he is amused by his own mistake. Then he moves on 
sovereign infelicities 125 
 
 
to capitalise on the amusing moment to suggest with his head gesture, ‘whatever’. 
Whatever indeed, the prosecutor and/or the witness who testified against him would 
have been ‘defendants’ under his authority – the judge smiles back, sharing in the 
humour of the situation. Saddam Hussein’s slip of the tongue cuts through the 
spectacular conflict of sovereign claims in the courtroom to reveal just how thin a 
façade the trial constitutes. 
 Finally, the trial of the UK student protesters was an attempt by the 
Metropolitan Police to legitimise having caused near-fatal injury to a protester. 
Unlike the other two trials I have discussed here, the trial of Meadows and King did 
not have much of a public life as a political trial, except in certain limited circles. 
The hung jury in the first trial meant that the police were close to securing a 
retroactive authorisation of their violence. But when Superintendent Woods shot at 
the jury with an imaginary machine gun as a ‘last resort’, he re-enacted something 
of the sovereign violence to which the police seemed to feel entitled in the 2010 
demonstrations. The performance disrupted and unravelled the performativity at 
work in the trial. The playacted shooting of the jury was further the enactment of a 
threat on the members of the jury – an unconscious threat that perhaps was 
registered by the jury also unconsciously at some level. This inadvertent 
performance entirely reconfigured the scene so that the respective positions in the 
trial were redistributed to effect a sea change in the dynamics of performativity: the 
witness became perpetrator, defendant became victim, and jury members became 
witnesses as well as potential victims. The sovereign performative initially at work 
was thereby undermined, to give way to an entirely different truth-effect. No 
wonder, then, that the trial resulted in a unanimous acquittal. 
As privileged sites both for staging sovereign spectacles and for exposing 
(and sometimes thereby undermining) law’s performativity, political trials provide 
an important occasion for reconsidering the relation between performativity and 
performance. The double-edged nature of trial performance whereby it can make or 
break the sovereign spectacle cannot ultimately be fully attributed to the political 
designs, intentions, and strategies of participants. The disturbance of sovereign 
spectacle should be identified as transpiring also in subtler ways in trials, beyond 
the intentions and designs of the parties, though nevertheless revealing much about 
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the political at stake. In the brief examples above, I have tried to tease out the 
undecideability lodged in legal proceedings not only by their very conventions, but 
also by the involvement of bodies that ‘arise as such’ in speech, with their desires, 
fears, fantasies, anxieties.18 In the following two chapters, I offer more detailed 
case studies to further explore the vagaries of the political in political trials. Chapter 
4 is a close reading of a ‘haunted’ trial in 1921 Berlin, held in the aftermath of the 
Armenian genocide. The felicitous performatives that are enacted by, literally, a 
ghost in the trial provide an occasion to consider the spectral operations of the 
political. Here, beyond all the political calculations of the participants, we witness 
an inadvertent politicisation of the trial whereby the political emerges as something 
like a sharing of ghosts. The Berlin trial connects, intimately but spectrally, to two 
contemporary unconcluded ‘deep state’ trials from Turkey: the Ergenekon trial and 
the Hrant Dink murder trial. In Chapter 5, I turn to these two trials to explore the 
performative functions of fantasy and disavowal in the courtroom, particularly as 
they interact to produce a fetish of the state.  
 
                                                
18 Cf. ‘“A body,” Lacan says, “is speech arising as such”’ (Felman 2003: 65). 
  
 
 
4 
ghosts in the courtroom  
 the trial of soghomon tehlirian 
 
 
 
 
On 15 March 1921, a young Armenian man named Soghomon Tehlirian 
assassinated Talât Pasha, the Ottoman statesman who devised and ordered the mass 
deportations that led to the annihilation of a great majority of the empire’s 
Armenian citizens. Tehlirian killed Talât on the sidewalk of a busy street in 
Berlin’s Charlottenburg district, in broad daylight, with a single bullet to the back 
of his head. When the assassin was captured on the spot by a somewhat violent 
citizens’ arrest, he said to his captors in broken German, ‘I am an Armenian. He is a 
Turk. It is no loss to Germany’ (The Case of Soghomon Tehlirian 1985: 33).1 He 
received an injury to his head during the commotion,2 and was eventually delivered 
to the police. Although he suffered from loss of blood and a high fever during the 
night, he was interrogated by the police the next morning and testified. In this 
preliminary investigation, Tehlirian stated that his only reason for coming to 
Germany was to assassinate Talât in an act of vengeance, and that his conscience 
                                                
1 Hereafter ST, referring to the English translation of the original stenographic record of the trial 
(Der Prozess Talaat Pascha, C.J. 22/21, LG Berlin 1921) by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
(Dashnaksutyun). 
2 A 22cm-long cut running from the crown of his head to his jaw, according to a newspaper report: 
‘Die Ermordung Talaat Paschas’, Deutzsche Tageszeitung, 16 March 1921.  
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was clear.3 His trial lasted two days, over 2-3 June 1921, in a Berlin District Court, 
and resulted in acquittal.  
Technically, the acquittal was secured by the figure of a ghost – the 
apparition of Tehlirian’s mother who had perished in the death marches, understood 
in the trial as having haunted his capacity for voluntary action. In turn, the 
invocation of this singular ghost brought thousands of others into the courtroom, 
haunting the trial in myriad ways. Tehlirian’s is a curious one among political 
trials: it remained politicised despite the efforts of the prosecutor, the presiding 
judge, and the defendant himself to play down the political significance of the 
crime and the proceedings. Ironically, this inadvertent politicisation was effected by 
the ghost that was initially introduced by the defendant as a way to depoliticise the 
crime. Thus the trial is a case study in the logic and temporalities of haunting as a 
political category, revealing the reach of the political beyond considerations of 
expediency, interest, calculation and other such states of sovereign willing. Instead, 
the political in this political trial partially takes shape as a shared sense of haunting, 
a state of having ghosts in common. While the transcript provides a partial record 
of the ghosts that flocked into the courtroom following the introduction of the 
singular ghost, a historical contextualisation of the trial, namely, an inquiry into the 
processes that came to haunt the trial, and the processes that the trial came to haunt, 
illustrates the spectral operations of the political through legal procedure. 
 
talât  
The victim of the assassination, Ottoman politician Mehmet Talât, had come to 
prominence with the 1908 Young Turk Revolution which reinstituted constitutional 
rule in the Ottoman Empire4 and installed the Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) in government. Although initially only a CUP 
deputy, Talât was among the professional committee organisers who from early on 
‘held the real power and indeed became more influential than cabinet ministers or 
even grand viziers’ (Hanioğlu 2001: 280). He became Minister of Interior in 1912. 
Following a brief interlude of several months out of government, he achieved full 
                                                
3 ‘Das Geständnis Des Mörders Talaat Paschas: Vernehmung im Polizeipräsidium’, Berliner 
Tageblatt, 16 March 1921. 
4 A constitution was first adopted in 1876, only to be shelved by Sultan Abdülhamid in 1878.  
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power in the bloody coup d’état of 26 January 1913, as one of the triumvirate along 
with Enver and Cemal Pashas, both of whom were military officers unlike Talât, a 
civilian. Still, Talât is considered to have been the ‘most important single member 
of the Committee, giving it much of its character’ (Ahmad 2010: 214), indeed ‘the 
Big Boss of Turkey’, as Henry Morgenthau (1918), American Ambassador to the 
Ottoman Empire from 1913 to 1916, referred to him in his memoirs. During World 
War I, the Ottomans sided with Germany, and Talât’s role in this alliance was 
acknowledged by the Kaiser with the highest honour, the Order of the Black Eagle, 
in March 1917.5 It was also in 1917 that he became Grand Vizier, leading the 
cabinet until its resignation in October 1918. On 30 October 1918 the Ottoman 
Empire’s defeat was confirmed by an armistice agreement signed with the Allies. 
The following day, on 1 November 1918, Talât and six others of the CUP inner 
circle fled the country with the help of the German military. Talât then settled in 
Berlin under the pseudonym Ali Salih Bey.  
It has been suggested that Talât’s own reasons for his escape included his 
culpability for wartime atrocities against Armenians (Dadrian and Akçam 2011: 24; 
Akçam 2007: 269). Historian Vahakn N. Dadrian derives this from the first person 
accounts of Midhat Şükrü, the Secretary-General of the CUP, who relayed an 
intimate conversation between himself and Talât where the latter spoke of ‘the 
burden of responsibility’ with regards to the Armenian massacres only hours before 
his flight. Talât’s public statements do not corroborate it, but if there is any truth to 
the suggestion that he was indeed haunted by the massacres in this way, his 
assassination by a man who lost family members in the massacres acquires a 
particularly striking figurative force.   
It is not a matter of historical contestation that Talât and Enver Pashas 
conceived of, engineered, and ordered the mass deportations of the Armenian 
civilian population. Rather, the debate turns on whether the deportations were 
ordered with the ‘intent to destroy’ this population ‘in whole or in part’, as provided 
post-facto by Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948. As the Ottoman Empire’s successor 
state, the Republic of Turkey’s official position is that the deportations were a 
                                                
5 ‘Die Ermordung Talaat Paschas’, Kölnische Volkszeitung, 16 March 1921. 
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matter of military necessity – they were wartime measures taken against a 
rebellious population and thus justified. Relying on exaggerated accounts of 
atrocities perpetrated by Armenian militia groups prior to the deportations, this 
‘provocation thesis’ forms the basis of Turkey’s official denial of genocide and 
significantly downplays the extent and magnitude of the deportations, the resultant 
atrocities (the brutal assaults on and the mass murder of the deportees by the 
gendarmes, soldiers and gangs), as well as the ensuing appropriation of the 
deportees’ wealth by local governments. More crucially, it denies any link of 
intentionality between the deportation orders and these consequences.  
However, this was not always the official Turkish stance on the issue. 
Following the dismantling of the CUP and the flight of its leaders at the end of 
World War I, the Ottoman parliament was dominated by an assortment of anti-CUP 
politicians. This allowed the unleashing of widespread and unequivocal 
condemnations of CUP leaders for their responsibility and role in the genocide, 
across print media and in parliament (Aktar 2007; Akçam 2007: 257-302; Dadrian 
and Akçam 2011: 23-52).6 Indeed, the post-war Ottoman government initiated a 
series of prosecutions concerning crimes committed during the war, and CUP party 
leaders and functionaries were tried in Extraordinary Military Tribunals (Divan-ı 
Harbi Örfi). Mostly held in Istanbul, these trials were conducted from 1919 until 
1922, when they were truncated due to the Turkish war of independence and the 
ensuing regime change, the establishment of today’s republic. At least 63 of these 
trials directly involved crimes committed against the Armenians (Dadrian and 
Akçam 2011: 202). Talât was tried in absentia, along with other the leading CUP 
members and wartime cabinet ministers as a ‘perpetrator of the crimes of 
                                                
6 However, we also encounter early incarnations of the current official Turkish arguments in the 
parliamentary debates (Aktar 2007) and publications of that era. One such primary source in English 
is a pamphlet published by The National Congress of Turkey in 1919, entitled The Turco-Armenian 
Question: The Turkish Point of View. Written essentially as a plea to the Entente not to punish the 
entire Turkish population for the Armenian massacres, the pamphlet takes recourse to a now familiar 
story of unreasonable territorial claims of ungrateful Armenian revolutionaries and their treasonous 
war-time conduct. However, what is unusual compared to the current official stance is that this story 
is offered not as a defence of necessity (justification) but rather as an articulation of mitigating 
circumstances. More significantly, the fact of the genocide (mass murder as state policy) is not 
contested. The pamphlet states: ‘The guilt of the Unionist organisation [CUP] which conceived and 
deliberately carried out this infernal policy of extermination and robbery is patent. Its leaders rank 
among the greatest criminals of humanity’ (83). 
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massacres’. Drawing on witness testimonies, memoranda, coded telegrams, letters 
and other written documents, the indictment claimed that the massacres of 
Armenians subjected to deportation were ‘carried out under the [express] orders 
and with the knowledge of Talât, Enver and Cemal Beys’. On 5 July 1919, Talât 
was sentenced to death in absentia, for crimes that would later be formulated in 
terms of genocide.  
The Ottoman tribunals are significant in various ways, though their legacy 
has not been explored exhaustively. They were obviously political trials, more 
specifically ‘trials by fiat of the successor regime’ (Kirchheimer 1961), meant to 
provide legitimacy to the new regime through an incrimination of the previous 
regime’s policies. The importance of this tactical aspect has to be appreciated 
within the trials’ immediate political context: they were instigated at a time when 
the Ottoman Empire was anxious to placate the victors of the war in the midst of 
negotiations that were underway from January 1919 for a peace agreement. Thus to 
some extent, the trials can be seen as part of Ottoman authorities’ attempt to 
distance themselves from their predecessors so as to gain legitimacy vis-à-vis the 
Entente and secure leniency. It would, however, be misguided to overemphasise the 
international realpolitik dynamics at the expense of recognising the genuine outrage 
at the Armenian massacres and concern for retributive justice found among 
Ottoman politicians and intellectuals at the time.7 In this sense, they are interesting 
to consider as pre-Nuremberg genocide trials (Dadrian 1997; Bass 2000). In 
contemporary Turkish nationalist historiography, the trials are often dismissed as 
farcical, cruel exercises in political justice imposed and orchestrated by the Entente 
                                                
7 One account that risks such a misrecognition is Bass (2000: 106-146). His discussion is valuable 
for placing the ‘Constantinople’ trials within a historical context of attempted and actual war crimes 
tribunals from St. Helena to The Hague, thus revising the Nuremberg-centred narrative. However, 
because Bass chooses to frame the Ottoman trials mainly as an issue for British politics, 
reconstructing the history principally through British military and diplomatic exchanges, he makes a 
number of conclusions that end up sharing in the self-centred confusions of British imperialism at 
that time. For example, Bass claims that the Ottoman court martial was ‘created under massive 
British pressure’ (106) and dates the beginning of this pressure to January 1919 (119), which of 
course, fails to explain the existence of two Ottoman parliamentary commissions investigating the 
Armenian massacres from as early on as November 1918, a fact that Bass himself notes (ibid). Bass 
also blames the failure of the Ottoman tribunals and the frustration of the later international tribunal 
attempts at Malta on British ‘legalism’ (107) – cf. Akçam (2007: 415-424) for a much more nuanced 
discussion that instead highlights the role of British colonialism in this failure. 
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(e.g. Ata 2005). However, a close study of the procedure employed suggests that 
the evidentiary standard that the tribunal upheld was significantly high, producing a 
record that proves to be of value for historians (Dadrian and Akçam 2011). This ties 
in with the tribunals’ legacy in relation to the Tehlirian trial: the specific evidence 
against Talât in the Ottoman court martial indicated not only that he had knowledge 
and awareness of the extent of atrocities that were going on around the 
deportations, but also that he had personally ordered the annihilation of the 
deportees. While the latter incrimination was based on witness testimonies, the 
evidentiary basis for the former was documentary.8 Thus Talât’s trial in the 
Ottoman tribunal proves a significant node in considering the ways in which the 
Tehlirian trial came to be haunted: the earlier trial had not only publicised a body of 
evidence directly incriminating Talât vis-à-vis the Armenian deportations and 
massacres, but also convicted him and sentenced him to death.  
Would the sentence be carried out had the post-war Ottoman authorities 
gotten hold of Talât, we will never know. An extradition request made by the 
Turkish Ambassador to Germany on 11 November 1918, only ten days after Talât’s 
flight, was refused by the Berlin government on 16 November 1918 (Dadrian and 
Akçam 2011: 71n24). Germany’s then Foreign Minister Wilhelm Solf stated, ‘Talât 
stuck with us faithfully, and our country remains open to him’ (qtd. ibid: 25). Later, 
Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles, signed in June 1919 between Germany and 
the Allies, required Germany to hand over ‘all persons accused of having 
committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war’, and even though 
Talât was one such accused, he was never extradited. When the assassinated ‘Ali 
Salih Bey’ was identified as Talât, Germany’s official position was that the 
authorities had no idea that he was resident in their territory.9 This is of course 
highly unlikely (cf. Hofmann 1989: 44). In Berlin, Talât seems to have had an 
active social life, and lived with his wife in luxury. Upon his death, the New York 
Times relayed hearsay to the effect ‘that the Deutsche Bank has [Talât’s] fortune of 
                                                
8 An English translation of the full text of the Key Indictment in the trial against the leading CUP 
members and wartime cabinet ministers is printed in Dadrian and Akçam 2011: 271-290. A 
summary of the documentary evidence against Talât can be found in Akçam 2007: 182. 
9 ‘Die Ermordung Talaat Paschas: Die Tat Eines Armeniers’, Vossische Zeitung, 16 March 1921. 
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more than 10,000,000 marks in safekeeping’.10 On the morning of 15 March 1921, 
Talât was taking his usual morning stroll in his well-to-do neighbourhood in West 
Berlin, walking on Hardenbergstrasse towards the zoo.  
 
tehlir ian 
We glean one version of the biography of the 24-year-old assassin Soghomon 
Tehlirian from his own statements at the beginning of his trial. We owe this 
detailed autobiographical account both to a structural element of German criminal 
trials in which key emphasis is placed on the defendant’s account of events, and to 
a particular decision made by the panel of judges in Tehlirian’s case. Section 243 of 
the 1877 German Code of Criminal Procedure requires11 that after the case is called 
up and the judge has ascertained that participants are present, the witnesses leave 
the courtroom and the proceedings begin with an initial examination of the 
defendant by the presiding judge as to his/her personal circumstances. Then the 
indictment is read, and the defendant is informed that s/he may, but is not required 
to, respond to the charges. This option is constructed in section 136(2) of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure in terms of presenting the accused an opportunity to remove 
the grounds for suspicion existing against him/her and to present the facts which are 
favourable to him/her. If the defendant chooses to make use of this opportunity, 
s/he is further examined by the judge on the charges.12 While the examination of 
the defendant as to his/her personal circumstances at the very beginning is often 
limited and the main part of the initial interview is this latter examination on the 
specific charges after the indictment is read; in Tehlirian’s case, the panel of judges 
decided on hearing Tehlirian’s account of the massacres before the charges were 
put to him, despite the prosecutor’s objection. 
During his interview Tehlirian related the following: He was born in a village 
near Erzincan, an eastern Anatolian province of the Ottoman Empire. In June 1915, 
when Tehlirian was 18 years old, an order was issued for Armenian inhabitants of 
                                                
10 ‘Talaat is Mourned as Germany’s Friend’, New York Times, 16 March 1921. 
11 Section 243 is still in force today in its original form except for the addition of one subsection 
which is not relevant to the discussion here.  
12 As during the rest of the proceedings, the role of the judge here is not that of an umpire between 
prosecution and defence, but is inquisitorial in character: the judge has to actively conduct and 
participate in the trial with an independent obligation to seek and elicit the truth (Morris 2005: 208). 
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Erzincan to leave the city. Three days later, people were taken out of the city, 
divided into groups and marched off in caravans (ST 6). Tehlirian was in a group 
with his family, travelling on foot. Gendarmes, cavalry and other soldiers guarded 
the convoy on the sides so that no one would escape. Once they were at a distance 
from the city, they were attacked by the gendarmes (ST 7) and mobs. He witnessed 
his sister being taken away, raped and killed, his younger brother’s skull being 
cracked open with an axe, and his mother shut down with a bullet (ST 8). Then he 
was struck on the head, went unconscious and was probably taken for dead. He 
regained consciousness a few days later and had to climb out from under his older 
brother’s corpse. He then found his way to a mountain village in the Kurdish town 
of Dersim where he was taken care of by an old woman and her family for about 
two months (ST 9). When his injuries were sufficiently healed, he set out for Iran, 
and eventually found his way to Berlin after a circuitous route covering Tbilisi, 
Erzincan, then back to Tbilisi, Istanbul, Thessaloniki, Serbia, then back to 
Thessaloniki, Paris and Geneva (ST 10-16). He did not find a trace of any family 
members (ST 9).  
The indictment was read to Tehlirian following this account. Unlike his 
statement during the preliminary interrogation to the effect that he only came to 
Berlin to assassinate Talât, in his trial testimony Tehlirian stated that he moved to 
Berlin to study engineering (ST 15). In this version of his story, it wasn’t that he 
hunted Talât down, but rather a chance encounter with Talât on the streets of Berlin 
provided the twist of fate that led to the assassination. As he was going on with his 
life in Berlin as a student of mechanical engineering and trying to improve his 
German through private tuition, one day he chanced upon a group of three or four 
men speaking Turkish among themselves, on a street near the zoo. One was 
addressed by the others as ‘Pasha’, and when Tehlirian looked carefully, he 
recognised Talât from the pictures he had seen in newspapers (ST 17, 25). Tehlirian 
claimed in the trial that his mother’s ghost appeared to him following this chance 
encounter with Talât. 
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enter ghost 
HAMLET: Speak, I am bound to hear.  
GHOST: So art thou to revenge when thou shalt hear.  
(Shakespeare, Hamlet, 1.5.7-8) 
In the trial, the ghost is invoked soon after the indictment is read to Tehlirian: he is 
accused of killing with intention and premeditation under Article 211 of the 1871 
German Penal Code. Tehlirian pleads not guilty. His counsel requests that the judge 
ask the defendant why he does not consider himself guilty, the judge relays the 
question. Tehlirian answers: 
DEFENDANT: I do not consider myself guilty because my conscience is 
clear. 
PRESIDING JUSTICE: Why is your conscience clear? 
DEFENDANT: I have killed a man. But I am not a murderer. (ST 14) 
The judge then tries to ascertain whether Tehlirian is objecting to a key element of 
the charge, and begins to inquire whether the killing was ‘premeditated’.13 This 
must have been because intentional killing without premeditation was a different 
charge under Article 212, and incurred a considerably lighter sentence (a minimum 
of 5 years imprisonment) than an Article 211 conviction which called for death by 
decapitation. The judge asks: 
PRESIDING JUSTICE: When did the idea first occur to you to kill Talât? 
DEFENDANT: Approximately two weeks before the incident. I was feeling 
very bad. I kept seeing over and over again the scenes of the massacres. I 
saw my mother’s corpse. The corpse just stood up before me and told me, 
‘You know Talât is here and yet you do not seem to be concerned. You are 
no longer my son.’ 
PRESIDING JUSTICE: (repeats those words to the jury) (ST 15) 
Here, between the parentheses, we see the ghost making an immediate impression 
upon its first mention: Tehlirian recounts his encounter with his mother’s ghost in 
Armenian, his interpreter repeats the account of the encounter in German, then the 
judge repeats these German words to the jury once again. The ghost story echoes in 
                                                
13 Although Tehlirian had admitted to premeditation in his initial interrogation by the police, he had 
the right at this stage to contradict his earlier confession. See, however, Section 254 (still in effect) 
of the German Code of Criminal Procedure which allows for transcript of police interrogation to be 
read during the trial when there is a contradiction between statements made to the police and trial 
testimony. See also Schmidt (1965: 14), for a brief discussion of how a judge should handle such a 
contradiction. 
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the courtroom. After Tehlirian’s harrowing account of the massacres, it probably 
resonates, too. Newspaper reports of the trial mention attendance in great numbers 
by the Armenian community of Berlin.14 Given that the trial took place soon after 
the war, we can surmise that many others present either as participants or spectators 
were living with ghosts of their own. Since the record is restricted to the legally 
authorised speech that takes place in the hearings, we can only conjecture the full 
range of resonances, but the transcript itself does allow some insight into the 
various levels of haunting, especially in retrospect.  
A little while after the entry of the ghost into the courtroom, the judge’s 
seeming absorption by this figure is evidenced once more as he continues his 
examination of the defendant: 
PRESIDING JUSTICE: How did it come about that you committed this 
homicide? 
DEFENDANT: It was because of what my mother told me. I was thinking 
about that and on March 15th I saw Talât. 
PRESIDING JUSTICE: Where did you see him? 
DEFENDANT: While I was walking around in my room, I was reading and I 
saw Talât leave his house. (…) When he stepped out of the house, my 
mother came to my mind. I again saw her before me. Then, I also saw 
Talât, the man who was responsible for the deaths of my parents, my 
brothers, and my sisters. 
PRESIDING JUSTICE: You also saw your relatives before your eyes and 
thought that Talât Pasha was responsible not only for their deaths but also 
for the deaths of your fellow nationals. (ST 21) 
Here the judge feels the need to intervene to supplement the defendant’s story, 
seemingly so captivated by it that he cannot stop himself from participating in its 
telling. It is pertinent that whereas in Tehlirian’s account the business of the ghost 
is strictly a family affair, in the supplement that the judge offers, its significance is 
generalised to include vengeance for sake of ‘fellow nationals’ – this is a 
generalisation that is at once a politicisation, as a narrative of kinship is 
                                                
14 According to one particularly embellished account published as the trial was underway: ‘This is 
the trial of tortured Armenian people and the gates of the courtroom are besieged by beautifully dark 
people who stand by the killer with burning hopes’ (‘Die Ermordung Talaat Paschas’, Vossische 
Zeitung, 2 June 1921). 
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reconfigured into one about ethnic belonging.15 So already at this early stage of the 
trial, the ghost is politicised by the judge’s interpretation. This is but one instance 
of the gradual politicisation of the trial by the ghost. The process mainly unfolds 
through the testimonies of witnesses introduced by the defence. As a significant 
part of the two day trial is flooded by the horrific stories of the genocide, the 
singular ghost of Tehlirian’s mother is recast as one of the many ghosts of the 
Armenian genocide.  
A key figure effecting this ghostly pluralisation was Christine Terzibashian 
who, along with her husband and brother, seems to have been a close friend to 
Tehlirian in Berlin. Herself a survivor of the genocide, Terzibashian testified 
through an interpreter about her own experience of the death marches. She spoke of 
being forced to march over the bodies of deportees who had recently been killed, of 
her legs being covered with the blood of the corpses she stepped on, of some 500 
youths being tied together in groups and pushed into the wild currents of a river, of 
gendarmes crushing the pelvic bones of pregnant women to tear out the foetuses 
(ST 73-74). Her account caused several commotions of outrage and incredulity in 
the courtroom, prompting the judge to ask: 
PRESIDING JUSTICE: Is all this really true? You are not imagining it? 
WITNESS: What I have said is the truth. In reality, it was much more 
horrible than it is possible for me to relate. (ST 75) 
At the end of her testimony the judge broached the question of responsibility, 
signalling a key shift in the focus of the hearings:  
PRESIDING JUSTICE: At the time, who was thought to be the person 
responsible for this terror? 
WITNESS: Enver Pasha16 was the one who gave the orders and the soldiers 
forced us to kneel and cry out ‘Long live the Pasha,’ because the Pasha had 
permitted us to live. (Commotion) (ibid.) 
                                                
15 Note that the judge’s supplement does not function as a suggestion that is meant to trap Tehlirian 
into admitting a political motive in addition to a personal vendetta. According to the transcript, he 
does not wait for Tehlirian’s response to his supplement before going on to ask another question. 
16 The English translation of the transcript, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation edition, has 
‘Talât’ in place of ‘Enver’ in this passage. Even though that may be dramaturgically more desirable, 
Terzibashian says ‘Enver’ according to the original German transcript.    
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From this point in the trial, the question of responsibility for Talât’s death became 
temporarily engulfed by the question of responsibility for the plight of the Ottoman 
Armenians, further discussed by the following witnesses, including very prominent 
ones.  
One such prominent figure was Dr. Johannes Lepsius, a German missionary 
who had written books and articles on the Armenian massacres and was considered 
to be the foremost expert on the subject in Germany at the time.17 In affect, 
Lepsius’ testimony was contrapuntal to Terzibashian’s, and in content, it lent the 
latter some leverage by providing a more general, historico-political perspective. 
He suggested that there are over a hundred eyewitness accounts published in 
German and English, and that these accounts are similar in content to Tehlirian’s 
and Terzibashian’s (ST 77). He proposed that Talât, among other Young Turk 
leaders, was directly responsible for the annihilation of Ottoman Armenians, and 
that he could verify this by official written proof based on German and Turkish 
documents (ST 81). Lepsius also broached the question of how these events came to 
take place, a question that many scholars have shied away from until recently, due 
to the fear that the attempt to explain the causes of the genocide will amount to an 
attempt to justify it, in a landscape of historical research polarised and distorted by 
Turkey’s official denial (Suny 2011). 
The second celebrity witness was Liman von Sanders, a German General who 
was sent to Constantinople in 1913 for modernising and reorganising the Ottoman 
Army, and had remained there through the war, heading various campaigns. 
Liman’s position on the question of high-level responsibility for the massacres was 
characteristic of the German military stance. He suggested that while the 
deportation orders were indeed given by the government, the responsibility for the 
ensuing atrocities should be attributed to the lower echelons and mobs. He vaguely 
indicated that he saw some incriminating official orders issued by Enver, but then 
dismissed these as ‘incomprehensible’, ‘impracticable’ and ‘nonsensical’, without 
going into any substantial detail (ST 84). Further, he emphatically denied having 
                                                
17 Lepsius established the German Oriental mission in 1895, had been in the Ottoman Empire 
through the 1895-96 Armenian massacres, and had raised funds to build orphanages for children 
who had lost their parents. He went again in 1915 to investigate the Armenian situation on behalf of 
German missionary interests. 
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witnessed anything that incriminated Talât (ST 85). However, his testimony was 
followed and countered by another key witness, Bishop Grigoris Balakian, one of 
the very few survivors of the initial wave of deportations and massacres that 
targeted Istanbul’s Armenian intellectual elite on 24 April 1915. Balakian knew 
Talât personally, and testified to having seen what Liman claimed he had not, an 
incriminating telegram signed by Talât.  
Floating in the air from the very beginning of the trial, the question of CUP 
leadership’s direct responsibility for the massacres found a dramatic if somewhat 
unthinkable shape in Terzibashian’s testimony, then was recast by Lepsius, and 
entirely structured the testimonies of the following two witnesses, Liman and 
Balakian. Through these ‘eyewitness’ testimonies (not of Talât’s assassination, but 
of the Armenian massacres) the defence successfully reversed the positions of 
victim and defendant – a common strategy in political trials. In this spirit, following 
Balakian’s testimony, the defence further proposed to introduce as evidence five 
telegrams from the vice-governor of Aleppo that they claimed proved ‘that Talât 
personally gave the orders to massacre all the Armenians including women and 
children’ (ST 92). Prosecution objected, and finally attempted to bring to a halt the 
victim-defendant reversal that had taken place: 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: I feel that the motion should be denied. Even though 
great latitude was granted to discuss this subject, nevertheless, it is not the 
purpose of this body, nor is it within its competence, to come to a historic 
decision pertaining to the guilt or innocence of Talât and the extent of his 
involvement in the massacre of the Armenians. The essential point is that 
the defendant believed that Talât was the responsible party and thus the 
motive becomes fully clear. (ibid.) 
The prosecutor’s appreciation of the limitations of a trial as a site for exercises in 
historiography is notable, a point eloquently articulated later by scholars such as 
Hannah Arendt ([1963] 1994), Carlo Ginzburg (1999) and Costas Douzinas (2012). 
The curious aspect of the prosecutor’s objection is that it is at once a significant 
concession to the defence, as he acknowledges the genuineness of Tehlirian’s belief 
in Talât’s responsibility for the massacres and suggests that this suffices for the 
truth-seeking function of the trial. The judge condones the prosecutor’s position, 
while the defence recognises its worth, withdraws the motion, and introduces no 
more witnesses after this point.  
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Thus what counts in the end is not an absolute certainty vis-à-vis Talât’s 
responsibility, but rather the defendant’s belief in Talât’s responsibility. While this 
would not be news for criminal lawyers who will often find themselves trading in 
fine but crucial distinctions between ‘genuine’ and ‘reasonable’ even if ‘mistaken’ 
beliefs, it is nevertheless important to note that history itself acquires a ghostly 
status here: the law withholds judgment on historical fact, but nevertheless allows it 
a hold over the proceedings as subjective vision. In attempting to limit the effects of 
the classical victim-defendant reversal on the trial, the prosecutor ascribes the 
historical question of the Armenian Genocide which threatens to flood the 
proceedings, to the defendant’s own beliefs and opinions. While this attempted 
‘containment’ seems to have had the desired effect of bringing the ‘digression’ or 
the reversal to an end in the actual proceedings, it was clearly a failure in terms of 
containing the ghosts that had been unleashed into the courtroom through the 
accounts of the genocide. In receiving no conclusive judgment which the trial 
participants could accept or reject but at least have as a tangible point of reference, 
history itself became ‘there but not there’, like a ghost. Thus the restless spirits 
invoked by the witness testimonies must have enthralled their audience to an 
unthinkable history, through what Avery Gordon refers to as a ‘haunting 
recognition’ (2008: 63). Another effect of the attempted containment was, of 
course, to bring Tehlirian back in focus, as it was his state of mind that was said to 
matter in the end – how convincing he seemed in his convictions was key.  
  
the haunted haunter 
In the trial, Tehlirian does indeed come across as a genuinely haunted man. A 
definitive moment occurred at the very beginning of the trial, during his initial 
interview by the judge. When he was prompted to recount his experience of the 
massacres, Tehlirian dramatically broke down in the telling: 
DEFENDANT: While we were being plundered, they started firing on us 
from the front of the caravan. At that time, one of the gendarmes pulled my 
sister out and took her with him. My mother cried out, ‘May I go blind!’ … 
I cannot remember that day any longer. I do not want to be reminded of 
that day. It is better for me to die than describe the events of that black day.  
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PRESIDING JUSTICE: (…) it is very important that we hear of these events 
from you. You are the only one that can give us information about those 
events. Try to pull yourself together and not lose control. 
DEFENDANT: I cannot say everything. Every time I relive those events … 
They took everyone away … and they struck me. (ST 7) 
A rather ornate account in a German newspaper relates this moment in the 
following words: ‘Tehlirian lifts his small hand on his white forehead – he does not 
want to be reminded of those days of horror. It takes some time to convince him of 
the need for accurate depiction.’18 The New York Times correspondent is less 
forgiving: ‘As Teilirian [sic.] was narrating, through an Armenian interpreter, the 
Turkish atrocities in Armenia, his Oriental temperament got the better of him and 
he shrieked, “Rather will I die than again live through the black days”’.19 Notably, 
Tehlirian’s breakdown occurs as soon as he embodies his mother’s voice (‘My 
mother cried “May I go blind!”’), as an initial hint of the haunting that later comes 
to dominate the proceedings.   
The character portrait drawn by witnesses corroborates something of 
Tehlirian’s hauntedness. His first landlady who has ‘only good things to say about 
him’, confesses that she could hear everything that went on in his room: ‘At night 
he seemed to have nightmares. … he always played his mandolin. …he used to sing 
very melancholy tunes. … many times he would talk out loud to himself, making 
me think that there was someone with him’ (39-41). His second landlady testifies: 
‘On the morning of March 15th, the day the incident occurred, the maid came in to 
tell me that the defendant was in his room crying’ (43). His German teacher: ‘It was 
easy to see that he had an emotional trauma. He always looked sad’ (47); then, an 
acquaintance: ‘He was always dejected and had a vacant stare’ (64). Reporting on 
his examination of Tehlirian, the court physician Dr. Robert Störmer says, 
‘Whenever the defendant spoke of the massacres, I had the impression that what he 
said came straight from the heart’ (95). 
This sad, visibly haunted figure also appears as a ghostly, haunting figure 
himself. He is described by the doctors at the trial as a very sick young man, weak, 
trembling, thin, fragile. An earlier report by a medical officer filed during 
                                                
18 ‘Die Ermordung Talaat Paschas’, Vossische Zeitung, 2 June 1921. 
19 ‘Says Mother’s Ghost Ordered Him to Kill’, New York Times, 2 June 1921.  
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Tehlirian’s preliminary investigation described him as ‘malnourished’ and 
‘inconspicuous’ (Hofmann: 43). In the trial, it gradually emerged that Tehlirian 
developed epilepsy following the traumatic events. As the inquiry turned from the 
historical record to the subjective, Tehlirian’s epilepsy became a focal point for the 
proceedings, especially in the testimonies of five expert witnesses – two 
neuropsychiatrists, two neurologists and a physician. The psych-experts, testifying 
one after the other, were particularly invested in understanding the link between 
Tehlirian’s epileptic seizures and his memories of the massacres.  
People with epilepsy are known to experience the hallucination of a pungent 
odour just before a seizure. In Tehlirian’s case the hallucinated odour was 
understood to be related to the stench of the corpses. The physician Dr. Störmer 
explained: ‘He remained for three days under corpses; he lost consciousness, 
coming to only because of the horrible stench arising from the corpses – a stench 
which has remained ingrained in his mind forever. He tells me that any time he 
reads anything horrifying or whenever he recalls the massacres, the stench from the 
corpses penetrates his olfactories and he cannot seem to overcome it’ (94). Except 
for Dr. Störmer who diagnosed Tehlirian with epilepsy, all other experts concluded 
that Tehlirian was suffering from ‘affective epilepsy’ rather than ‘real’ epilepsy. 
Though coined in the early 20th century by German neurologists Bratz and 
Falkenburg to designate a slightly different phenomenon (Horst 1953: 25), the term 
Affekt-Epilepsie seems to have been used in the trial to denote seizures that were 
psychological in origin rather than organic.20  
The extended discussion of Tehlirian’s epilepsy and detailed descriptions of 
his seizures must have imparted to him further mystique. In his famous essay ‘The 
Uncanny’, published only two years before Tehlirian’s trial, Sigmund Freud 
discusses the work of Ernst Jentsch, who writes about instances in which there are 
‘doubts whether an apparently animate being is really alive; or conversely, whether 
a lifeless object might not be in fact animate’ as having an uncanny effect (qtd. in 
                                                
20 In this sense the trial experts’ distinction between real epilepsy and affective epilepsy is very 
similar to the distinction Freud made in his 1928 essay on Dostoevsky: ‘It is therefore quite right to 
distinguish between an organic and an ‘affective’ epilepsy. The practical significance of this is that a 
person who suffers from the first kind has a disease of the brain, while a person who suffers from 
the second kind is a neurotic’ (Freud 1928: 181). However, the trial experts identify Tehlirian as a 
psychotic rather than a neurotic.  
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Freud 1919: 226). For Jentsch epileptic seizures have this effect because they 
‘excite in the spectator the impression of automatic, mechanical processes at work 
behind the ordinary appearance of mental activity’ (ibid.). Freud adds to this that 
the ordinary person sees in epileptic seizures the ‘workings of forces hitherto 
unsuspected in his fellow-men, but at the same time he is dimly aware of them in 
remote corners of his own being. The Middle Ages quite consistently ascribed all 
such maladies to the influence of demons, and in this their psychology was almost 
correct’ (243). Elsewhere Freud calls this ‘uncanny disease with its incalculable, 
apparently unprovoked convulsive attacks’ by its old name: ‘morbus sacer’, the 
sacred disease (Freud 1928: 179).  
Such associations around epilepsy have particularly strong resonations in the 
figure of Soghomon Tehlirian. According to what emerges of/as his past in the trial, 
Tehlirian has quite literally arisen from the dead, from beneath the corpses. He is 
sickly and weak, and yet he demonstrates a steely, almost mechanical, automated 
determination to avenge the dead. The stories of his epileptic seizures bestow him 
with an almost netherworldy quality – at the onset of each seizure, his sense of 
smell returns him to the scene of carnage, the scene of his own death from which he 
was miraculously revived. If the classic ghost story plot dictates that the ghost must 
return to seek vengeance for past injustice, the telos for Tehlirian’s return from the 
dead is only too obvious. As he is animated by forces beyond his limited physical 
strength to avenge the dead, his epileptic seizures serve in the narrative universe of 
the trial as the all too tangible sign of Tehlirian’s rapport with the world of the 
dead. Tehlirian himself acquires an uncanny, ghostly presence as the revenant: 
haunted and haunting, possessed and captivating, all at once. 
The question of whether the defence outlined in Article 51 of the German 
Penal Code applied to the defendant becomes particularly interesting when read in 
this light. Article 51 states ‘If the offender at the time of the committal of an 
offence was in a state of unconsciousness or derangement of the intellect due to 
illness by which the free exercise of his will was prevented, the act is not 
punishable’. In Tehlirian’s trial, all expert witnesses were asked to consider 
whether Article 51 applied to the defendant, in other words, whether his free will 
was totally absent or not at the time of the act of killing. The experts’ answers 
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arrived in a gradual scale from no to yes. First expert, Dr. Störmer, court’s 
examining physician, said no, his free will was not totally absent. Second expert, 
neuropsychiatrist Dr. Liepmann also said no, but added that Tehlirian’s condition 
was very close to falling within the purview of Article 51, as at the time of the act, 
he was under the influence of an ‘over-valued idea’.21 Liepmann also expressed 
regret that a doctrine of diminished responsibility had not yet been introduced into 
German criminal law, suggesting that such mitigation rather than a full defence 
would be more appropriate in this case. Expert witness number 3, Dr. Richard 
Cassirer, also suggested that Article 51 did not apply, that Tehlirian’s free will was 
not totally absent at the time of the incident, but similarly added that the provision 
came very close to applying. The fourth expert, Dr. Edmund Forster22 was also on 
the fence, but leaning towards yes. He expressed uncertainty as to how his medical 
judgments translate into a legal opinion, but said that Tehlirian’s status comes very 
close to Article 51, and added ‘I am even inclined to say that free will was totally 
absent’ (ST 108). The final expert Dr. Bruno Haake, in his very brief testimony, 
univocally stated yes, Article 51 did apply to Tehlirian.   
In effect, this collection of testimonies functioned as so many attempts to 
translate the haunting into a medico-scientific language. And yet, the translation, 
rather than explaining the ghost away or secularising it, instead seems to have 
reified the haunting to a significant extent. This was especially the case with the 
‘over-valued idea’ formulation, advanced by Dr. Liepmann and backed by the other 
neuropsychiatrist, Dr. Forster. In Liepmann’s explanation, the recollection of a 
profound psychological shock ‘dominates the personality; it is always present; it 
always comes out, forcing the person to submit to its authority. … Tehlirian was 
under the influence of such a compulsive precept and he was unable to free himself 
from the memory of the severe shock he had endured’ (ST 99). Considering that the 
German psychiatric profession maintained a generally hostile attitude towards 
psychoanalysis at the time (Wetzell 2000: 143), it is not entirely surprising that we 
                                                
21 In the English trial transcript this is inaccurately translated as ‘compulsive precept’. Liepmann 
had served as an assistant to Carl Wernicke, the originator of this doctrine of ‘over-valued ideas’. 
The doctrine still seems to have currency in psychiatric discourse. See Veale (2002: 384-386), for a 
comparison between its early European and contemporary American definitions. 
22 Edmund Forster also happened to be the neuropsychiatrist who cured Adolf Hitler of his 
‘hysterical blindness’ at the front during World War I, see Lewis (2003). 
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have here what reads as a clumsy theory of trauma. The concept of ‘over-valued 
idea’ comes across at best as a gross misnomer for recurrent and haunting 
memories of a massacre. It presumes the existence of a standard gauge, a measure 
for how much such past experiences should normally be valued; and it bestows the 
neuropsychiatrist with a claim to authority over that measure. On the other hand, 
the language of psychoanalysis may have allowed a better grasp of the workings of 
trauma, even back in 1921,23 as well as possibly a more self-reflexive approach on 
the part of the doctors, some of whom were clearly haunted by Tehlirian and his 
ghost.24 By utilising the ‘over-valued idea’ doctrine, Liepmann seems to have in 
fact lent further purchase to the figure of the ghost: ‘the entire recollection of the 
calamity … appeared in physical form – seeing his mother’ (ST 100-101). Thus the 
ghost becomes in this account the very physical manifestation of every recollection 
Tehlirian has of the traumatic events, the memory of which has imprisoned him. 
And this, the good doctor says, gives us ‘the singular creation of “over-valued idea” 
… His vision of his mother was an all-powerful force, thus making any further 
argument pointless.’ (101, translation modified).  
The inevitable force of the demands of the ghost was thus melded with 
accounts of Tehlirian’s ‘affective epilepsy’ to yield a pseudoscientific account of 
his intentionality, but it was pseudo, precisely because everything that was uncanny 
about the haunting and the seizures was retained in an odd form of scientific 
reification. Although the majority of the experts actually claimed the non-
applicability of Article 51, their testimonies in effect reinforced the sense that 
Tehlirian’s volition was haunted at the time of his act. Their attempts to secularise 
the ghost and exorcise it failed, as evidenced in the closing statements that followed 
the expert testimonies. The ghostly retained its hold on the proceedings as one of 
the defence attorneys in his summation drew on its force. After recounting 
Tehlirian’s entire story and his encounter with his mother’s ghost in properly 
dramatised form, the defence counsel said:  
                                                
23 Freud’s ground-breaking Beyond the Pleasure Principle was published in 1920. 
24 Dr. Störmer, for example, says about the ghost ‘I certainly had to ask myself if this was not a 
delusion of the senses. But after a detailed cross-examination, I was able to verify that what the 
defendant experienced was not a delusion of the senses, but a living mental picture. He does actually 
see his mother in her physical form. He not only sees her in his dreams but even while he is awake.’ 
(ST 96) 
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It is quite evident that such visions play an altogether different role in the 
lives of spirited Easterners than they do in the lives of us Westerners, who 
look upon such things from a philosophical and medical point of view. I 
remind you of the passage from the Holy Bible which reads: ‘And the 
angel appeared to him in his dream.’ A similar apparition or corporeal 
vision is what had the decisive effect on Tehlirian.  
The double move here is noteworthy: disowning the ghost as ‘us Westerners’, but 
then drawing on its persuasive force nevertheless; allocating ‘such things’ to their 
proper Western site of philosophy and medicine, but then invoking the Holy Bible 
and its angels. The jury, in returning a verdict of not guilty, seems to have agreed 
with this analysis of Tehlirian’s volition being haunted by the ghost, whatever its 
proper place in the ‘Western’ imagination.25  
 
the many l ives of tehlir ian 
As I have suggested, the positions of the victim and the defendant were temporarily 
reversed in Tehlirian’s trial, as the ghosts of history congregated in the courtroom 
to reconstruct history as ghostly. The trial was first transformed from a truth-
seeking effort regarding responsibility for Talât’s murder to an inconclusive truth-
seeking effort regarding responsibility for the Great Catastrophe, then began 
revolving around the inner world of the haunted, haunting defendant. This 
trajectory had the key effect of disappearing from the scene of the trial the various 
doubts and unresolved questions concerning the facts of Talât’s assassination.  
For example, even though early on in the investigation the police had expressed 
that they strongly suspected Tehlirian had accomplices,26 in the trial that question 
entirely vanished, not even surfacing during Tehlirian’s examination. More 
significantly, questions raised by the contradictions between Tehlirian’s initial 
confessions to the police and his trial testimony, especially with regards to 
premeditation, were dematerialised with a fascinating slight of hand. This one was 
a translator’s coup: Kevork Kalustian was Tehlirian’s interpreter during the police 
                                                
25 The verdict was not accompanied by any explanation as to why they decided to relieve Tehlirian 
of any responsibility for his act, as such justification was not required by German criminal 
procedure. 
26 ‘Das Geständnis des Mörders Talaat Paschas: Vernehmung im Polizeipräsidium’, Berliner 
Tageblatt, 16 March 1921. 
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interrogation, and later at the trial, as well as a witness. In both instances, 
Kevorkian openly admitted his admiration of Tehlirian for the deed he committed. 
It emerged during his trial testimony that he purposely did not sign the transcript of 
the police interrogation ‘for the simple reason that the defendant was in no 
condition to be interrogated’ (ST 66). The absence of his signature on the transcript 
absolved Tehlirian of his self-incrimination, prompting the presiding judge to 
conclude: ‘There is grave doubt as to the validity of the contents of this transcript in 
terms of its acceptability as evidence’ (ST 67). 
The questions as to accomplices and premeditation thus vanished from the 
scene of the trial. In retrospect, especially in light of various later retellings of 
Soghomon Tehlirian’s story, these prove to be highly significant disappearance 
acts. The versions of the retellings vary, but the assassination provides the 
organising centre to all. There is a volume of Tehlirian’s memoirs as recorded and 
published by his friend Vahan Minakhorian (Tehlirian 1956) in Cairo, which 
incorporates the original trial transcript. This volume is in Western Armenian and 
has never been fully translated into English, though an adaptation can be found in 
Atamian (1960-61). Then there is Tehlirian’s ‘memoirs’ as told by Lindy V. 
Avakian (1989), published in English almost three decades after Tehlirian’s death. 
The structure of the narrative is strange: Avakian inhabits Tehlirian’s voice and 
appropriates his ‘I’ in the retelling, while intervening in the narrative with what 
seem like editorial, disinterested and ostensibly objective ‘(COMMENT)’s that are 
highlighted as such in capital letters and parentheses, usually including dry 
‘historical facts’. The effect thereby created is a split in the authorial voice, which 
is probably meant to authenticate the ‘I’ as that of Tehlirian, and Avakian as the 
historian that the jacket proclaims him to be. While the book contains some 
privileged information with regards to Tehlirian’s life,27 its historical accuracy is 
                                                
27 In the ‘Introduction’, the only part of the book where Avakian inhabits his own voice, he explains 
that his father, a figure in the Dashnak community of the US, had befriended Tehlirian, thus: ‘My 
recollections are deeply etched with the inspiring memory of countless discussions with or about 
Tehlirian, held in the old-fashioned parlor of our home at 422 South Fulton Street in Fresno by 
representatives of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and my father’ (1989: 12). 
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highly suspect as can be discerned from the complete rewriting of the trial that has 
precious little to do with the transcript.28  
Another account is by Edward Alexander (2000), a retired American 
diplomat of Armenian descent, who, in a much more conscientious attempt to 
reconstruct the story, draws on the trial transcript and newspaper reports, as well as 
Tehlirian’s 1956 memoirs, though glossing over some key conflicts between the 
latter and the former. Additionally there’s a volume by French political thriller-
writer Jacques Derogy (1990), who was commissioned to write the story of 
Operation Nemesis, Armenian Revolutionary Federation’s (ARF) covert vengeance 
campaign which aimed to ‘bring justice’ to those deemed responsible for the 
massacres. In addition to various secondary sources, Derogy draws on memoirs, 
archival documents and oral history for the arduous task of reconstructing the story 
of a series of assassinations. Notably, Tehlirian is featured in the narrative as a 
Nemesis agent.  
Indeed, according to all retellings, including Tehlirian’s own, Tehlirian was 
assigned the task of assassinating Talât by Armen Garo29 during a visit to the ARF 
headquarters in Boston in late 1920. Nor was Talât the first man he assassinated: in 
his memoirs Tehlirian admits to having killed Harootiun Mugerditchian in 1919 in 
Istanbul,30 a detail that is featured in the other retellings as well.31 Mugerditchian’s 
assassin remained officially unknown, and it is no surprise that Tehlirian did not 
volunteer this information during his 1921 police interrogation or trial testimony in 
Berlin, as that would have depicted him as a professional hit-man. It is also 
understandable why Tehlirian did not admit to having accomplices in Talât’s 
assassination, namely other Berlin-based ARF operatives that all accounts refer to. 
                                                
28 Avakian stretches the two-day trial over 15 days, introduces fictional witnesses and entirely new 
conflicts into the proceedings, jettisons Tehlirian’s testimony along with every other indication that 
reflects on Tehlirian as less than the manly, muscular, chauvinist hero fantasised throughout the 
narrative. Further, in Avakian’s version, the trial is recast as adversarial, which though much more 
suitable to the courtroom drama genre that the author was clearly after, had obviously nothing to do 
with the actual proceedings which were inquisitorial.  
29 Armen Garo was the nom de guerre of Karekin Pastermadjian, a key ARF leader.  
30 I am grateful to Eric Bogosian for his assistance with this reference. 
31 Although an Armenian, Mugerditchian was considered to be a collaborator, as he was deemed 
responsible for facilitating the 24 April 1915 apprehension and massacre of Istanbul’s Armenian 
leaders and intellectuals, by handing the CUP a ‘black list’.  
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In the retellings an entirely different story of the assassination emerges: Tehlirian 
did have accomplices, and the murder was premeditated. 
More crucially, according various accounts, including Tehlirian’s own 
memoirs, he was never in the death marches himself. He and his brothers had left 
Erzincan in 1914, on the eve of the war, to join their father in Serbia, while the 
mother and sisters stayed behind. When the war broke out and he found out that 
there were Armenian volunteer forces fighting on Russia’s side, he travelled to 
Tbilisi to join them. He was not allowed to go in the field for a while, and was 
tasked with organising the reception of orphans. The first time he heard of the 
massacres was from these orphans who had survived them. When the region was 
occupied by the Russians in 1916, he went to his village seeking his mother and 
relatives, but found no trace of them. He found his family home in ruins and had his 
first epileptic fit there, in the garden of his abandoned home.32  
Ellis Island records corroborate Tehlirian’s fateful trip to the United States, 
though this is one trip that is not mentioned in the seemingly endless list of travels 
recounted during the trial. It is difficult to know whether the ARF connection 
would have been discovered if the German authorities had knowledge of 
Tehlirian’s recent trip to the USA. A remarkable detail, however, is that there are 
two Tehlirians even in the Ellis Island records, according to which on 22 August 
1920 a ‘Salonon Telarian’, aged 24, of Armenian ethnicity, resident of Paris, 
arrived in Ellis Island on a ship named Saint Paul, which departed from 
Southampton; and three days later, on 25 August 1920, another ‘Solomon 
Telarian’, aged 24, of Armenian ethnicity, resident of Paris, arrived at the island on 
a ship named Olympic, which departed from Cherbourg, France.33 The glitch in the 
                                                
32 The discrepancy between this account and Tehlirian’s trial testimony was discovered by Turkish 
newspapers very belatedly, on the occasion of the publication of a book in 2005 in Germany about 
Operation Nemesis, and it produced headlines such as ‘Armenian Murderer Told Fairy Tales’ which 
proclaimed that Tehlirian did not actually lose his family in the death marches – see, for example, 
Celal Özcan, ‘Katil Ermeni Masal Anlatmış’, Hürriyet, 27 March 2005, 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=306974. This is a distortion: Tehlirian’s father 
and brothers remained in Serbia through the war, but he did lose all family members who remained 
behind, namely his mother, sisters, brothers-in-law, nieces and nephews. 
33 All other items on the arrival registry (height, complexion, colour of hair, colour of eyes, 
‘whether going to join a relative or friend, and if so, his name and complete address’, ‘the name and 
complete address of nearest relative or friend in country whence alien came’, etc.) also match 
between the two records. The arrival records are available on http://www.ellisisland.org. 
the trial of soghomon tehlir ian 150 
 
 
archives fascinatingly reproduces the doubling that seems to have characterised 
Tehlirian’s life at the time.  
It is admittedly quite difficult to reconcile this later version of Tehlirian’s 
story with the figure he cuts in the trial as a man who seems genuinely haunted by 
memories of a massacre of which he was the only survivor. One wonders about the 
source of the story of deportation and massacre he told as his own during the trial. 
Did he make it up, or did he borrow it? Was it entirely his imagination, or could it 
be a story that he heard from someone else, say, one of the orphans he received 
during his service in Russia? Could it be that he was haunted by the testimonies of 
these orphaned children to the extent that he adopted their stories and adapted them 
to his own loss? Bearing witness to the testimony of others, being the immediate 
receiver of the testimony of survivors is ‘actually participat[ing] in the reliving and 
reexperiencing of the event’ (Laub 1992: 76). Writing of his experience of working 
on the Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale, psychoanalyst Dori Laub 
suggests that ‘the listener (or the interviewer) becomes the Holocaust witness 
before the narrator does’ in this reoccurrence of the event (85), as the encounter 
between listener and survivor ‘makes possible something like a repossession of the 
act of witnessing’ (ibid). But in being the primary witness to the event through 
witnessing its reoccurrence and reliving, the listener also becomes ‘part of the 
struggle to go beyond the event and not be submerged and lost in it’ (76). This is 
not to say that one will necessarily manage to prevail over that struggle. 
While there is a veritable disjuncture between how convincing Tehlirian was 
deemed in his trial and the fact that his story was otherwise, it is not entirely 
possible to explain this disjuncture away by attributing it to his cunning or 
theatrical skills. If we are to take into account the loss that he did suffer, we might 
ask what it may mean for one’s relatives to disappear without a trace in a series of 
events later relayed by survivors in unthinkable narrations. This line of inquiry may 
begin to bridge the disjuncture between Tehlirian’s credibility at the trial and his 
other story, and afford a new perspective on the haunting itself. As Avery Gordon 
suggests, ‘disappearance is an exemplary instance in which the boundaries of 
rational and irrational, fact and fiction, subjectivity and objectivity, person and 
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system, force and effect, conscious and unconscious, knowing and not knowing are 
constitutively unstable’ (2008: 97).  
The epistemological instability effected by loss as disappearance is a liminal 
experience that is akin to the structure and operation of haunting. This combination 
of loss as disappearance, and witnessing as listening (as the immediate receiver of 
survivor testimonies) may provide an insight to Tehlirian’s haunting that was 
deemed credible in his trial by character witnesses, experts and, finally, the jury. In 
the trial, just as the character witnesses and psych-experts testified to Tehlirian’s 
haunting through their statements, the members of the jury did the same by 
returning a not guilty verdict. In exploring the politics of this particular political 
trial, the key question is not so much whether Tehlirian’s haunting was genuine or 
not, but what it meant for other trial participants to share Tehlirian’s ghosts, by 
verifying the haunting, and thus partaking in it.  
 
polit ics of haunting 
Writing on another, indeed the proverbial drama of the parental ghost appearing to 
the son to demand vengeance, Ross Poole addresses the nuance between the 
political and the personal significations of the ghost in Shakespeare’s play Hamlet. 
He indicates that due weight is rarely given to the political meaning of the play in 
its stage productions (Poole 2009: 146n13), or its theoretical interpretations (129). 
In its first few appearances, the ghost in Hamlet is ‘a public existence, and not a 
private experience’ (ibid.), it appears as the warrior king clad in combat armour, 
and it is visible not only to Prince Hamlet but also to the sentinels and Horatio. 
Contesting Hegel’s reading of the play in Aesthetics, Poole suggests that the ghost 
in its early appearances ‘is not just “an objective form of Hamlet’s inner 
presentiment,”’ it is also ‘an “objective form” of the presentiments of those others 
to whom it appears’ (130). This significance shifts dramatically in Act III during 
the bedroom scene between Hamlet and Gertrude – in this final appearance of the 
ghost, it is only visible to Hamlet, not to Gertrude, and this time it is clad in night 
attire. Hamlet is trapped in an Oedipal return. Poole concludes ‘a political story has 
been reduced to a domestic drama’ (133). 
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Following Poole’s reading of Hamlet, we could propose that the political is, 
to a certain extent, a sharing of ghosts. The politicisation of the Tehlirian trial was 
precisely an effect of a ghostly convergence: the singular ghost of Tehlirian’s 
mother came to represent and ushered into the courtroom the many ghosts of the 
Armenian genocide, and very possibly other ghosts, too, in the aftermath of the 
war. In ‘The “Uncanny”’, published also in the wake of World War I, Sigmund 
Freud ruminates on the swift uptake of ghosts, and of the belief that ‘the dead can 
become visible as spirits’, even in a ‘supposedly educated’ milieu, including by 
some of ‘the most able and penetrating minds among our men of science’ (Freud 
1919: 242). Freud explains this modern inclination to be haunted in terms of a 
primitive remainder, the entrenchment of old beliefs and the primitive fear of the 
dead that is ‘still so strong within us and always ready to come to the surface on 
any provocation’ (ibid), and ‘ready to seize upon any confirmation’ (247). While 
Freud’s analysis is based on a civilised/primitive dualism which he holds on to even 
as he problematises it, contemporary theorists of ghosts point out that we are prone 
to hauntings precisely because ‘indignities and damages continue under cover of 
civilisation’ (Dayan 2011: 9); and ‘deep “wounds in civilisation” are in haunting 
evidence’ (Gordon 2008: 207). The shared haunting in Tehlirian’s trial perhaps has 
to do with the recognition of the unthinkable, that this kind of collective violence is 
humanly possible. The spectre gives a form to what is ‘really real’ (Aretxaga 2005: 
227), the ghost becomes a figure that contains the impossible recognition of 
political violence. It is this recognition that then undoes the violence of Tehlirian’s 
act. In this sense, the most felicitous performative is enacted by the ghost in the 
trial, resulting in an acquittal. The traumas that people have brought into the 
courtroom seem to combine to create a scene that is beyond any (individual or 
stately) sovereign decisions or damage limitation exercises.  
The key irony is that although the ghost played a central role in politicising 
the proceedings, it was initially introduced in an attempt to depoliticise the crime. 
The discrepancy between Tehlirian’s admissions during his police interrogation and 
his trial testimony34 is of significance here: during his police interrogation Tehlirian 
                                                
34 In her study of the pre-trial records of Tehlirian’s case (four files that resurfaced in East German 
archives containing case records created by the German police, the state prosecutor, the Ministry of 
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admitted to intentional killing with vengeful premeditation, whereas in the trial he 
introduced the figure of his mother’s ghost as a way to indirectly deny 
premeditation. Tehlirian later gave his own explanation for his change of testimony. 
According to his memoirs, it had to do with his encounter with a fellow prisoner 
after his police interrogation, who explained to him that murder committed with 
political motivations will incur the death sentence, whereas killing for personal 
reasons would be treated with much more leniency in German courts (Atamian 
1961: 19-21; Alexander 2000: 20, 28). I have not found any indicators of such a 
legal distinction between political and personal motivations,35 and perhaps the issue 
had more to do with the question of premeditation – likely assumed to exist in a 
‘political’ crime, whereas not necessarily in a personal ‘crime of passion’. It is 
nevertheless interesting to entertain this differentiation between the political and the 
personal that Tehlirian himself says he heeded. In an attempt to shift the focus from 
the political to the personal, Tehlirian speaks of his mother’s ghost. The 
quintessential ‘political crime’, the assassination of a (former) statesman by 
someone who is a stranger to him, was to become personalised through the figure 
of a ghost, who establishes an intimacy, a link of private vengeance between the 
assassin and his victim. Tehlirian’s trial appearance was very much in line with this 
strategy of keeping it personal, as he limited his account of the Armenian 
deportations and massacres to the sufferings of his family. 
                                                                                                                                   
Justice and the German Foreign Office) Osik Moses (2012) identifies that this shift of testimony 
occurred on 26 March 1921, 11 days after the assassination and more than two months before the 
trial. On this date, the investigating judge conducted the last hearing of the preliminary 
investigation, during which Tehlirian gave the version of his story that he reiterated in his trial, even 
though it contradicted his initial confessions to the police.  
35 Even during the troubled early years of the Weimar Republic where political assassinations were 
rife, the largest category of death sentences passed between 1919 and 1925 involved the murder of 
victims closely related to the offender (Evans 1996: 525). One possibility is that the fellow prisoner 
who advised Tehlirian at the time might have had in mind the political make up of the German 
judiciary. Remnants of the previous monarchical regime, judges of the Weimar Republic were 
famously conservative as they had been selected under Wilhelm II for their political reliability. 
Statistician Emil Gumbel’s study of the adjudication of political crimes between late 1918 and the 
summer of 1922 revealed that 54 murders committed by rightists resulted in no death sentences, 1 
life sentence, a total of 90 years and 2 months in prison and 326 unpunished perpetrators; whereas 
22 murders committed by leftists in this period resulted in 10 death sentences, 3 life sentences, a 
total of 248 years and 9 months in prison, and 4 unpunished perpetrators (Morris 2005: 1). This kind 
of pervasive judicial right-wing bias could have resulted in a harsh condemnation of the assassin of 
Talât, an ally of the Kaiser, but that might be an argument stretched too thin.  
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Interestingly, Tehlirian’s commitment to keep politics out of the trial was 
shared by the prosecution and the presiding judge, according to historical records. 
Tessa Hofmann (1989) provides an account of the prosecutorial strategy and the 
position of the judge by drawing on previously unearthed case records and files 
documenting the correspondence between the Foreign Office, the Ministry of 
Justice, the Attorney General, the chief public prosecutor, and the trial prosecutor 
regarding how the Tehlirian case should be handled. In a plea to the Ministry of 
Justice written about a week before the beginning of the trial, the chief public 
prosecutor expresses the worries of the Foreign Office with regards to the 
approaching trial. The escalation of the trial into a ‘mammoth political case’ could 
create disturbances on the public front ‘as well as in German-Turkish relations’ 
(qtd. in Hofmann 1989: 44). The correspondence expresses fear that the defence 
may question the stance of the German government on the Armenian atrocities, and 
suggests that this would be undesirable especially at a time when Germany was 
busy trying to suppress the Polish insurrection in Upper Silesia (44-45). The chief 
prosecutor adds ‘Of even greater concern from the political point of view is a line 
of inquiry during the trial, which would consider (Talât) Pasha’s general political 
role and his German connections’ (45). Representatives of the Foreign Office met 
the trial prosecutor Gollnick one day before the trial to discuss these concerns 
(ibid.) and the presiding judge was similarly briefed according to Hofmann’s 
research (46). The authorities initially entertained the idea of excluding the public 
from the trial to keep its politics under control, but then decided that this strategy 
might backfire. Instead they tried to contain the trial by restricting the time and the 
facts: ‘Only subjective and medical questions were to be raised’ (46).  
Hofmann’s conclusion is that the prosecutor and the presiding judge indeed 
handled the case extremely tactfully, to render it ‘conspicuously unpolitical’ (49). 
She concludes, ‘it was no true victory for political justice, but rather just a first and 
involuntary step in the right direction’ (50). Note that Hoffman writes this in the 
Dashnak-supported journal Armenian Review, to break the perhaps unwelcome 
news that the Tehlirian trial was not exactly the idealised moment of rupture that 
later Armenian nationalist mythologising held it out to be: the legal recognition of 
the plight of Armenians on the world stage, justice done and justice seen. 
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According to Hoffman’s account, there were other, more parochial political 
considerations at work, ones that required the depoliticisation of the proceedings. 
However, my sense is that the trial is politically significant precisely because its 
politicisation was ‘involuntary’ as Hoffman puts it. Its significance exceeded the 
political designs and strategies of the parties involved. 
This is not to say that there were no felicitous performatives of expediency: 
the fact that the German authorities planned to play down the political significance 
of the trial did not prevent them from capitalising on it for their own political ends. 
The transcript specifically betrays an attempt to absolve Germany of any liability 
for the Armenian deportations and massacres. Historians differ on the question of 
Germany’s complicity in the plight of the Armenians (Weitz 2011: 176-77), some 
accord a decisive level of responsibility, while others limit it to quiet complicity at 
the top echelons. Certainly at the time of Tehlirian’s trial, Germany was widely 
seen as blameworthy, largely due to Entente propaganda campaigns to this effect 
(Bloxham 2005: 129-30). Thus, the need to emphasise Germany’s innocence 
emerged then and again in the Tehlirian trial. Notably, it was flagged at the very 
beginning of the trial by the defence counsel, who, when arguing for the necessity 
to introduce testimony on the Armenian massacres, said ‘Believe me, gentlemen, it 
is in the interests of the German government that nothing be left out’ (ST 4). 
Concerning the interests of the German government, it seems, the defence and the 
prosecuting authorities were very much in agreement. 
Germany’s innocence provided a point of consensus even for witnesses 
otherwise entirely in disagreement with one another. It united, for example, the 
testimonies of Liman von Sanders and Johannes Lepsius, though they contradicted 
one another on nearly every other issue.36 But the issue came to the fore most 
crucially during the closing speech of one of the defence counsel. After 
congratulating himself and his team for not turning the trial into a political trial, 
Kurt Niemeyer made this argument on behalf of acquitting Tehlirian: 
During the war, German military and other establishments, both in this 
country and beyond its borders, passed over in silence and then tried to 
                                                
36 Lepsius was in fact the perfect candidate for helping prove Germany’s innocence, as he had 
already done much to absolve Germany of complicity. As Moses (2012: 16) puts it ‘the renowned 
Armenophile … was first and foremost a German nationalist’. 
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cover up the atrocities committed against the Armenians. This was done in 
such a manner as to imply that our German government actually condoned 
these atrocities. Certainly, up to a point, individual Germans tried to put an 
end to the atrocities, but to the Turks the implications were clear. They 
thought, ‘It is impossible for these events to take place without the consent 
of the Germans. After all, we are their allies and they are so much stronger 
than us.’ Therefore, in the East and all over the world, we Germans have 
been held responsible with the Turks for the crimes committed against the 
Armenians. There is a wealth of literature in the United States, Great 
Britain, and France whose purpose is to show that the Germans were really 
the Talaats in Turkey. If a German court were to find Soghomon Tehlirian 
not guilty, this would put an end to the misconception that the world has of 
us. The world would welcome such a decision as one serving the highest 
principles of justice. (162) 
We do not know whether this argument played a role in the jury decision. We can, 
however, surmise that in responding to the proceedings with a not guilty verdict, 
the jury, composed of average Berliners, may have sought to dissociate from the 
harrowing atrocities they had listened to. The decision, which functions as a 
condemnation of Talât’s responsibility in the genocide, may be interpreted as a 
collective attempt to put (at least some of the) ghosts to rest.  
 
the fore- & afterl ives of a trial 
We may locate the Tehlirian trial within a history of political trials by seeking its 
‘cross-legal’ connections, in Shoshana Felman’s formulation, considering the ways 
in which it references or ‘recapitulates the memory’ of, ‘repeats and reenacts’ 
(Felman 2002: 61) but also, crucially, pre-enacts other trials. In a veritable sense, 
the Tehlirian trial is haunted by the 1919 judgment in Istanbul that sentenced Talât 
to death for his responsibility in the Armenian deportations and massacres. But it is 
also haunted by the trial that never was. On 24 May 1915, exactly one month after 
the beginning of the genocide, Great Britain, France and Russia issued a joint 
declaration stating,  
In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilisation, 
the Allied governments will hold personally responsible all the members of 
the Turkish Government, as well as all officials who have participated in 
these massacres. (qtd. in Akçam 2007: 2) 
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The reference to the ‘new crimes’ against humanity and civilisation here was 
without precedent, but the Allied governments were clearly conjuring a future 
judicial process in their emphasis on personal accountability. Indeed, the idea of 
prosecuting state leaders for war crimes was quite prevalent already at the 
beginning of World War I. After the war, it was brought to the table at the Paris 
Peace Conference, one of the consequences of which was Article 227 of Treaty of 
Versailles, pertaining to bringing the German Emperor before an international 
tribunal. As for Ottoman authorities, we can look at Article 230 of the Treaty of 
Sevres which stipulates the establishment of an international tribunal for the 
‘massacres committed’ in Ottoman territory during the war. The said tribunal was 
never formed, and eventually the Treaty of Lausanne covered the perpetrators with 
the shield of amnesty. It is in this sense that the trial that never was haunts the 
Berlin trial, possessing it, and turning a murder trial into a trial about the genocide.  
Further, the Tehlirian trial can also be said to haunt, in advance, the trial to 
come. In hindsight, it is difficult not to note in astonishment that this is a trial about 
a genocide, held in Germany more than two decades before the Nuremberg trials. It 
is now known that Raphael Lemkin, the jurist who coined the word ‘genocide’ in 
1944, was captivated by the Tehlirian trial as a young student of law. In his draft 
autobiography published posthumously, he identifies it as one of the key events that 
shaped his thinking around mass atrocity and international law.37 Another among 
the young law students watching the trial was Robert Kempner who later was on 
the US prosecutorial team of the Nuremberg trials. In a 1980 article he wrote of the 
Tehlirian trial’s legal historical significance in somewhat exaggerated terms:  
For the first time in legal history, it was recognised that other countries 
could legitimately combat gross human rights violations caused by a 
government, especially genocide, without committing unauthorised 
intervention in the internal affairs of another country. (qtd. in Hoffman 
1989: 51) 
                                                
37 ‘Tehlirian, who upheld the moral order of mankind, was classified as insane, incapable of 
discerning the moral nature of his act. He had acted as the self-appointed legal officer fort he 
conscience of mankind. But can a man appoint himself to mete out justice? Will not passion sway 
such a form of justice and make a travesty of it? At that moment, my worries about the murder of 
the innocent became more meaningful to me. I didn’t know all the answers but I felt that a law 
against this type of racial or religious murder must be adopted by the world.’ (Lemkin 2013: 20).  
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Kempner thus monumentalises the Tehlirian trial as something it never was. 
Perhaps more crucially, while the men of law attempt to mould the Tehlirian trial 
into a triumphant legal history of international justice, various traditions of political 
violence have proven much more hospitable to the revenants of this trial. 
In his multivalent discussion in Spectres of Marx, Jacques Derrida proposes 
that the spectre of the past and the spectre of the future cannot be differentiated 
once and for all (2006: 48). ‘The question of the event as a question of the ghost’ 
(10) brings together repetition and the novelty of the first – since the first time a 
ghost appears is always already a return. Derrida writes ‘One cannot control its 
comings and goings because it begins by coming back’ (11). In the aftermath of 
Talât’s assassination, German newspapers featured debates about what happened in 
1915. Two moments are notable in this range of publications: In trying to justify 
Talât and the deportations, one Middle East correspondent held up the spectre of 
what the British did in the Boer War, namely an early use of concentration camps, 
and argued that the Armenian deportations were similarly justified out of military 
necessity.38 The second is an article written after the trial by the former German 
chief of General Staff of the Ottoman army, Baron von Schellendorf, in testament 
to Talât’s genius as a statesman. Outraged by the decision of Tehlirian’s acquittal, 
which he seems to read as an incrimination of Talât, von Schellendorf also argues 
the primacy of military necessary, but not with reference to past events such as the 
Boer War: imagine, he suggests instead, if in today’s Germany all Polish insurgents 
were removed from Upper Silesia and placed in concentration camps, or, he says, if 
all communists were deported from Germany, would not, he asks ‘a storm of 
applause roar through the whole of Germany?’39 As these two moments indicate, 
the logic of haunting, this inability to distinguish the ghosts of the future from those 
of the past, has a particularly strong purchase on the question of political violence.  
The spectre of Tehlirian’s trial continues to roam around. Like every ghost, 
the ghost of this trial that we encounter today is an impoverished and distorted 
version of the life, the live event it once was, inflected through various 
chauvinisms, or various modalities of resentment, enmity, frustration, grief, longing 
                                                
38 ‘Zum Tode Talaat Paschas’, Kölnische Zeitung, 16 March 1921. 
39 Fritz Bronsart von Schellendorf, ‘Ein Zeugnis Für Talaat Pascha’, Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 
24 July 1921. 
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and desire. This is easily traced in the fictionalised retellings of the trial: In a 
novel40 by Turkish writer Mim Kemal Öke (2012) who depicts almost all 
Armenians as ungrateful, back-stabbing bandits and all Turks as magnanimous, 
tolerant peace-seekers, Tehlirian’s mother appears towards the end of the trial, not 
as ghost but in flesh and blood, and explains to the court that he has long disowned 
his son Soghomon because he killed his own older brother who refused to 
collaborate with the Dashnak fighters against the Ottoman Army. The 
melodramatic narrative has it that Soghomon then testified against a Turkish soldier 
for his brother’s murder in a hearing held by Talât himself, who had sensed he was 
lying but, being a man of justice, would honour a Christian’s word as much as a 
Muslim’s, and therefore sentenced the Turkish soldier to death. Soghomon then felt 
he had to kill Talât because his piercing and accusing gaze had become the stuff of 
his nightmares. In Armenian-American writer Lindy Avakian’s similarly 
imaginative reconstruction,41 Tehlirian is portrayed as nothing less than a superhero 
– vigorous, muscular and ultra-virile. He doesn’t say much in his trial except 
protesting when the judge identifies his country of origin as ‘Turkey’: ‘No, Sir!’. 
There is consternation in the court until his counsel leaps to his feet: ‘If it please the 
court, I believe I can explain my client’s answer. As an Armenian he recognises 
neither Soviet nor Turkish domination of his country. He was born in Erzinga, 
Armenia. The defence respectfully asks the court to recognise the defendant’s 
birthplace as Erzinga, Armenia, rather than Turkey’ (Avakian 1989: 125). The 
fictional retellings involve a whole range of fantasising about sovereignty and 
sovereign agency in the trial. 
The same can be said for the ways in which the trial is understood in 
retrospect. In the Turkish nationalist imaginary, the acquittal of Talât’s killer in 
Berlin serves as proof of the old ally Germany’s betrayal, hypocrisy and injustice. 
For example, when Angela Merkel and the Christian Democrats submitted a motion 
in 2005 to the German Parliament that called for Turkey to apologise to Armenians, 
Oktay Ekşi, a senior columnist in the popular daily Hürriyet, suggested that perhaps 
Merkel should apologise to the Turks on behalf of German judges for the injustice 
                                                
40 This was originally the script for a TV series broadcast on Turkish national television in the mid-
1980s. 
41 See supra fn. 29. 
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that was perpetrated in Tehlirian’s trial.42 This kind of rhetoric about the trial is 
often thrown around, with parochial historical vision (i.e. as if Tehlirian’s acquittal 
was the only problem with Weimar courts) and without regard to certain key facts 
(i.e. that it was a jury trial). In the Armenian nationalist imaginary, Tehlirian’s 
acquittal is a triumph of truth and a victory for justice: as a momentary recognition 
on the world stage of the catastrophic injustices of 1915, it is a memory that is held 
dear. But this acquittal seems to also serve as vindication for acts of political 
violence that are legitimised in terms of retribution for 1915. Tehlirian must have 
been a source of inspiration for the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide 
(JCOAG) and Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) 
killings of Turkish diplomats from mid-1970s to mid 1980s,43 assassinations 
through which, in the words of Fatma Müge Göçek, ‘The unexamined past thus 
suddenly and unexpectedly came to haunt the present’ (2011: 52, my emphasis).  
The timing of the publication of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation’s 
English edition of the Tehlirian trial transcript, the year 1985, is significant in this 
sense and the foreword to the publication actually highlights this link between 
Tehlirian and ASALA/JCOAG assassinations. Signed by ‘Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation, Varantian Gomideh, Los Angeles’, the foreword mentions the ‘recent 
trials of Armenian political prisoners around the world who have, as Tehlirian did 
in 1921, forced the Armenian Cause onto the streets and courts of world capitals’. 
Tehlirian’s trial, it is suggested, was the first case during which the horrors of 1915 
were ‘introduced as evidence to justify political violence in the face of neglect by 
world governments’ and concludes: ‘Over six decades later, those same facts –
compounded by Turkish denials– have motivated a new generation of survivors to 
use a variety of means in seeking justice and retribution for the Armenian people’ 
(ST vii). This formulation of ‘a new generation of survivors’ in a nod towards the 
                                                
42 Oktay Ekşi, ‘Berlin’de hakim var mı?’, Hürriyet, 1 March 2005, 
http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/01/606954.asp.  
43 The timing of the publication of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation’s English edition of the 
transcript of Tehlirian’s trial, the year 1985, is significant in this sense. Indeed, the foreword, signed 
by ‘ARF, Varantian Gomideh, Los Angeles’ mentions the ‘recent trials of Armenian political 
prisoners around the world who have, as Tehlirian did in 1921, forced the Armenian Cause onto the 
streets and courts of world capitals’ (ST, vii). 
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new assassins is noteworthy, as it evokes a heritage of haunting, a lineage of 
haunted hunters.  
An even more sinister return of the 1921 Berlin drama may have been the 
assassination of Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink in 2007. Fethiye Çetin, 
the lawyer representing Dink’s family in the murder trial, noticed in the case file 
that Yasin Hayal, an ultranationalist young man arrested soon after the killing and 
eventually convicted of soliciting Dink’s murder, had been obsessed with the 
assassination of Talât and the acquittal of his killer. Several dark figures who were 
implicated in Dink’s assassination were all founding members of a certain Talât 
Pasha Association according to the case file of another trial.44 Dink was murdered 
close to his office on the sidewalk of a busy, central street in Istanbul, in broad 
daylight, shot at the back of his head – just like Talât. Such parallels and resonances 
between the two killings have been noted in the Turkish print media, including by 
historian Taner Akçam, who suggests that Dink’s murder was vendetta for Talât’s 
assassination.45 Without a grasp of the political background of Dink’s assassination, 
this suggestion rings, at best, absurd: Why should an Armenian-Turkish journalist, 
human rights defender, indefatigable peacemaker be assassinated in vengeance for 
the killing of an Ottoman statesman 86 years before? What kind of trans-historical 
will could carry out such a mission? Would it not require a conspiracy of fantastic 
proportions and reach, a trans-generational commitment to hostility, an omnipresent 
consciousness and tenacity of feud and enmity? Either that, or more likely, it would 
take a more modest orchestration of hauntings, a conjuration of ghosts for maximal 
symbolic effect. Indeed, the suggestion that the two assassinations are linked only 
rings true in relation to the suspected ‘deep state’ involvement in Dink’s murder – 
something I explore in detail in the next chapter.  
On the day of his funeral, Hrant Dink was commemorated by hundreds of 
thousands of people. Some had pinned on their chests a funeral badge that seemed 
standard at first glance: a portrait of the deceased with his dates of birth and death. 
                                                
44 Most prominent among these people were lawyer Kemal Kerinçsiz and retired brigadier general 
Veli Küçük who were later tried and convicted in the Ergenekon trial for other offences (see Chapter 
5). They had led the campaign of persecution against Dink prior to his assassination by a 17-year-
old. 
45 Taner Akçam and Neşe Düzel, ‘Ermeni olayında Atatürk’ü izleyelim’, Taraf, 14 March 2012.  
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On second take, one realised that the badges were not so standard: the span of 
Dink’s life was represented as ‘1954-1915’. This particularly powerful utilisation of 
the rhetorical device of hysteron proteron, the inversion of ordinary temporal order, 
combined with the depiction of now as then is exemplary of the strange logic and 
temporality of haunting. The time of haunting is time out of joint, as Jacques 
Derrida reminds us with reference to Hamlet. For Derrida, haunting helps us see 
through the ‘doubtful contemporaneity of the present to itself’. What he calls the 
‘spectrality effect’, ‘consists in undoing this opposition, or even this dialectic, 
between actual, effective presence and its other’ (2006: 48). The temporal rupture 
that was depicted on those funeral badges had various immediate resonances, 
ranging from the recognition of the state-sponsored nature of the killing to the 
understanding that Dink had been eliminated for threatening to destabilise the 
official version of history. 
In the Spectres of Marx, Derrida puns on ontology to propose ‘hauntology’ as 
a way of knowing that involves, but is more than, and is indeed the condition for 
the possibility of ontology. He refers to this concept almost as if in jest, without 
spelling it out as a methodology in detail, though he writes of the necessity of 
introducing ‘haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of every concept’ 
(202). And yet, his book as a whole can be read as an exercise in hauntology – a 
rethinking of the notion of inheritance, a deconstruction of (Marxist) ontology and 
its determinations of the political by pursuing the logic of spectrality. Thus the 
foregoing could be read as a modest attempt to trace something like a hauntology of 
political violence as they are conjured and perpetrated in trials. I continue with this 
effort in the following chapter, exploring some of the methodological difficulties 
around addressing political violence, both legally and conceptually. If hauntology is 
to some extent a particular attunement to ghosts that assists us in formulating a 
sense of ‘how the past lives indirectly in the present, inchoately suffusing and 
shaping rather than determining it’ (Brown 2001: 145), then the law is a 
particularly blunt instrument for such an effort, as I hope to show with my 
discussion of two contemporary political trials from Turkey, the Hrant Dink murder 
trial and the Ergenekon trial. In studying political trials where the crimes under 
concern have been perpetrated by the state itself, we can both diagnose the failures 
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of the legal imagination in grasping political violence, but also understand 
something about the ‘magic of the state’ (Taussig 1997). If hauntology is required 
‘to account for the processes and effects of … metaphysicalisation, abstraction, 
idealisation, ideologisation and fetishisation’ (Derrida 1999: 244-45), then perhaps 
the study of the ghosting of the political that we encounter in political trials, 
especially those concerning state crimes, may afford privileged insight into what 
may be understood as the fetish of the state. 
  
 
 
5 
the state of conspiracy  
 turkey’s deep state trials 
 
 
 
 
In Turkish popular parlance, the phrase ‘deep state’ refers to powers operating with 
impunity through and beyond the official state structure. The deep state is 
considered to be a state within the state, a network of illegitimate alliances 
crisscrossing the military, the police force, the bureaucracy, the political 
establishment, the intelligence agencies, mafia organisations and beyond; lurking 
menacingly behind the innumerable assassinations, disappearances, provocations, 
death threats, disinformation campaigns, psychological operations, and shady deals 
of the past several decades. The currency of such a phrase points to a public 
consensus around the existence of non-democratic leadership, state-sponsored 
extralegal activities, state protection and perpetuation of particular forms of 
political violence, and more generally corruption within state institutions.  
Recently, a number of criminal trials brought the deep state into Turkey’s 
courtrooms. This chapter focuses on two of these: the Ergenekon trial of 2008-2013 
and the ongoing trial concerning the assassination of Armenian-Turkish journalist 
Hrant Dink in 2007.1 The former is a political trial by choice and for expediency, a 
‘classic political trial’ in Otto Kirchheimer’s taxonomy, as it proved to be the 
                                                
1 At the time of writing, both of these trials are still in progress. The Ergenekon case is at the 
appeals stage. The Dink murder case is currently being retried, after the verdict of the first trial was 
appealed. My reading in this chapter is based on the case files of the first (pre-appeal) trials in both 
cases. 
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government’s explicit attempt to eliminate its political foes. The latter involves a 
common crime committed for political purposes and corresponds to what Otto 
Kirchheimer defines as a ‘political trial by necessity’: several agents behind Dink’s 
assassination, including the hitman, were apprehended by security forces and 
therefore had to be prosecuted. These differences between the two trials are in some 
ways analogous to the different ways in which each implicates the deep state. 
Although the deep state seems to be inscribed all over Dink’s assassination and the 
ensuing criminal process, the trial is only accidentally, not officially a ‘deep state 
trial’. To the contrary, the entire process has been structured by its disavowal. The 
Ergenekon trial, on the other hand, purports to grab the deep state by the horns: the 
indictment and the judgment explicitly claim that the object of prosecution, the 
‘Ergenekon Terrorist Organisation’, is synonymous with what has come to be 
known as the ‘deep state’ in the popular imaginary. Although officially 
unacknowledged, there are important links between the two trials, including 
clusters of evidence and certain key figures.2  
My reading of these two cases revolve around two related themes: the 
performative production of the state in trials involving state crimes, and the 
problem of producing knowledge about something as vague as the deep state. The 
latter is as much a problem for critical thought as it is for the law. While the phrase 
certainly has an exchange value in vox populi, ‘deep state’ operates as a known 
unknown or unknown known of Turkish political life.3 It communicates something, 
its utterers and hearers often seem to have a loose consensus as to what it may 
signify, and yet it is extremely difficult to pin down what exactly it is. The Dink 
murder case and the Ergenekon trial demonstrate that criminal trial has its own way 
of reifying this notion, in a bizarre amalgam of fact, fiction, fantasy, and disavowal. 
What yields the performative production of the state in the scene of the trial is 
                                                
2 These crossovers are quite significant, so much so that the lawyers representing the Dink family 
have advocated for several years, albeit unsuccessfully, for the Dink murder case to be integrated 
into the Ergenekon prosecution. 
3 Similar terms seem to be in use elsewhere. I am told that ‘para-state’ signifies comparable 
structures of non-transparency in Greece. Since Hosni Mubarak’s fall in February 2011, and more 
frequently since the military coup of July 2013, English language reports have been referring to 
Egypt’s ‘deep state’. Occasional references to Russia’s ‘deep state’ are also found in political 
analyses and commentaries.   
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neither the accuracy of the inquisitorial process, nor an efficacious distribution of 
liability, but rather the failure of the legal machinery and imaginary to satisfactorily 
address the deep state. At times engineered and highly convenient, these failures 
crystallise the conscious and unconscious legal investments into an idea of the state. 
The political, then, emerges in these trials as an amalgam of expediency and 
fantasy, convenience and fetish.  
The chapter begins with a brief and inevitably incomplete institutional history 
of the deep state, in an initial attempt to orientate the reader to its specifically 
Turkish connotations. Political theory provides a number of conceptual frameworks 
for locating and explaining the dynamics invoked by such a phrase. However, 
anthropologists of state have emphasised that these frameworks are incomplete 
without a consideration of the affective investments in the notion of the state 
(Navaro-Yashin 2002; Aretxaga 2003). I take this suggestion seriously in my 
reading of the two trials and try to identify the governmental rationalities as well as 
the irrationalities that combine to enact the state through the legal procedure. The 
concern with the problem of knowledge production pertaining to the deep state 
permeates the entire chapter, based on the premise that ways of knowing the 
political are intimately tied to ways of reifying it (Abrams 1988). In Pierre 
Bourdieu’s words, the state ‘thinks itself through those who attempt to think it’ 
(1994:1). In this sense, the coincidence of the constative (cognitive) and the 
performative takes on a distinct significance vis-à-vis ‘knowledge’ of the (deep) 
state. I find that ‘conspiracy’ proves a suitable name for this coincidence in the 
phenomena and the trials under consideration here. The relevance of the notion of 
conspiracy will, I hope, become clearer as my discussion in this chapter progresses, 
but to foreshadow the connections: the attempt to produce knowledge of the deep 
state is to necessarily risk engaging in conspiracy theorising, while the way in 
which such knowledge is produced or disavowed (or both) in the two trials I 
discuss here can be understood as amounting to a conspiracy or complicity with the 
deep state. This is why I conclude the chapter with a consideration of some of the 
ways in which one can attempt to know otherwise, so as to effect a rupture in the 
melding of the performative and the constative, through counter-mobilising law’s 
archive in a counter-conspiracy that disinvests from stately fantasies of sovereignty. 
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four units and an accident: a brief history of turkey’s deep state 
The obscure notion of the deep state has served and continues to serve as occasion 
for myriad conspiracy theories. When divorced from an institutional and historical 
analysis, the very concept sounds less than credible. The kind of activities and 
alliances it refers to has to be understood against the background of Turkey’s 
extended history of military tutelage (Söyler 2013), its military coup tradition 
(Ünver 2009) and the special privileges of unaccountability and impunity that the 
army has enjoyed throughout the republic’s history, up until very recently.4 The 
military has traditionally been regarded as the central command of the Turkish deep 
state. In turn, the military coups that have marked the country’s history are often 
interpreted as periods during which the state became synonymous with the deep 
state through the suspension of the veneer of parliamentary democracy. The 
paradigmatic example is the September 1980 coup d’état which resulted in the 
adoption of a new, entirely state-security centred constitution that is still in effect; 
but the interpretation is also relevant for the military coups of May 1960 and March 
1971, the so-called postmodern coup of February 1997, the e-coup attempt of April 
2007, and the ‘judicial coup’ attempt of 2008.  
                                                
4 Arguably, the last years of the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government have 
witnessed the consolidation of an appearance of representative democracy, owing to a series of 
‘purges’ aimed at tackling military tutelage, which in turn is often understood to be the sole source 
of the wide range of phenomena evoked with the phrase ‘deep state’. And yet, as I propose in this 
chapter, the deep state should be understood not as a field of measurable deviance, the gradual 
elimination of which will lead to democratisation (cf. Söyler 2013), but rather as a particular 
amalgam of governmental rationality and fantasy that perpetuates a state tradition. Unlike various 
recent analyses that focus on the military as the one and only source of the problem of the deep 
state, my approach is able to address the recent episodes in Turkish politics whereby the phantom of 
‘the state within the state’ continues to hover around in new guises. One such guise is the ‘parallel 
state’, formulated and vehemently denounced by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan since members of 
the police force (allegedly part of this ‘parallel state’) exposed a number of governmental corruption 
scandals on 17 December 2013. The banal irony here is that the so-called ‘parallel state’ was 
originally instituted by the AKP government itself. The current referent of the incriminating phrase, 
Pennsylvania-based imam Fetullah Gülen’s Hizmet movement, used to be a key constituent of the 
coalition that makes up the AKP. Installed and encouraged to organise within the police and the 
judiciary, the Gülen movement was very effective in carrying out AKP’s purge of military influence 
over politics. The deep state is supposedly eliminated, but now that Erdoğan’s old ally has turned 
into his arch-nemesis, long live the parallel state. Yet another new guise of the deep state can be 
traced in the AKP government’s recent legislation of new forms of institutional non-transparency, 
especially its manoeuvres to restructure the intelligence agency. All of these seemingly ‘new’ 
developments can be seen as a perpetuation of politics as usual.  
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Against this background of military tutelage, historians, investigative 
journalists and commentators attempting to get a more credible hold on the 
nebulous concept of the deep state tend to focus on state institutions that are 
considered to be conducive, due to their structural non-transparency, to the 
continuation and prospering of such activities and alliances. Such focus on 
institutions rendered unaccountable by design yields a relatively long history of the 
Turkish deep state, stretching beyond the republican era to a unit established by the 
Committee of Union and Progress during Ottoman rule. This is the Special 
Organisation (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, SO), which has been identified as the forerunner 
of Turkey’s contemporary deep state (Belge 1998). The unit was established 
sometime between 1911 and 1913 (Criss 1999: 95), and although it is often referred 
to as a secret service in the literature, it may be more appropriate to define it as ‘an 
early type of unconventional warfare organisation’ whose ‘operations included the 
recruitment, training, and supervision of armed groups tasked with conducting 
asymmetric warfare to weaken enemy morale and fighting strength’ as well as 
engaging in small-scale intelligence activities (Safi 2012: 89). While the military 
division was responsible to the Minister of War, Enver Pasha, the unit also included 
a civilian division that engaged mainly in ideological and propaganda activities and 
reported to the Minister of Interior, Talât Pasha. Notably, the SO is considered to be 
the key operational structure behind the Armenian Genocide, as it incorporated and 
mobilised criminal gangs under military direction (Akçam 2007, 2012; Dadrian 
1993).5 The organisation’s capacity for such semi-official activities facilitates the 
Turkish state’s continuing denial of allegations of genocide.6 
In the republican period, a key moment of the institutional history of the 
Turkish deep state is commonly identified as the establishment of the Special 
Warfare Department (Özel Harp Dairesi, SWD) in 1953 in line with NATO’s anti-
                                                
5 Here we can trace yet another ghostly link between the Tehlirian trial and the Hrant Dink murder 
trial, another clue of the strange spectral operations of political violence. 
6 Polat Safi (2012) provides an insightful review of the literature on the Special Organisation, 
focusing his attention on the significant polarisation in the field of historical research on this subject, 
between chauvinistic glorification of the organisation as an anti-imperialist revolutionary mission on 
the one hand, and accounts offered by revisionist critics of the Turkish ‘state tradition’ on the other 
hand. I’d suggest that such polarisation can be seen as a testament to the currency of the unit’s 
ideological and political significance. 
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Soviet measures. This was a secret army that directly reported to the Chief of 
General Staff and recruited paramilitary forces. The aim of this unit, as later 
acknowledged by military authorities, was to build an infrastructure of civilian-
military mobilisation against a possible Soviet occupation. As with similar NATO 
units in other countries (Ganser 2005), in practice, the activities of the SWD was 
not limited to an anticipated Soviet occupation but involved operations against 
those identified as ‘internal enemies’. Around 1973-74, when social democrat 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit found out about the existence of the SWD, he spoke 
of ‘an organisation that is within the state but acts outside the knowledge and 
control of the state’, and expressed his suspicion of the unit’s involvement in 
assassinations and massacres targeting communists. The visible civilian actors 
behind this kind of political violence were often militants from the far-right 
ultranationalist organisation Grey Wolves. A prosecutor, Doğan Öz, who was the 
first person to research into and report to the prime minister on SWD’s deployment 
of Grey Wolves as its ‘civilian elements’ in such cases of political violence, was 
himself assassinated in early 1978. Around the same time, an MP from Ecevit’s 
party proposed to make a motion in the parliament to enable investigation into 
SWD’s involvement in such cases. When the party rejected the proposal, Ecevit 
began to deny the existence of kontrgerilla, and claimed not to remember ever 
speaking of it (Akçura 2006: 20). The culmination of political and state violence in 
the 1980 coup d’état effectively collapsed the distinction between the state and the 
deep state. Years later, in November 1990, Ecevit regained his memory and brought 
up the issue again in more detail during an interview, triggering public debate and 
renewing suspicions regarding the unit’s role in various significant past instances of 
political violence.  
These suspicions were neither confirmed nor repudiated by any official 
investigation, instead continuing to hover over Turkey’s political life as open 
secrets. During the 1990s, the SWD’s status, structure and alleged activities were 
brought before the parliament a total of 27 times, none leading to an actual 
parliamentary inquiry (Kılıç 2008: 299). The timing is not coincidental. It was in 
the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, that most of the other NATO stay-behind 
units in Europe were legally purged (Ganser 2005). On the other hand, the failure 
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of official investigations in Turkey can be explained by two key factors. First, the 
Turkish secret army apparently differed from other secret NATO armies in Europe 
in that it was relatively autonomous vis-à-vis central NATO command.7 Second, 
the Turkish military’s ‘low intensity war’ against the guerrillas of the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) would prove to greatly benefit from an obscure structure 
that can operate without accountability. Thus, instead of a legal purge, the SWD 
was restructured into a military division and renamed Special Forces Command 
(Özel Kuvvetler Komutanlığı, SFC) in 1991, with the new principal task of counter-
terrorism. This also helped to dispel the allegations and suspicions regarding the 
SWD’s involvement in extralegal activities. Even though the restructured unit 
seems to be more integrated into the official bureaucracy of the Turkish Armed 
Forces, it retains its civilian constituents and perpetuates a pattern of non-
transparency. The SFC has, for example, come under suspicion for the Hrant Dink 
assassination (Çetin 2013: 87-107; 270-74). 
A unit that emerged around the same time and was, for a while, virtually 
synonymous with the deep state is JITEM, acronym for ‘Gendarmerie Intelligence 
and Counterterrorism Group Command’. According to one theory, JITEM 
supplemented the restructured SWD by continuing to provide cover for 
unaccountability and impunity.8 This unit is alleged to be responsible for the 
majority of the thousands of disappearances and extrajudicial executions that 
peaked during the 1990s, primarily targeting Kurds in the southeast of Turkey. 
JITEM confessors describe having summarily arrested, tortured and executed 
members of the public who were suspected of supporting the PKK. There are also 
allegations regarding the unit’s involvement in illegal arms trading and drug 
                                                
7 Italy’s former president and a self-confessed founder of the Italian NATO stay-behind unit Gladio, 
Francesco Cossiga, recently stated that an organisation resembling Gladio was formed in Turkey 
following World War II, though it remained independent from the central Gladio network in Europe, 
keeping NATO out of Turkey’s internal affairs (Nur Batur, ‘Türk Gladiosu Bağımsız Bir 
Konumdaydı’, Sabah, 17 February 2009). Former Chief of General Staff Necdet Üruğ corroborates 
this view. In an interview he gave in 2000, Üruğ describes Gladio as ‘a military unit in NATO 
member countries’, and upon being asked whether Turkey as a NATO member country also has a 
Gladio unit, he answers: ‘No, we don’t have Gladio. We have the Special Warfare Department. It is 
not organised in the same way’ (Düzel 2001: 203). Throughout this chapter, translations from cited 
Turkish sources are mine. 
8 Ahmet İnsel, ‘Özel Harp Dairesi’nden Jitem’e’, Radikal İki, 7 December 2008, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/ozel_harp_dairesinden_jiteme-911847.  
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trafficking in the region. Although JITEM has for many years been officially 
disavowed and said to have ‘never existed’, an abundance of testimonials9 and 
records in the last decade, including official payslips and parliamentary reports 
explicitly referring to the unit, corroborate its existence. It is a ghostly institution: 
there, but not there. The testimonials draw a portrait of the organisation as one that 
is specifically geared towards carrying out the ‘dirty work’ of the war –intelligence, 
interrogation and extrajudicial executions– with absolute impunity. 
The very style and structure of deep state plots render them almost 
immediately recognisable to a public that has become all too familiar with them. 
However, such familiarity does not alleviate the epistemological problem 
concerning the deep state. Official secrets, official denials, cover-ups, suppression 
or outright elimination of witnesses or researchers, psych-ops, and barrages of 
misinformation all weave a web of opacity, casting the deep state as a wilderness of 
mirrors, and endless fodder for conspiracy theories. After all, conspiracy theories 
may be seen as so many attempts ‘to give form to, and thus exercise a certain 
amount of control over, a fearful, ghostly reality of violence’ (Aretxaga 2005: 197). 
However, there was a key moment in the mid-1990s, at the height of the dirty war 
against the PKK, when a justification offered itself up for a wide array of 
suspicions, briefly illuminating the murky depths of the Turkish state in a flash of 
lightning. It took the form of a car accident.  
On 4 November 1996, a speeding Mercedes crashed into a lorry in the town 
of Susurluk. The passengers in the car included Sedat Bucak, parliamentarian and 
the leader of a Kurdish clan in close cooperation with the Turkish authorities in the 
war against the PKK, providing about 2000 of the notorious paramilitary ‘village 
guards’. Then there was Hüseyin Kocadağ, the director of the Istanbul Police 
Academy and former Deputy Police Chief of Istanbul. A third passenger was 
Abdullah Çatlı, who was wanted by not only the Turkish police for alleged 
participation in the massacre of seven members of the Turkish Labour Party in 
                                                
9 Most importantly those of ‘confessors’ Abdülkadir Aygan and İbrahim Babat; the statement given 
to the Parliamentary Commission on Susurluk by gendarmerie intelligence officer Hüseyin Oğuz; 
and recently the statement of Ergenekon defendant Colonel Arif Doğan who admitted to having 
founded the unit.   
turkey’s deep state trials 172 
 
 
1978,10 but also by Interpol for his 1982 escape from a Swiss prison where he had 
been held on drug smuggling charges. Of this unholy trinity of warlord 
parliamentarian, police chief and nationalist mafia, only the first survived, and he 
claimed a complete loss of memory. At the time of the accident, the mafia boss 
Çatlı was found to be carrying diplomatic passports and a licence to carry weapons, 
the latter bearing the original authorisation signature of Mehmet Ağar, the then 
Minister of Interior. This alone crystallised something of the essence of what the 
phrase ‘deep state’ tries to communicate: the documents had been forged, but the 
signatures were authentic. Fourteen individuals linked to the so-called ‘Susurluk 
gang’ were tried on charges of organised crime, though efforts to bring to light the 
entire set of connections and culpabilities failed spectacularly. The trial came to a 
conclusion in 2001, but neither addressed the full range of implications, nor 
satisfactorily ensured prosecution.11 The Ergenekon trial picks up where the 
Susurluk process left off, according to its prosecutors and judges. The claim is 
seemingly corroborated by the incorporation of some key figures from the Susurluk 
process into the Ergenekon trial as defendants. To what extent the trial succeeds in 
illuminating the deep state is something I discuss later on in this chapter.  
 
conceptualising the abysmal state 
Institutional histories pursued along the lines I have sketched out above have been 
and can continue to be helpful in terms of providing us with something more or less 
solid to work with in addressing as vague a notion as the deep state. Perhaps their 
most important function is to show us what kind of bureaucratic structures allow 
the monopoly of violence to be distributed beyond the bureaucracy. They further 
elucidate something like a history of the state’s self-stylisation, as it makes and 
                                                
10 At the time of the massacre, Abdullah Çatlı was a member of Grey Wolves, the ultranationalist 
youth organisation that was allegedly recruited by the SWD’s as its ‘civilian elements’ in acts of 
political violence targeting communists. 
11 Former Minister of Interior Mehmet Ağar and several other Susurluk gang members have 
recently been prosecuted again as part of an investigation concerning the extrajudicial executions of 
the 1990s. Currently, the trial pertains to only one execution, though it is likely that other cases will 
be integrated into it along the way. In the end, especially owing to the trial testimony of one of the 
defendants, a repentant police officer who refers to himself as a ‘murderer’, this relatively minor 
process may prove to be valuable in elucidating a key moment of the deep state when it was allowed 
to run rampant at the height of the war against the PKK.  
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remakes itself in the counter-image of its imagined or actual enemies. In the case of 
Turkey, the four units, from the Ottoman Special Organisation to the NATO stay-
behind unit to Special Forces Command and JITEM, provide a clear picture of the 
key categories of ‘internal threat’ that were prioritised in different periods to such 
an extent as to instigate bureaucratic reorganisation in order to allow the 
redistribution of extralegal violence: non-Muslim minorities, communists, Kurds. 
Thus, institutional histories could allow us to inquire into the transformations that 
the identity of the state (and by implication, the law, the concept of citizenship, 
etc.) undergoes as it securitises itself according to its prioritised categories of 
enmity. 
However, such an institutional focus may also create a disorientation, a 
misconception of the deep state as solely a unit within the state, a hub of 
extralegality within a larger context of constitutional operation, a rotten spot that 
can be carved out and discarded, isolated and thus easily purged. In the aftermath of 
the Susurluk incident, one of the points that the more theoretical approaches 
insisted on was precisely that the deep state is the state. The editorial preface for the 
critical journal Birikim’s 1997 special issue on ‘the state in Turkey’ suggested that 
the état de droit and the deep state are like the solid and liquid forms of the same 
matter’ (‘Türkiye’de Devlet’ 1997: 16). In the same issue, Ömer Laçiner (1997: 18) 
described the deep state as not so much a special unit within the state system, which 
carries out and commissions criminal activities and conducts secret operations, but 
rather institutions and establishments that operate on the basis of the understanding 
that the state will inevitably engage in such activities. Tanıl Bora (1997: 53) 
advocated for a technical rather than moralising terminology to refer to the kind of 
operations exposed in the Susurluk accident, because ‘although such activities are 
indeed “dark”, “dirty” and “horrific”, they are activities that are part of the nature 
of the modern state apparatus – therefore they are normal. In the case of our 
particular nation-state these natural organs are especially well developed’.  
This warning against Turkish exceptionalism, repeated by other thinkers 
responding to the Susurluk accident (i.e. Laçiner 1997; Mutman 1997; Sancar 2000; 
Sabuktay 2010), is an important point to heed. The covert and extralegal functions 
of the Turkish state over the past several decades have to be understood as part of 
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both a global historical context, and a widespread, if not universal, governmental 
rationality. Thus, on the one hand, the period we can identify as the SWD/NATO 
stretch (1953-1991) cannot be divorced from the general context of the Cold War 
and similar extralegal formations in other European countries (cf. Ganser 2005). 
Turkey’s 1980 coup d’état, in terms of its economic and political objectives 
(Ahmad 1981), finds its precursors in the Southern Cone coups of the mid-1970s 
(cf. Klein 2007). Likewise, the extralegal methods utilised by the Turkish state 
during the so-called ‘low-intensity warfare’ against the Kurdish insurgency are 
comparable to state-sponsored terror that goes under the name of anti-terror 
measures across the world: Britain’s deployment of the Military Reaction Force 
against the IRA in the early 1970s (Ware 2013); Spain’s grotesque tactics in the 
Basque conflict (Aretxaga 2000); Argentina’s ‘dirty war’ (Suárez-Orozco 1992); 
state-sponsored terror in Guatemala (Afflitto 2000) and so on.  
On the other hand, the governmental rationality operative in such activities 
can be identified very generally in terms of raison d’état, whereby the legitimacy of 
a state’s activities is solely grounded in the preservation and perpetuation of the 
state itself. The self-referential legitimation means that according to this rationality 
a state’s activities should not be subject to any external law – positive, natural, 
moral, nor divine. Offering a genealogy of raison d’état in his 1977-78 Collège de 
France lectures, Michel Foucault (2007) discusses it as a late-sixteenth century 
innovation that became the dominant governmental rationality in Europe in the 
seventeenth century through to the early eighteenth century. Foucault points out 
that in raison d’état the state serves both as the principle of intelligibility of an 
already existing institutional reality, and as its objective. In other words, raison 
d’état both explains the state as a given, and functions for its protection and 
perpetuation. Although Foucault discusses raison d’état in the context of a 
particular historical period, locating it in between pastoral power and liberalism 
(Foucault 2008), he emphasises that these rationalities neither exist in pure form, 
nor are distributed discretely and consecutively across history. Rather, in different 
periods and settings, we find particular combinations of the various kinds of 
governmental rationalities (2007: 4-12). Foucault does not provide a thorough 
account of how different governmental rationalities may coexist at any given 
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time,12 but his characterisation of raison d’état as it crystallised during the 
particular period of its dominance is still useful. 
In Foucault’s account, the relationship between raison d’état and the sphere 
of legality is one that is determined according to the convenience of the former: 
[R]aison d’État, which by its nature does not have to abide by the laws, 
and which in its basic functioning is exceptional in relation to public, 
particular, and fundamental laws, usually does respect the laws. It does not 
respect them in the sense of yielding to positive, moral, natural, and divine 
laws because they are stronger, but it yields to them and respects them 
insofar as, if you like, it posits them as an element of its own game. 
…However, there will be times when raison d’État can no longer make use 
of these laws and due to a pressing and urgent event must of necessity free 
itself from them… [i]n the name of the state’s salvation. It is this necessity 
of the state with regard to itself that, at a certain moment, will push raison 
d’État to brush aside the civil, moral, and natural laws that it had 
previously wanted to recognise and had incorporated into its game. (262) 
So the field of legality is never a proper external limitation to raison d’état, but 
rather always already accessorial – overridden and suspended if need be.13 
However, the question of political economy that Foucault discusses briefly in his 
exploration of this governmental rationality is important to keep in mind in terms of 
‘externality’, lest we get carried away with the emphasis on self-referentiality. It 
was the very context of mercantilism in the 17th and 18th centuries that gave 
‘meaning to the problem of the state’s expansion as the principle, the main theme of 
raison d’État’ (292): 
[the major states] assert themselves, or anyway seek to assert themselves in 
a space of increased extended and intensified economic exchange. They 
seek to assert themselves in a space of commercial competition and 
domination, in a space of monetary circulation, colonial conquest, and 
control of the seas… (291)  
                                                
12 At times it is as if Foucault is taken by the chronologic of his genealogies to such an extent as to 
forget his warning about combinations. This may be one reason why his formulation of 20th century 
exercises of the sovereign right over life and death in terms of an always already biopolitical ‘state 
racism’ (2003: 257-63) doesn’t quite hit the nail on the head. 
13 Notably, Foucault identifies the coup d’état as the epitome of the absolute priority of raison 
d’état vis-à-vis the field of legality. In the coup d’état, raison d’état asserts itself unequivocally. The 
coup d’état is ‘the self-manifestation of the state’ (ibid.) It is interesting to consider in this light the 
analysis one often finds in Turkish political literature to the effect that the country’s relatively 
frequent coups are precisely moments when the deep state and the state become one.  
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The economic competition between states thus fuelled a governmental rationality 
geared primarily for the perpetuation and prosperity of the state as a singular unit in 
that field. Although Foucault does not investigate it much further, political 
economy can provide an analytical lens with which one may explore the question of 
combinations through a Foucauldian lens, that is, how raison d’état may continue 
to operate in a post-mercantilist global economy of nation-states in which 
(neo)liberalism is the dominant governing rationality. 
When the Susurluk accident indisputably exposed an alliance between 
politicians, mafia and the police, and implicated a plethora of further illegitimate 
relations and activities, government spokespersons and representatives of certain 
state agencies were forced to publicly address the situation. The framework that 
emerged in the speeches of those in positions of power and implicated in the 
scandal was unmistakeably one of raison d’état, as they spoke of the legitimate 
defence of the state, the necessity to secure the perpetuity of the state,14 the honour 
of sacrificing one’s own and others’ lives for the sake of the state, 15 and the like. 
The threat posed by the Kurdish insurgency to the Turkish state ostensibly justified 
just about anything from the provision of official protection for a convicted drug 
trafficker also wanted for his role in a massacre, to extrajudicial executions. Indeed, 
raison d’état seemed to be so commonsensical as a basis of legitimation that even 
opposition politicians who were keen to capitalise on the implication of their rivals 
in the scandal reverted to it (Sabuktay 2010: 101). For example, one party leader 
who claimed to have documentary evidence incriminating the deputy prime 
minister reasoned:  
The state may carry out covert operations through its secret channels of 
intelligence. Certain types of structures may be instituted within the 
intelligence service, the police, and the armed forces. This is of course 
understandable. However, no one has the right to carry out these secret and 
covert operations and use the power of the state for their private gain while 
claiming to protect the lofty interests of the state.16  
                                                
14 Serhat Oğuz, ‘Çiller’den ilginç açıklama’, Milliyet, 9 November 1996. 
15 ‘Çiller: Bucak kahraman’, Milliyet, 23 November 1996; ‘Çiller: Abdullah Çatlı şerefli’, Milliyet, 
27 November 1996. 
16 ‘Yılmaz: Belgelerin adresini gösterdim’, Milliyet, 14 November 1996. 
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Thus the problem was not the state’s involvement in extralegal operations, but 
rather, the use of such operations for private benefit. Had drugs trafficking, arms 
trafficking, extrajudicial executions and other similarly illegal activities been 
carried out by agents of the state solely in the service of the lofty interests of the 
state, no one would be blamed. This is raison d’état pure and simple: the legitimacy 
of covert operations is not decided on the basis of their legality or illegality, but 
rather on the basis of a distinction between interests of the state versus private 
interests (Sancar 2000: 94-101).  
Turkish political scientist Ayşegül Sabuktay (2010) reflects on the Susurluk 
incident from four different theoretical prisms, or four ways of conceiving of the 
relationship between law and politics, and compares the outcomes: rule of law 
(Weber, Habermas), pure theory of law (Kelsen), raison d’état (Machiavelli),17 and 
Schmitt’s theories (i.e. of the exception, friend/enemy distinction, the decision and 
the state of emergency). Sabuktay suggests that except for Kelsen’s, all these 
theoretical perspectives provide some way of addressing the extralegal activities of 
a state, even if only to identify them as illegitimate.18 Kelsen’s pure theory of law 
allows no scope whatsoever for the state itself to operate extralegally. Sabuktay 
suggests that it can only explain away such activities by incriminating individual 
state actors. Because the state is equated with the existing system of legality in this 
perspective, illegal operations such as those exposed by Susurluk can only be 
addressed by performing a clean separation between the state and those who 
(purport to) act in its name. Sabuktay suggests that the criminal legal response to 
the Susurluk scandal, namely, the prosecution of fourteen individuals, was 
Kelsenian in its essence, as it was an attempt to incriminate individuals as distinct 
from the state. However, in a strictly Kelsenian operation, such a prosecution would 
have to seek to illuminate wider patterns of corruption within the state, resting 
                                                
17 In identifying the raison d’état doctrine with Machiavelli, Sabuktay is following Friedrich 
Meinecke (1984). However, Foucault (2007: 242-245) argues that such identification is mistaken, as 
raison d’état proper cannot be found in Machiavelli and is often mistakenly attributed to him. 
18 According to Sabuktay, in a rule of law perspective, such activities will prove illegitimate, either 
on the basis of Weberian formal rational legitimacy or Habermasian democratic legitimacy. In a 
raison d’état perspective, such activities may be deemed necessary if they are understood to serve 
‘national interest’. In a Schmittian approach, the legality or illegality of the state’s extralegal 
activities will be based on a political decision. 
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satisfied only with a wholesale purge of illegality. Sabuktay’s diagnosis here is 
therefore not fully accurate, though her emphasis on individual incrimination may 
assist us in beginning to formulate some of the complications involved in trials 
concerning state-sponsored crimes.  
A trial concerning (and involving) the extra-legal activities of a state or state 
crimes is a particular kind of political trial. Such activities stem from certain 
political decisions that operate beyond the sphere of legality and override the rule 
of law, which is idealised in liberal democracies as the sole basis of the legitimacy 
of political decisions. The criminal prosecution of extra-legal activities is meant to 
subject the entire affair to the rule of law. This dynamic can be stage-managed to 
maximal effect as a grand ‘return’ to the rule of law in transitional justice scenarios 
(trials by fiat of successor regime) or in trials that involve a jurisdictional remove 
(e.g. international tribunals). Both scenarios allow at least the appearance of a 
conflict between the prosecuting authorities and the defence concerning what a 
state’s relation to legality ought to be. Thus in a felicitous prosecution in either type 
of scenario, the trial may serve to performatively enact the very rule of law to 
which it purports to submit.  
However, in the absence of either a transitional framework or jurisdictional 
remove that allows for a high enough definition of the line that separates the 
prosecutors and the prosecuted, we have a particularly complex political trial 
scenario. When state crimes come before the law of the very state suspected of 
criminal activity, the state becomes both the law and its transgression (Aretxaga 
2000: 60). The blurring of the distinctions between the prosecution, the defence and 
the court as arbiter in trials involving the public prosecution of a state’s own crimes 
produces a surplus that cannot be easily managed. This is both a surplus of meaning 
and an affective surplus. There are, of course, various typical strategies of 
containment: In trials of necessity (e.g. the Susurluk and the Hrant Dink murder 
trials) the court will likely function on a damage-limitation principle. For this, the 
individuals on trial will be incriminated to the minimum extent necessary to 
exculpate state institutions. In trials of expediency (e.g. Ergenekon) the prosecuting 
and judicial authorities will attempt to clearly delineate the separation between 
themselves and those on trial. For this, the individuals on trial will be incriminated 
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to the maximum extent possible to establish the legitimacy of the prosecuting and 
judicial authorities. But even with such common strategies of dissociation and 
hyperassociation, the surplus cannot be fully managed.  
On a more general level, this surplus is the product of the exposure of the 
ultimate instability of the opposition between raison d’état and the rule of law. 
Admittedly, in doctrine, the two concepts of raison d’état and the rule of law seem 
to be diametrically opposed as bases of governmental legitimacy. This opposition is 
particularly pronounced in the genealogies of the two concepts.19 In its inception, 
the idea of the rule of law is understood as an attempt to impose external limitations 
on raison d’état by recourse to law, namely ‘juridical reflection, legal rules, and 
legal authority’ (Foucault 2008: 9). However, the history of the relationship 
between raison d’état and the rule of law may be more complicated than the 
doctrinal origins suggest.20 Reflecting on the co-existence of and the tension 
between raison d’état and rule of law, Turkish legal scholar Mithat Sancar (1997; 
2000) suggests that the two doctrines are not as incommensurable as they may 
seem. Sancar identifies the different ways in which a combination between the two 
can be brought about: In a normativist interpretation of the rule of law, raison 
d’état can be incorporated into legal norms. In an approach that may be referred to 
as the ‘raison de l’état de droit’, raison d’état can be rendered the organising 
principle of the constitution (1997: 84-85). Sancar further proposes that the entire 
history of the bourgeois constitutional state can be read as the history of its 
marriage to the doctrine of raison d’état (85). While opposition is weak and the 
system has confidence in itself, the rule of law can be foregrounded. But in times of 
                                                
19 Foucault notes that the idea of Rechtsstaat (the rule of law) developed in the eighteenth century in 
Germany very much in opposition to Polizeistaat (the police state) which in turn was ‘the form 
taken by a governmental technology dominated by the principle of raison d’état’ (2007: 318). 
Danilo Zolo’s (2007) broader perspective arrives at a similar conclusion, comparing the different 
historical experiences that led to the formulation of the analogous concepts of the Rule of Law in 
Great Britain and North America, Rechtsstaat in Germany, and état de droit in France. 
20 This complication can also be traced, albeit somewhat circuitously, in Foucault’s genealogy of 
governmental rationalities. While the emergence of the rule of law doctrine is intimately bound with 
the attempt to propose an external limitation on raison d’état, it’s proper appropriation within a 
governmental rationality occurs with liberalism, and only as a principle of internal limitation, that is, 
solely to do with formal interventions in the economic order. In other words, in liberalism, the rule 
of law is not an end in itself, but a principle defining the scope of legal interventions by the state in 
the economy. This shift from external limitation to internal rule regulation can be understood to take 
the rule of law out of an axis of opposition to raison d’état. 
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crisis or a substantial opposition, a variety of methods can be employed to render 
raison d’état operative (ibid.).21  
Even though there isn’t necessarily a strict opposition between the two 
principles, in certain contexts it is possible to stage the prosecution of state crimes 
as a heroic battle of the rule of law against raison d’état. However, in trials 
involving the prosecution of state crimes without a proper jurisdictional or 
ideological remove, this opposition is at a higher risk of subversion. The blurring of 
not only the distinction between the prosecuting authorities and the defence, but 
also the strict opposition between raison d’état and the rule of law, creates a field 
of slippery significations that reveal important clues concerning the legal 
imagination of the state and the statist imagination of the law. As I will be 
exploring in more detail in the rest of this chapter, in the Ergenekon trial, this takes 
the fascinating form of the co-production by the defendants, the prosecutors and the 
judges of an idea, or perhaps, a fetish of the state, through and beyond what played 
out as a grand conflict of ‘radical difference’ between the defendants on the one 
hand and the prosecutors and the judges on the other. Although this was not a 
conscious collaboration and the participants were seemingly convinced of an 
irreducible political conflict, the case file betrays important instances of this co-
production of the (deep) state as fetish. In the Dink murder trial, the blurring of the 
distinctions take the form of a particularly clear exposure of the court’s complicity 
with the very crime it is supposed to pass judgment on. The criminal state rears its 
head in the form of a logic of dissociation so pronounced that it speaks of precisely 
the continuity between the crime and the criminal justice process. Notably, 
‘rupture’ comes from outside this enmeshed triangle of defence-prosecution-court, 
from those participating in the trial on behalf of the victim, in the form of an 
articulation that is at the same time a proposal for a way of knowing the criminal 
state beyond the limits of legal and conspiratorial imagination.  
 
 
                                                
21 Sancar summarises such methods under three general headings: those that stay within the purview 
of legality (i.e. partial suspension or relativisation of human rights); those that blur the limits of 
legality (i.e. state of emergency); and those that dispense with legality altogether (i.e. 
counterinsurgency tactics such as extrajudicial executions). 
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the ergenekon trial: the conspiracy to end all conspiracies?  
Ergenekon is a sprawling criminal process that began in June 2007 with the police 
discovery of a cache of hand-grenades in a residential building in a working-class 
district in Istanbul, following an anonymous tip. The investigation then expanded in 
myriad directions to include coup plots, bomb attacks, assassination plans, further 
secret arms caches and the like. The first hearing of the first Ergenekon trial began 
in October 2008 with 86 defendants. By the time the verdict was passed in August 
2013, 23 other indictments had been integrated into this trial, raising the total 
number of defendants to 275.22 They included retired and active senior and junior 
military officials, police chiefs, civil leaders, ultranationalist militants, politicians, 
bureaucrats, journalists, writers, academics, lawyers, businessmen, mafia bosses 
and small-time gangsters. Only 21 defendants were acquitted in the August 2013 
verdict, and most of the others were convicted on charges relating to leadership of, 
membership in, or aiding an armed terrorist organisation, referred to in the main 
indictment as the ‘Ergenekon Terrorist Organisation’.  
Ostensibly, this is Turkey’s deep state trial. It purports to purge patterns of 
corruption and illegality within the state. The main indictment and the verdict of the 
first trial equate the Ergenekon Terrorist Organisation with the deep state. The 
indictment describes the organisation as ‘a key obstacle to Turkey securing the 
Rule of Law’, having been ‘active for many years in the country’ as ‘the dark force 
behind countless actions’, involved in mafia and acts of terror, such as ‘unknown 
assailant killings of intellectuals’ (Ergenekon Indictment 46-47). It is claimed that 
the Susurluk investigation shed some light on this organisation, but could not be 
deepened sufficiently due to the organisation’s influence and power at the time 
(47). The indictment and the judgment further provide partial histories of the deep 
state with references to the NATO stay-behind unit and the assassination of the 
prosecutor who initially investigated the matter. They refer to the purge of NATO-
related paramilitary organisations in the early 1990s in other European countries, 
especially highlighting Italy’s Mani plute operation. The prosecutors and the judges 
thus present the Ergenekon trial as the belated Turkish counterpart to these Europe-
                                                
22 There are a number of ongoing trials that are products of the Ergenekon investigation. These trials 
were not integrated into the main Ergenekon trial for technical reasons, but are legally considered to 
be part of the Ergenekon case as a whole. 
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wide clean-up operations. Notably, in the deep state histories alluded to by the 
prosecutors and judges, there is no mention of the Ottoman Special Organisation.  
The English-language coverage of the trial has been dubbing it a ‘conspiracy 
trial’. In terms of communicating the crux of the prosecution, this is a very good 
utilisation of the world of associations of ‘conspiracy’ in Anglo-American popular 
legal culture. However, it is technically incorrect, as there is no conspiracy doctrine 
as such in Turkish criminal law. There are various formulations in the Turkish 
Penal Code (TPC) that are comparable to the common law conspiracy doctrine: 
Listed under ‘crimes against the security of the state, the constitutional order and 
the functioning of this order’, Article 316/1 regulates that ‘an agreement established 
by material evidence between two or more persons with appropriate means to 
commit any of these crimes is punishable by imprisonment for three to twelve years 
according to the gravity of the intended crime in question’. Another formulation in 
the TPC that bears an affinity to conspiracy is in Article 220 which defines 
founding / membership to / aiding and abetting / making propaganda for ‘an 
organisation formed to commit crimes’. The same formulation in the context of 
‘crimes against the state’ is found in Article 314. Individuals can be prosecuted for 
alleged association with the organisation ‘where the organisation is deemed in its 
structure, number of members and instruments capable of perpetrating the intended 
crimes’. In the Ergenekon trial, all defendants are prosecuted under Article 314, in 
addition to other, mostly inchoate and a few substantive charges. 
The mistranslation of Ergenekon as a ‘conspiracy trial’ is a felicitous 
translation on various levels including but beyond the logic of the laws deployed. 
The trial itself is widely perceived as a government conspiracy against the secular 
elite. Those who are suspicious of the governing party AKP’s commitment to 
secularism have been concerned that Ergenekon is a witch-hunt carried out by the 
pro-Islam government against the deep-seated secularist establishment whose ranks 
include the Turkish army. Further, some of the better known defendants happen to 
be first rate conspiracy theorists themselves. For example, defendant Erol 
Mütercimler is a writer, researcher and TV figure, hosting shows called 
‘Conspiracy Theory’ and ‘Behind the Mirror’. The Ergenekon verdict identifies 
him as ‘an expert on conspiracy theories and strategy’ (Ergenekon Judgment IIA: 
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166), and quotes a high profile journalist’s description of him as ‘one of the most 
important conspiracy doctors in Turkey’ (167). Similarly, defendant Yalçın Küçük, 
once a widely respected socialist intellectual, now almost exclusively trades in 
conspiracy theorising, with a particular obsession about the ‘Sabbatian Jewish’ plot. 
Defendant Doğu Perinçek, the leader of the Maoist-turned-ultranationalist Workers’ 
Party, has been publicly conspiracy theorising for decades with remarkable 
consistency in style, though the ‘plots’ of his theories have changed considerably. 
As his Workers’ Party is known for keeping its own ‘intelligence’ archive, 
Perinçek’s and other party members’ prosecution meant that whole swathes of this 
library of conspiracy theories are incorporated into the Ergenekon case file.   
More significantly, the very pillar of the prosecution is something of a 
conspiracy archive in itself. According to both the indictments and the judgment, a 
collection of documents obtained by the police from Ergenekon defendants 
comprise the main body of evidence concerning the very existence of a terrorist 
organisation called Ergenekon, as well as certain defendants’ affiliation with it. The 
indictment refers to this collection as ‘organisational documents’ (örgütsel 
belgeler) and the judgment as the ‘documents of the organisation’ (örgüt belgeleri). 
They consist of structural guidelines, action plans, and reports on contemporary 
events produced by and for a secret organisation that refers to itself alternately as 
‘the deep state’ or ‘Ergenekon’. These documents have not only served as an 
important trail in the police operations, but also assist the prosecutors in making 
their case: the indictment directly quotes them in describing the overall structure, 
different units, as well as the functions and aims of Ergenekon. There are 
approximately 20 of these documents, adding up to 700-800 pages in total. They 
read like a mishmash of internal bureaucracy and wild conspiratorial fantasy. One 
entitled ‘Ergenekon Analysis Restructuring Management and Development Project’ 
is considered by the prosecution to be Ergenekon’s ‘constitution’. A cursory 
summary of the document will perhaps explain what I mean by mishmash: The 
document begins by stating that ‘it aims to contribute to the reorganisation of 
Ergenekon which operates from within the Turkish Armed Forces’. The proposed 
restructuring is for Ergenekon to organise and incorporate influential members of 
the civilian public. It is indicated that Ergenekon’s ‘own successful JITEM 
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experience’ must be seen as a precursor to this restructuring. Then the following 
suggestions are made: Ergenekon needs to establish its own non-governmental 
organisations and gain control over foreign-funded NGOs that are currently active 
in Turkey; it must secure control over the media and establish its own media 
outlets; it must attain ideologically desired politico-economic conditions by 
becoming a key player in international trade and banking; it must gain control over 
drugs trafficking; it should consider undertaking chemical weapons production so 
as to exercise control over terrorist organisations worldwide, and so on.  
It is difficult to ascertain whether these documents are genuine, i.e. unwitting 
paper trails of a group of individuals habituated to exercising illegitimate power 
with impunity, to the extent that they’re now on a permanent fantasy trip of world 
domination. Some are more fanciful than others, for example, one document 
recommends replacing the PKK leadership with select members of the Turkish 
Armed Forces so as to keep the conflict alive while securing full control over it. 
Yet what reads like fantasy could also be understood as a hyperrationality of raison 
d’état, since the war against the PKK has indeed been a politically and financially 
profitable enterprise for the Turkish state. Further, parts of these documents seem to 
shed light on a few of the odd turns of events in Turkey’s recent history. If genuine, 
these documents portray Ergenekon as a conspiracy-theory-fed conspiracy-in-
progress; an unexpected network of individuals who are trying to work out the 
terms of their collaboration via these glorified internal memos. The documents 
would thus testify to the administrative machinery of a ghostly state. Then again, 
several defendants claimed to have downloaded these documents from open 
sources on the internet, while others claimed that copies of these documents were 
planted, thus counter-accusing the police of conspiracy.  
Even though the truth concerning the production and circulation of these 
documents is decisive regarding individual defendants’ destinies, it does not make 
much difference from a broader perspective. Whether fabricated or genuine (i.e. 
whether produced by the police force or by deep state actors), whether planted or 
actually circulated, the very existence of these documents and their incorporation 
into the case file as the crux of the evidence against the defendants convey 
something of the fantasies of state that are operative in the trial. Bureaucracy and 
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state violence is often understood as an ‘inherently unstable combination’ (Green 
and Ward 2009: 123), the latter requiring the distortion of the former. In the case of 
both the production and the incorporation into the trial as evidence of the so-called 
organisational documents, we have something like a bureaucratisation of fantasies 
of extralegal state violence. The documents comprise an archive of a phantasmal 
bureaucracy as they are conjured in the Ergenekon case file, framed within the texts 
of the indictments and the judgment. As bureaucratisation is always already ‘a 
phenomenon of abstraction and spectralisation’ (Derrida 1999: 245), the 
phantasmal archive of Ergenekon is a ghosting of ghosts unknown, a further 
spectralisation of the always already ghostly reality of state violence.  
The ghostly operation of these documents in the case file is particularly 
pronounced in instances when the indictment cites them but then has to intervene in 
the citations themselves to disclaim any and all suggestions of institutional 
involvement. For example, in quoting a paragraph from the so-called constitution of 
Ergenekon, the prosecutors amend the quotation, intervening in the citation with 
parentheses, to dispel any undesirable association: 
“(Supposedly) Currently active within the Turkish Armed Forces, 
Ergenekon is in need of a reorganisation.” (Ergenekon Indictment, 48)23 
The quotation is used to at once provide incriminating evidence vis-à-vis the 
individual defendants and to preemptively exculpate state institutions. The editorial 
intervention introduces doubt as to the validity of the statement contained in the 
organisational document, though it is nevertheless supposed to serve as valid 
evidence against the defendants. This is a strange complicity with these documents 
and the facts/fantasies embedded therein.   
Indeed, the case file reveals in other instances that the prosecutors are beset 
by a fundamental ambivalence concerning how much state there is in the ‘deep 
                                                
23 Quotation marks, italics and bold in the original. The original reads, with the following typos and 
font settings “(Sözde) Türk Silahlı Kuvvetli bünyesinde faaliyet göstermekte olan ‘Ergenekon’un 
yeni bir yapılanmaya yönelme zorunluluğu ve gereksinimi vardır.” The use here of ‘sözde’ to doubt 
the validity of the statement is particularly significant. Though I’ve translated it as ‘supposedly’ in 
the context of this particular quote, the word literally means ‘in word’, and means ‘in words only, 
not reality’. One phrase that this word is very often appended to in Turkish media and official 
publications is the Armenian genocide – which renders it something like ‘the (so-called) Armenian 
Genocide’. 
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state’. The first indictment purports that ‘it is obvious that the Ergenekon terrorist 
organisation has crucial contacts within state institutions’ (47). But then it disavows 
this claim at every opportunity. In a section entitled ‘Could there be such a structure 
as Ergenekon within the State?’, the prosecutors serenely explain that they have 
officially written to the offices of the Chief of General Staff, the secret service and 
the police service, to ask ‘whether there is such a formation within their 
organisation’. Having received negative answers from all these official bodies, the 
prosecutors conclude that: 
The Ergenekon organisation which describes itself as the ‘deep state’ has 
no connection or relation to any official institution of the state … [it is thus 
understood that] the Ergenekon organisation masquerades as the deep state 
… but unlike the definition of the deep state which involves the benefit and 
vested interests of the state, it attempts to govern the state in accordance 
with its own ideological views. (54-55) 
Amidst the plethora of inconsistencies that make up the Ergenekon indictment, 
perhaps this is the most significant one: the defendants are at once identified as ‘the 
deep state’ and as people who ‘masquerade as the deep state’; while the deep state 
is at once described as the ‘dark force behind countless bloody actions’ and as the 
body that protects the interests of the state. Here, raison d’état rears its head to 
reveal a prosecutorial rationality that is deeply ambivalent about the rule of law, to 
which the Ergenekon trial is supposed to represent a return. The trial is supposed to 
purge the deep state, but the only way the prosecutors can bring themselves to do so 
is by denying that the prosecution has anything to do with the state. It is as if the 
purge of extralegality from within the state is magically enacted by a prosecutorial 
disavowal: ‘Now you see it, now you don’t! It never was there anyway, but we will 
condemn it!’  
The limits of the imaginary afforded by the criminal trial is decisive in 
allowing this disavowal its performative operativity. There are two crucial moments 
to note here: The object of prosecution, the deep state, translates into criminal legal 
perception as a ‘terrorist/criminal organisation’. In turn, the alleged crimes of the 
deep state translate as ‘crimes against the state’. The former designation recasts the 
ghostly agency of the deep state in terms of a willful aggregation and co-operation 
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of individuals, who can be held liable collectively and separately.24 The latter 
designation does two things at once: it indemnifies the state as perpetrator, and 
relegates it to the status of victim. These structural failures of the criminal legal 
imagination combine with the Ergenekon prosecutors’ own investments into the 
idea of the (deep) state to render extralegal state operativity effectively 
uncapturable. Here again is a process of spectralisation of extralegal state activity, 
effected in and through the Ergenekon trial.  
The present tense of the deep state is not the only ghosting that the Ergenekon 
case file effects. While both the indictments and the judgment constantly evoke the 
past deeds of the Turkish deep state, they do little to adjudicate or illuminate them. 
In effect, past atrocities are included in the Ergenekon trial only to be excluded as 
proper objects of either thorough investigation or judgment. This inclusion/ 
exclusion of past atrocities serves different purposes for the indictments and the 
verdict. In the indictments, they are brought in as force without substance. 
Conjecture, hearsay, stories, and vague references to past events are included 
without being elucidated. The occasion for their inclusion is that a minority of the 
275 defendants happen to be suspected of involvement in the extrajudicial 
executions, forced disappearances and illegal arms and drug trafficking of the 
1990s, partially exposed in the Susurluk process. And yet, even these defendants 
are not technically accused of those past deeds. They nevertheless serve as an 
excuse for the prosecutors to pile together potential though unverified fragments of 
information gleaned from secret witnesses, tapped phone conversations and the vast 
cache of confiscated documents. The indictments accumulate these to create what 
can be best described as a bewildering amalgam of fact and fiction whereby the two 
cannot be told apart. Thus the indictments create a chaotic archive of conspiracy in 
which the conspiracy theories cannot be distinguished from actual conspiracies 
pertaining to the past. In this sense the indictments themselves can be said to 
conspire to obfuscate the truth of past atrocities. The vast case file that supposedly 
brings the deep state to justice illuminates barely anything of the most vicious 
periods of deep state activity.  
                                                
24 Here again are affinities with how the conspiracy doctrine tends to operate in the Anglo-
American context, where more often than not it signals a misrecognition of the collective agency in 
question (Ertür 2011).  
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The judgment, on the other hand, has a different use for the 
inclusion/exclusion of the past deeds of the deep state. It evokes them constantly to 
capitalise on their rhetorical uses, it cites them explicitly to demonstrate the self-
evidence of the existence of the deep state. Past atrocities further serve as 
instruments of self-justification: they verify not only the necessity but also the 
soundness of the judgment itself. However, all the cited atrocities are then fully 
excluded from the actual judgment. Instead the only non-inchoate or complete 
criminal acts that the defendants are convicted of pertain to three non-fatal 
bombings and the 2006 Constitutional Court shootout that resulted in the death of 
one judge, an incident that was belatedly integrated into the Ergenekon case.25 The 
rest of the offences that the defendants are convicted of are either possession 
crimes, or inchoate offences including incitement and the Turkish anti-terror 
version of conspiracy offences. 
As evidenced by their oddly defensive preamble to the judgment, the judges 
are fully aware of the glaring absence of any proper inquisitorial process 
concerning the past deeds of the deep state in the trial. Responding to challenges to 
the court to expand the purview of the trial to adjudicate the state-sponsored 
activities of the late 20th century, the judges suggest that such a proposal 
has no standing in practice. First and foremost, a court judges the acts 
involved in the case before it. Further, it is also evident that it is very 
difficult to take into consideration events that have taken place in the 
distant past. Additionally, there is neither a legal nor a conscientious basis 
for an approach that says ‘How can you judge the present if you are not 
judging the past’. (Ergenekon Judgment Preamble, 1n1) 
Arguably, one basis for insisting otherwise is that the past deeds of the deep state 
were eminently more atrocious due to their efficacy and systematicity. However, by 
excluding past atrocities as proper objects of finding, the court effectively passes 
judgment on the ‘failed deep state’ but not on the successful deep state. Further, the 
inclusion/exclusion bolsters the zone of unaccountability that these deeds have 
traditionally occupied, by reframing it within an insufficient legal account of the 
past. In other words, the judgment empowers the ghostly hold of past atrocities on 
                                                
25 Even then, these can be considered failed actions as per the objective attributed to them in the 
indictments and the judgment, namely the creation of a general atmosphere of chaos to pave the way 
for a military coup. 
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the present by letting them remain apparent but not established, rousing them but 
not laying them to rest, conjuring them but not demystifying them. 
 Jacques Derrida (2006: 47-48) has drawn attention to the link between 
conjuration and conspiracy: 
A conjuration, then, is first of all an alliance, to be sure, sometimes a 
political alliance, more or less secret, if not tacit, a plot or a conspiracy. 
(…) In the occult society of those who have sworn together [des conjures], 
certain subjects, either individual or collective, represent forces and ally 
themselves together in the name of common interests to combat a dreaded 
political adversary, that is, also to conjure it away. For to conjure means 
also to exorcise. 
The conspiracy of those who have taken an oath (con-jurare) or breathed together 
(con-spirare) against the evil spirit has to be complicit with that spirit up until the 
point of exorcism. The conjurers must first take an oath not only amongst 
themselves, but also with the spirit, so as to be able to then out-oath (ex-horkos) the 
evil spirit. A conjuration that fails to exorcise is thus merely a conspiracy with the 
evil spirit. In Ergenekon, the alleged conspiracy of the defendants is conjured by 
means of both magic tricks and a hyperrationality that unfolds in the form of 
hyperassociation. The over-assertion of links between defendants, the ties between 
pieces of evidence, and the relation between this reified cohort of defendants and 
the unified body of evidence is akin to an average conspiracy theory in its ‘paranoid 
style’ (Hofstadter 1996). The men of law thus conspire with the object of their 
prosecution: in conspiracy theorising about the deep state, the prosecutors and the 
judges of the Ergenekon process performatively produce the deep state on the scene 
of the trial in terms of a conspiracy that they fail to either fully explain or properly 
conjure away. 
The disingenuity of the claim that the Ergenekon trial is a wholesale purge 
of extralegal operativity within the state is further exposed by the concurrent trial 
concerning the assassination of Hrant Dink. The process that led to Dink’s 
assassination and the spectacular, albeit convenient, failures of the criminal legal 
procedure in its aftermath serve as an external measure for the claims of the 
Ergenekon investigation and the prosecution. Dink was murdered in the midst of 
this supposedly ground-breaking investigation into the deep state. The criminal 
justice process that ensued in the aftermath of Dink’s assassination managed to hide 
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more than it revealed, precisely at the same time as the Ergenekon trial was 
supposed to be shedding light on and eradicating patterns of extralegal operativity 
within the state.  
  
the sneering state 
Hrant Dink’s assassination on 19 January 2007 was the culminating point of a 
persecution campaign that went on for three years and involved overt and covert 
threats by official bodies and belligerent individuals, a series of unmistakeably 
political prosecutions, a scandalous conviction for ‘denigrating Turkishness’, 
ultranationalist mobs protesting outside the offices of his newspaper Agos and 
hounding him in courthouses.  
It all began in February 2004 when Dink published in his newspaper Agos26 
claims to the effect that Sabiha Gökçen, the adopted daughter of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and Turkey’s first woman war pilot, was of Armenian descent, orphaned 
during the 1915 deportations and massacres. Two weeks later, on 21 February 
2004, Hürriyet27 ran an uncharacteristically carefully-worded story about the claims 
published in Agos. On the following day, the office of the Chief of Staff, the 
highest echelon of the Turkish army, made a harsh public statement repudiating the 
claims, and accusing those who disseminate such claims of ulterior motives against 
national unity and national values. Although it was unexceptional for the army to 
take the liberties to express its political position on contemporary issues, it was 
nevertheless a rare occasion for it to comment on a news article that did not feature 
itself (Göktaş 2009). The day after the army’s statement, on 23 February, Dink was 
summoned to the Istanbul deputy governor’s office and ‘warned’ by two people 
who were introduced to him as ‘friends’ of the then deputy governor. Six and a half 
years after this compulsory meeting, and three and a half years after the 
assassination, the intelligence service finally admitted that these two people were 
its senior operatives. Soon after the covert threats in the deputy governor’s office, 
in early March, Dink was prosecuted on charges of ‘denigrating Turkishness’. 
Notably, the charges were not pressed for his claims regarding Sabiha Gökçen, 
                                                
26 Agos is a bilingual Turkish-Armenian newspaper with a weekly circulation of 5,000-6,000 and its 
primary readership is Turkey’s Armenian community. 
27 A major Turkish daily which then had a circulation of around 400,000-500,000.  
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presumably because that would have reignited public debate about Gökçen’s ethic 
origin and risked the legal verification of Dink’s claims. Instead, the prosecution 
was based on a single sentence lifted out of a series of eight articles on ‘Armenian 
Identity’, an elaborate critique of its diasporic formulation, which Dink had 
published in his newspaper earlier in February.  
A number of inexplicable things happened during this trial for ‘denigrating 
Turkishness’. First, the court accepted third-party participation in the case. Turkish 
criminal procedure does allow partie civile participation for those who claim to 
have been harmed by the alleged offence, and yet the common practice for courts is 
to greatly restrict participation to direct victims or, in cases of homicide, their 
family members. In this case, the court accepted the participation of a group of 
ultranationalist lawyers and activists who claimed to have taken personal offence at 
their Turkishness being denigrated by Dink. Allowed full representation in the trial, 
these people then went on to create a lynch mob atmosphere in and around the 
courtroom.28 This was not the only oddity: following the insistent demands of the 
defence counsel, the court commissioned an expert report on whether the said 
offence had been committed; but then, in another bizarre move, it went on to 
completely ignore the report’s findings and recommendations in its decision. The 
detailed report written by three academics chosen by the court itself had strongly 
argued that the single sentence did not constitute an offence when considered 
within its general context, and that the indictment was based on a gross misreading 
of that sentence. In convicting Dink and thus ignoring the report that it itself 
commissioned from its own sources, the court deviated from common practice in 
such cases, which is to decide on the basis of expert reports where available. 
Another peculiar aspect of this trial was the unwarranted delays that the court 
effected between receiving the expert testimony and passing its judgment (Çetin 
2013). 
The ninth chamber of the Supreme Court of Appeal29 upheld Dink’s 
conviction despite the argument of the Public Prosecutor to the contrary. The Public 
                                                
28 Some of these characters were later integrated into the Ergenekon trial as defendants, though their 
participation in the campaign against Dink was not made a matter of investigation. 
29 Yargıtay: An alternative translation is ‘Court of Cassation’. As in the two-tiered appeal process in 
the UK, when appealed, a criminal case is first referred to one of the chambers of Yargıtay. This 
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Prosecutor then appealed the case, but the Supreme Court of Appeal’s General 
Council on Criminal Law dismissed the appeal in July 2006, sealing Dink’s 
conviction and leaving no further avenues of redress other than the European Court 
of Human Rights. These decisions signalled, at best, a severe difficulty in reading 
comprehension starting right at the top of the judiciary. A less forgiving 
interpretation would identify ideological bias and bigotry in these decisions, if not 
the lack of judicial independence and impartiality. The ECHR, to which Dink 
applied shortly before his assassination, eventually found that not only had Dink’s 
right to freedom of expression been breached, but also that the legal decisions ‘had 
made him a target for extreme nationalists’ (ECHR 2010).  
In this first glance at the events that led to Dink’s assassination, we can 
already discern the involvement of certain key state agencies in making Dink a 
target: the military, the intelligence agency, the judiciary, and the office of the 
governor of Istanbul. Information that surfaced in the aftermath of the assassination 
allows us to add the police force and the gendarmerie to this mix, and further 
implicates the army and the intelligence agency. This web of potential culpabilities 
corroborated what was an immediate and seemingly generally-shared sense of the 
murder as state-sponsored, much like the assassinations of left-wing and liberal 
activists and intellectuals in the late 70s, Kurdish businessmen and activists in the 
early 90s, and journalists and intellectuals throughout the past several decades. ‘The 
murderous state will be held to account’ – the traditional slogan was reutilised as 
early as the day of Dink’s assassination30 and is still chanted in memorial rallies 
and those held outside the courthouse where the trial is taking place. The latter 
context for the slogan is particularly aporetic, given the judicial complicity in 
Dink’s assassination. 
                                                                                                                                   
stage would correspond to a case going to the Court of Appeal in the UK system. If the director of 
public prosecutions (Cumhuriyet Başsavcısı – alternative translations include ‘Attorney General’, 
‘General Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeal’, ‘Principal State Counsel’) disagrees 
with the decision in this first stage of appeal, they can appeal to Yargıtay Ceza Genel Kurulu (direct 
translation: Supreme Court of Appeal General Council on Criminal Law). This stage would 
correspond to a case going to the Supreme Court in the UK. Obviously, any attempt to directly 
translate the process and the institutional structures inevitably fails as the two legal systems are quite 
different in organisation and operation. 
30 Within a few hours of his assassination, around ten thousand people spontaneously gathered in 
Istanbul’s central Taksim Square and marched to the place where Dink was killed. 
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At the time of writing, more than seven years after the assassination, the Dink 
murder trial continues. It began in July 2007, an initial decision was reached by the 
court in January 2012, the Court of Appeal ordered a retrial in May 2013, which 
has been underway since September 2013. Among the reasons for the Court of 
Appeal’s retrial decision was the inappropriateness of what had been the most 
controversial finding of the lower court: that the killing was not the deed of a 
criminal or terrorist organisation. The key significance of this initial ruling was that 
it denied what everybody knew: it disavowed the seemingly sprawling network 
around the immediate culprits and limited culpability solely to the latter, casting the 
assassination as the deed of a handful of misguided youth motivated by ignorance 
and extreme nationalism.31 The defendants were to be considered in isolation from 
their established and suspected connections with state agents and institutions, and 
any attempts to pursue a wider set of culpabilities would thus be pre-empted. 
The finding of no organisation in the first trial was partly due to a logic of 
discontinuity, disconnection, dissociation and fragmentation that seemed to 
permeate the entire investigation and prosecution. Notably, this is in stark contrast 
to the Ergenekon case which proceeds on a logic of hyper-association. In the Dink 
case, of the police and gendarmerie officers who were implicated in the process, 
only a few were prosecuted, and not as part of the main trial in Istanbul concerning 
Dink’s assassination, but in separate, isolated hearings in other cities (Çetin and 
Tuna 2009). Thus, rather than pursuing the connections holistically, the prosecution 
was broken into several parts. Further, investigating prosecutors identified 
a number of officers within the gendarmerie and the police force who could be held 
liable for negligence, abuse of office, destroying, obscuring, tampering with and 
fabricating evidence relating to the case, but the courts refused to proceed with their 
prosecution. Despite express demands by lawyers intervening in the trial on behalf 
of Hrant Dink’s family, certain high level officials within the security and 
intelligence services who were implicated in terms that range from negligence to 
                                                
31 Recently, before stepping into his new role as President of Turkey, Prime Minister Tayyip 
Erdoğan reiterated this view, thus explicitly aligning himself with the deep state on Hrant Dink’s 
assassination (‘Erdoğan: Dink Davası Kişisel Bir Dava, Yazılarını Kabullenemeyenler Yaptı’, T24, 
28 July 2014, http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-basbug-pasanin-dedigi-oldu-ben-de-ona-fuat-
yilmazeri-soyledim,265821). 
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complicity, were not even summoned to court as witnesses, let alone interrogated as 
suspects. The logic of discontinuity and dissociation was also quite stark in how the 
evidence was handled: key CCTV footage of the incident was seized by the 
Istanbul police and went missing under their watch; the gunman’s communications 
on his mobile and over the internet immediately before and after the assassination 
were never properly disclosed or investigated; certain suspect figures caught by 
CCTV cameras at the time of the incident were not traced. The court’s written 
requests from official bodies such as the Intelligence Service and the High Council 
for Telecommunications were either left unanswered, or responded to with 
incomplete, incorrect or entirely irrelevant information. 
The lower court’s refusal to identify the assassination as the work of a 
criminal or terrorist organisation was thus the culminating point of this general 
operation of dissociation. Notably, as the judges announced their finding of no 
organisation on the last day of the hearings, they forgot to pass verdict on one of the 
eighteen defendants. This lapsus memoriae, slip of the memory, served as a clearly 
recognisable symptom of the court’s disavowal of what everybody knew. 
Something was indeed missing in the verdict, and this was the role of the state in 
the assassination. The lapsus, performed by the court at the most crucial and highly 
publicised moment of the trial, literalised the glaring absence by displacing it. It too 
knew that something was missing. In turn, the performative disavowal of the deep 
state served as a perverse avowal of the tradition of state-sponsored killings.   
When the decision was announced, Fethiye Çetin, the lawyer representing the 
Dink family, said in a statement to the press: ‘They have been mocking us all along. 
And today, we saw that they saved the punch line for the end’.32 The experience of 
the murder trial by the victim’s family primarily as a mockery rather than, for 
example, either a process of mystification or serial frustration, provides a 
significant insight into the performativity of the proceedings. The trial’s 
dissociative operations were experienced not as a genuine difficulty or inability to 
pursue the connections and culpabilities, but rather as derision, a contemptuous and 
willing refusal to offer justice. Thus the ‘state effect’ produced in the trial is one 
                                                
32 ‘Fethiye Çetin: “Biten dosya, dava değil”’, Bianet, 17 January 2012, 
http://www.bianet.org/bianet/toplum/135511-biten-dosya-dava-degil.   
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that murders then mocks its victims behind an impenetrable shield of impunity. 
Although the formal promise of the trial was an inquisitorial exercise whereby a 
truth was to be arrived at as part of the doing of justice, in practice the Hrant Dink 
murder trial only delivered a smoke and mirrors show, the sole legible truth of 
which was that the state will remain beyond the reach of accountability. In this way 
the trial became the site through which the state ridiculed its victims and piled 
insults upon the injury.  
While such may be the face of the state that appears and makes itself felt in 
the trial, the sneer of the state here is much like the grin without the cat insofar as it 
is difficult to precisely pinpoint the political agency behind the sneer. The logic of 
dissociation and fragmentation that permeated the trial was in part owing to the fact 
that the investigation and the prosecution required the cooperation of a number of 
key state institutions, and specifically of those whose agents would likely be 
incriminated in the process. But there was no political pressure on the various 
implicated state institutions to fully comply and cooperate with the judicial process. 
Thus, it may have been the absence of a political will that allowed the more 
systemic and structural patterns of corruption to nevertheless produce the sneering 
state on the scene of the trial. This would be a departure from the common view of 
most political trials where the legal procedure is understood to be manipulated or 
hijacked by a sovereign will that weighs in on the trial to produce its desired 
outcome.  
 
singular wil l & state tradition 
However, in a submission to the local court prior to its verdict, the Dink family and 
its lawyers claimed otherwise. They expressed their suspicion that the injustices 
they had faced in the trial until then were due to a central power orchestrating the 
trial process, ‘a powerful will’ operating to obscure and frustrate the investigation 
and the prosecution (Dink, et al. 2011).33 In this very important document, which is 
first and foremost a call on the court to extend and deepen the scope of its inquiry, 
the Dink family and their lawyers attempt to work against the logic of dissociation. 
                                                
33 This 100 page document was submitted to the court on 5 December 2011 on behalf of the Dink 
family by its lawyers, who took turns to read it to the court in its entirety on that day.  
turkey’s deep state trials 196 
 
 
They do so by providing a detailed account of the persecution campaign that 
culminated in Dink’s assassination, flagging the involvement of state institutions, 
agents, as well as the role of the various key figures on trial in the Ergenekon case 
but not integrated into the Dink murder case. The document also serves as a 
meticulous record of all of the procedural breaches and errors involved in the 
investigation and the prosecution of the murder, including the numerous failings of 
the court to which it is submitted. The submission thus implicates the court, in no 
uncertain terms, in the overall design of injustice that the family perceives, whereby 
the criminal justice process is understood to operate as an extension of the crime 
itself. We read in this submission that the trial unfolded before the family as if it 
were a scripted play (48), fully proofed to ensure that impunity remained the rule 
and that even the accidental cracks were swiftly covered over by the various official 
bodies (52). 
Then again, even in this ‘singular will’ analysis, the suspected machination is 
not as straightforward as in most other political trials that are evidently stage-
managed by a recognisable political authority. The singular will here is not so 
easily identifiable. Indeed, a notable tension emerges in the Dink family’s 
submission to the court between on the one hand the ‘suspicion’, ‘concern’ and 
‘sense’ (57) that both the assassination and the judicial process have been stage-
managed by a powerful will according to a pre-written script, and the claim, on the 
other hand, that something like a tradition and mentality has been at work to 
produce the murder and the injustices of the trial. In other words, the submission’s 
singular will analysis seems to give way to a theory of mentalities and state 
traditions.  
If we were to trace the reasoning that leads to this theory, it begins from a 
global analysis of what the family has faced in the lead up to and the aftermath of 
the assassination. According to the submission: 
There is significant congruity and ideological consensus displayed by the 
institutions and mechanisms involved in the preparation and execution of 
the assassination, the concealment and obscuring of evidence in the 
aftermath of the assassination, the covering up of the truth, the setting of 
boundaries and a framework for the judicial process and the strict 
compliance with those boundaries. This congruity and consensus 
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corresponds to the existence of a strong mechanism and mentality that not 
only legitimises the assassination but also secures its impunity. (57) 
The submission further claims that ‘it is not possible to explain this strong 
mechanism in terms of an illegal structure that has penetrated the state’ but that it is 
the ‘establishment, the state itself’ and the ‘ideology and politics of the state’ (58) 
with all of its institutions. This analysis resonates with the critical debates that 
emerged in the aftermath of the exposure at Susurluk concerning the so-called 
‘deep’ state. It also provides an important counterpoint to, and perhaps an indirect 
criticism of the simultaneously ongoing Ergenekon trial’s ‘purge’ of the deep state. 
The earlier singular will thus gets transferred onto ‘the state’ itself, which can no 
longer remain singular as such. But, what does it mean to identify the culprit as ‘the 
state itself’ in a criminal court of the very state that is being accused? How can such 
a suggestion compute within the logic of criminal procedure? How can a court 
register the claim that the state is not only the law, but also its transgression? Or 
how can the state be identified as a subject capable of criminal agency in a 
language that can be assimilated by a criminal court? Engineered for apportioning 
individual liability, the criminal law can best recognise either discrete individual 
wills, or an aggregation of individual wills that is rarely more or less than the sum 
of its parts. How can the state be articulated as culpable within such parameters?  
The scandal of the submission does not end there. After suggesting that the 
culpable party is the state itself, it then goes on to explain this claim. The 
submission proposes that Hrant Dink’s murder is located at the intersection of 
Turkey’s two entrenched state traditions: the tradition of political assassinations 
and that of Armenophobia (59-72). The former is elaborated with a chronological 
account from the late-Ottoman rule of Committee of Union and Progress up until 
the present, covering many instances of political killings, so-called ‘unknown 
assailant’ (but evidently state-sponsored) assassinations and massacres of the past 
decades. The latter, Armenophobia, is explained by a genealogical account that 
begins with its reconsolidation in the aftermath of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-
78, incorporates the genocide, and traces its reconfigurations in the official 
ideology and legality of the new republic. The explicit reference to the genocide 
(spelt out as such in the document and thus read out to the court) is introduced in 
turkey’s deep state trials 198 
 
 
passing, calmly and without fanfare, as if it is a non-controversial issue on which 
there is general consensus. The genocide is further contextualised as one moment in 
an endless storm of Armenophobia.  
This extended discussion of the two state traditions in the family’s 
submission brings to mind Hannah Arendt’s objection to the prosecution’s 
contextualisation of Eichmann’s culpability in the Final Solution within an age-old 
history of anti-Semitism as entirely counterproductive: ‘perhaps he was only an 
innocent executor of some mysteriously foreordained destiny’ ([1963] 1994: 19). 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, Arendt insisted on the importance of individual 
culpability for legal procedure: ‘in a courtroom there is no system on trial, no 
History or historical trend, no ism, anti-Semitism for instance, but a person’ (2003: 
30). Reading the Dink family’s submission in light of Arendt’s position on the 
Eichmann trial, we may question the wisdom of invoking ‘state traditions’ as a way 
to contextualise Dink’s assassination. On the other hand, the two cases and the 
respective positions of the parties who take recourse to this kind of contextualising 
rhetoric could not differ more. The differences need not be elaborated in detail here, 
the point being that the Israeli prosecutor’s contextualisation of the crime in the 
Eichmann trial and the family’s contextualisation of the crime in the Dink murder 
trial emerge out of very different political concerns and serve very different 
political purposes. The latter is many things at once: defiance of the corrupt 
criminal justice process, diagnosis of the causes of corruption, and a challenge to 
the court to break with criminal state traditions – what Marianne Constable (2014) 
would perhaps identify as a ‘passionate utterance’ after Stanley Cavell (1994). 
Presumably, had the trial been going somewhere, uncovering the involvement of 
state actors in the crime, there would have been no need for a submission in this 
vein. The contextualisation of the crime that the submission offers is in this sense 
both necessary and irreducibly incommensurable with legal procedure. Indeed, at 
times, the submission reads as if it has no concern for whether it is registerable by 
the court. Here, then, is an unusual rupture strategy, not on behalf of the defence, 
but on behalf of the victim of the offence. The submission serves as an ‘objection 
that cannot be heard’ (Christodoulidis 2004) not because it challenges the 
foreclosure of the political by the court, but because it goes to the heart of law-
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instituting violence and identifies its legacies, including in the court itself. Against 
the trial’s operations of discontinuity and dissociation, it presents a counter-
memory, a careful tracing of continuities of state violence.  
This exercise in counter-memory inevitably skirts along, but ultimately 
diverges from the hyper-association of conspiracy theorising, which, as we have 
seen in the Ergenekon trial, involves the performative production of the state as 
fetish. The seeming contradiction between the submission’s claim that a singular 
will orchestrated the process (which is precisely when it touches conspiracy 
thinking) on the one hand, and its suggestion that two state traditions are at work on 
the other, is a product of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of addressing the so-
called deep state within a criminal court. The Dink family’s submission to the court 
reveals not only the aporia of demanding accountability for state crimes in a 
criminal legal setting, but also the difficulty of pinpointing a state that manifests 
itself not in its institutions and services, nor in its legitimised forms of violence, but 
in its extra-legal activities and illegitimate violence. In this sense, it is in the very 
tension between the singular will analysis and the chronological and genealogical 
accounts of state mentalities and traditions that the ghostly character of state 
violence can be said to be located. Then again, as I explore in the remainder of this 
chapter, the Dink case occasions another kind of knowledge pertaining to the deep 
state, one that engages in a counter-conspiracy with the case files and draws on 
what historian Carlo Ginzburg (1990) has identified as a ‘conjectural paradigm’. 
This may well signal a way of knowing that disinvests from the fantasies of 
sovereignty that sustain the (deep) state. 
 
knowledge of the unknown 
The proposal that a ‘powerful will’ manufactured both the assassination and the 
trial process appears in the Dink family’s submission to the court as the 
consequence of a number of conjectural leaps. The first of these pertains to the 
conclusion that the assassination was ‘managed from a single centre and in 
accordance with a plan’ (Dink et. al. 2011: 36). This conclusion is offered on the 
basis of the observation that a wide range of state and civil actors seemed to act in 
concert towards the same aim. The second conjectural leap concerns the murder 
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trial itself, the proposal that it has been masterminded by a singular will is based on 
the accumulative effect of various suspicious turns in the proceedings (57). The 
third leap connects both the assassination and the production of impunity in the 
legal process to the same ‘strong mechanism’ (ibid). The language of the 
submission around these leaps is noteworthy, as it speaks of ‘suspicion’, ‘concern’ 
and ‘sense’ of a singular will. The document’s account of the assassination and its 
aftermath could thus be said to partake in a conjectural paradigm, whereby 
‘imponderable elements’ such as instinct, insight and intuition provide passage 
from directly observed and/or experienced data to knowledge concerning what is, 
strictly speaking, unknowable (Ginzburg 1990).  
A similar form of knowledge production is found in the family’s lawyer 
Fethiye Çetin’s (2013) book about the assassination and its aftermath. Çetin is also 
the unnamed author of the family’s submission to the court, but a much more 
personal voice emerges in the book. Here she writes of frequently encountering 
‘traces and signs’ of cover-ups in the case files: ‘I had intuitions but was not able to 
demonstrate anything concretely’ (24). Something like a methodology for 
producing knowledge about the deep state emerges in her writing (227): 
What I knew of, lived through, saw in the case files and read in the press 
made me think that the truth must be sought not in what is shown and 
visible in the case files but rather in what is not shown, what is hidden.  
Çetin thus proposes the study of the negative spaces of the case files, of the traces 
and signs of that which has been deleted or not presented. She reads not only the 
Hrant Dink murder case file, but also the Ergenekon case file closely for signs of 
Dink’s assassination, scanning what has been left out and training her gaze on the 
gaps and absences. On a number of occasions, she specifically focuses on the 
ellipses in the Ergenekon prosecutors’ quotations of the Ergenekon defendants’ 
online chat records and wiretap transcripts, conjecturing on the basis of that which 
has been rendered invisible behind three dots. Here, it is as if Çetin is working 
against a conspiracy of case files. The documents hide rather than reveal the truth, 
unless one devises ways and means of deciphering them. This is both distinct from 
and related to the concept of ‘textual conspiracies’ where the unconscious elements 
of texts conspire against the intentions of their authors (Martel 2009). Çetin’s is a 
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reading practice that is attuned to the unintentional for the particular purpose of a 
counter-conspiracy, as she attempts to mobilise the traces of that which has been 
left out, censored and repressed, against the conspiring case files.  
Thus in Çetin’s book, again, are important resonances with Ginzburg’s 
‘conjectural’ or ‘presumptive’ paradigm: the importance of direct observation, 
experiential knowledge, intuition, insight, and the focus on traces and signs. 
Ginzburg formulates the conjectural paradigm in his famous essay on historical 
method, ‘Clues: Roots of an Evidential Paradigm’ (1990), departing from a 
consideration of the similarity of methods in the works of the art connoisseur 
Giovanni Morelli, Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis and the detective-work of 
Sherlock Holmes in Arthur Conan Doyle’s novels. Ginzburg suggests that it is the 
key significance of minor details in their methodology that bring these figures 
together: ‘In each case, infinitesimal traces permit the comprehension of a deeper, 
otherwise unattainable reality’ (101). Noting that Morelli, Freud and Doyle were all 
physicians, Ginzburg connects the conjectural paradigm to traditional medical 
semiotics whereby the analysis, classification and interpretation of directly 
observed symptoms lead to hypotheses about underlying causes. Though he 
understands this form of knowledge to have emerged in the humanities sometime 
around the late 19th and early 20th century, he suggests that its roots may be traced 
back to the kind of knowledge practiced by the hunter, who had to be attuned to 
traces, smells, and minute signs such as clusters of hair, excrement and broken 
branches in the chase of the prey. Pitting the conjectural paradigm against a natural 
scientific paradigm of knowledge that is anti-anthropocentric, anti-
anthropomorphic and quantitative, Ginzburg describes it as a form of sentient 
knowing that draws on our animalistic properties of senses, instincts, intuitions.  
The objects of knowledge that Ginzburg and Çetin are concerned with, 
history and the deep state respectively, are admittedly quite different. They pose 
different challenges to knowability. Unlike Ginzburg’s object of knowledge, the 
deep state is by definition secretive and non-transparent. It jealously guards 
evidences of itself, and presumably mobilises the entire state apparatus to do so. 
And yet, Ginzburg’s main examples for the conjectural paradigm notably pertain to 
similarly resistant objects of knowledge: Morelli’s was a technique developed to 
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distinguish original artworks from their copies which strove to pass for the original. 
Sherlock Holmes attunes himself to details that are imperceptible to most in 
seeking authors of crimes, who were clearly invested in covering over their tracks. 
Sigmund Freud attempted formulate a methodology for ‘divin[ing] secret and 
concealed things from unconsidered or unnoticed details, from the rubbish heap, as 
it were, of our observations’ (quoted in Ginzburg, 1990: 99), despite and against 
what he identified as a complex psychic apparatus of repression. Further, in all 
scenarios the clues are revealed when the sovereign agency of the ‘authors’ falter: 
the art historian looks for the unimportant details that the copyist paints 
inattentively, Holmes and Freud seek clues where in details that escapes intentional 
control. Thus it is as if Ginzburg’s ‘conjectural paradigm’ is formulated precisely 
for vanishing objects of knowledge that are actively resistant to capture, but attuned 
to the moments of failure in that resistance – a definition that is ultimately well-
suited for knowledge of the deep state. 
Dink family’s submission to the court and Fethiye Çetin’s book thus both 
read as counter-conspiracies attempting to work against the dissociative logic 
employed by the criminal justice system in tending to Dink’s assassination. For this 
they utilise an associative reasoning that is sustained by various conjectural leaps 
and a form of knowing that is not necessarily formalisable but is based on 
accumulated experience and a (counter-)memory of state violence. As in 
Ginzburg’s models, they seek their clues precisely in those details where sovereign 
intentionality discernibly falters.  
While conspiracy theories, too, claim to connect the dots, explain the 
unexplained, unmask the disguise and uncover what lies behind the world of 
directly observable phenomena, there are significant ways in which a ‘conjectural 
paradigm’ for producing knowledge of the deep state differs from conspiracy 
thinking about the deep state. In a short essay on the relationship between 
conspiracies, conspiracy thinking and other forms of knowledge, Ferhat Taylan 
(2011) engages with the question of how Ginzburg’s conjectural paradigm differs 
from conspiratorial perception. He suggest that while the two share an emphasis on 
traces, signs and clues, their main difference has to do with the failure of 
conspiracy thinking to interpret properly:  
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Conspiratorial perception does not interpret traces, it contents itself with 
presenting them as the evidence for an unarticulated ‘theory’. In this sense, 
it is like a child who points at the traces and shouts ‘there!’: traces alone 
enable the emergence and the verification of the so-called ‘theory’. The 
trace, deemed to be the evidence, turns into the sole constituent of the 
hypothesis that is expected, in and of itself, to yield an explanation. (17) 
Thus we can say that a metaphysics of presence is at work in conspiracy theorising 
whereby signs and traces are perceived to unambiguously stand for, and therefore 
reveal the content they are assumed to originate from. And more often than not, this 
content is the dark scheming of a group of conspiring individuals whose wills are 
understood as fully self-present, and their acts as absolutely felicitous. 
The problem of conspiracies and conspiracy theories occupied Ginzburg 
himself in The Judge and the Historian (1999), his book about the 1988-91 trial of 
Adriano Sofri, a leftist leader accused and eventually convicted of ordering the 
murder of a policeman in the early 1970s. Ginzburg takes up the process of the trial 
with its multiple miscarriages of justice as an occasion not only for arguing his 
friend Sofri’s innocence, but also for considering the similarities and differences 
between the judge and the historian as they professionally relate to the body of 
evidence in making meaning. He suggests that while the two disciplines of history 
and law have always been intricately and ambiguously tied (4, 12-18), the influence 
of the judicial model on historiography has been limited to particular periods and 
schools.34 According to Ginzburg, the effect of the judicial model on historiography 
is twofold:  
On the one hand, it encouraged [historians] to focus their attention on 
events (political, military, diplomatic events) which could be ascribed, 
without excessive problems, to the actions of one or more individuals; on 
the other hand, it led them to avoid all phenomena (history of social 
groups, history of mentalities and attitudes, and so on) which did not lend 
themselves to this explicatory network. (14)  
Thus judicial historiography in Ginzburg’s understanding foregrounds the wilful 
acts of individuals in explaining grand historical events. The event has to register as 
significant according to a preconceived idea of what counts as such, and the 
                                                
34 Ginzburg identifies the late 19th and early 20th century political historiography of the French 
Revolution that is eventually contested by the Annalists as especially crafted on the judicial model 
(15). 
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historian has to apportion liability, as if jury or judge in a trial, to individuals who 
are similarly readable as significant.  
Ginzburg’s analysis of conspiracy theorising is intimately related to this 
account of judicial historiography, but it seems that it is the very material he is 
contemplating that raises the question of conspiracies and conspiracy theories in the 
first place: the murder that Sofri was accused of ordering was an integral part of a 
series of acts of political violence that are understood to have launched the Italian 
‘Years of Lead’ (anni di piombo), a period that could be attributed to the Italian 
‘deep state’,35 though as far as I understand there is no such formulation in 
circulation. In this sense, the immediate context of the trial resonates with that of 
the two trials discussed here. With such a labyrinthine backdrop of the trial, 
Ginzburg’s account of it is haunted, if not driven, by his sense that the entire 
judicial process may be a conspiracy. In trying to make sense of the machinations 
involved, Ginzburg has to negotiate a potential accusation of engaging in 
dietrologia, a pejorative term coined in Italy to refer to conspiracy theorising.36  
While acknowledging that narratives concerning conspiracies amount to ‘a 
vast library of foolishness, often with ruinous consequences’ (64), Ginzburg notes 
that conspiracies do exist in the world as evidenced by the period in question. So 
how to make sense of conspiracies without lapsing into conspiracy theorising? 
Ginzburg does not rule out the latter as a form of methodology, especially in trying 
to decipher affairs as murky as the one under consideration. On the contrary, he 
suggests that an outright dismissal of ‘dietrologico attitudes’ would be detrimental 
to the effort ‘if by dietrologia we mean a clear-eyed interpretative scepticism, 
unwilling to settle for the surface explanations of events or texts’ (65). However, 
                                                
35 Following the bomb planted in the Agricultural Bank in Milan in 1969, ‘the first major event that 
revealed the conspiratorial character of Italian politics’ (Aureli 1999) widely known as the Piazza 
Fontana bombing, two anarchists were arrested as suspects. One fell off the window of a police 
station and died, an incident which inspired Dario Fo’s famous play The Accidental Death of an 
Anarchist. The window from which he fell was that of the office of the policeman whose eventual 
murder Sofri was accused of. The period launched by the Piazza Fontana bombing is attributed to 
the ‘Strategy of Tension’, which refers to the engineering of political instability in order to prepare 
the grounds for an authoritarian takeover. A series of terrorist attacks, later found to be carried out 
by neofascist groups (Bull 2012), were used both to create an eminently governable atmosphere of 
terror and to target those on the left by attributing them the responsibility for these incidents.   
36 Dietrologia literally translates as ‘behindology’, i.e. the science of uncovering ‘what lies behind’. 
Ginzburg offers a number of definitions of the term in a footnote (126n45). 
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while Ginzburg’s preferred methodology may share a spirit of inquiry with 
conspiracy theorising, he identifies a key flaw in conspiracy theories. This is their 
inability to take into account the rule of heterogeneity that presides over how wills 
are executed, intentions are materialised, and actions are enacted (ibid.): 
every action directed towards an objective –and therefore, a fortiori, every 
conspiracy, which is an action directed towards particularly chancy 
objectives – enters into a system of unpredictable and heterogeneous 
forces. On the interior of this complex network of actions and reactions, 
which involve social processes that cannot easily be manipulated, the 
heterogeneity of objectives with respect to the initial intentions is the rule.  
In this account, conspiracy theories err because they do not take account of the 
necessary and myriad infelicities that can interfere between the will and its 
execution, the intention and the action, the action and the objective it is meant to 
achieve. The equation of individual intentions with objectives reduces the causes 
behind events to individual wills. Notably, Ginzburg identifies this kind of equation 
posited by conspiracy theories as an ‘extreme form of judicial historiography’ 
(ibid.). The judicial model reduces the task of understanding an event to the 
attribution of liability to individuals. Just as a criminal trial is largely unable to 
account for the social, political and economic context of the act under consideration 
(Norrie 2001), conspiracy theories bypass rationalities and attitudes, social, 
economic and political conditions in their account of what (or more accurately, 
who) lies behind observable phenomena. 
 The affinity that Ginzburg flags between judicial historiography and 
conspiracy theories is particularly pertinent for understanding the problematic 
dynamics involved in political trials implicating the state itself as culpable, and 
concerning conspiracies that cannot be easily explained by conspiracy theories. The 
Ergenekon trial proves to be a particularly fascinating exercise in extreme judicial 
historiography. The coincidence of the judicial method with conspiracy theorising 
in this trial renders the prosecuting and judicial authorities complicit with their 
object of prosecution as they reify the deep state in terms of a conspiracy that they 
fail to fully capture or explain. Thus what we have in the Ergenekon trial is a highly 
infectious logic of conspiracy that creates a particular state-effect through extreme 
judicial historiography. In the attempt to enact a purge of the so-called deep state, 
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the trial instead reproduces it as a ghostly presence that becomes even more 
difficult, if not impossible, to conjure away.  
The complicity involved in the Hrant Dink murder trial between the 
authorities and the object of prosecution is comparable but of a different kind. It 
takes the form of a continuity between the crime and the criminal justice process, 
where the latter takes recourse to operations of dissociation and discontinuity to 
obscure the crime. To accuse the court of such complicity is to risk engaging in 
conspiracy theories, and the Dink family’s submission risks precisely that in 
conjuring a ‘singular will’. But the analysis we find in the submission to the court 
breaks with conspiracy theorising the moment it identifies the ‘singular will’ as the 
‘state itself’ and launches into an account of state traditions. Then again, this is also 
a moment of rupture, when the submission becomes unprocessable by the court. 
This talk of state traditions is ultimately neither fully formalisable, nor properly 
adjudicable in a court, precisely because it calls out the legacies of law-instituting 
violence. Further, the state continues to sneer through the façade of the murder trial 
because this kind of analysis cannot be legally processed. The earlier singular will 
analysis that we encounter in the submission, then, may be interpreted as in one 
sense imposed by the legal idiom. It is as if one must take recourse to the style of 
conspiracy theorising to speak felicitously of the extralegal activities of a state in a 
criminal legal setting. Then again, as we know from the Ergenekon trial, this is also 
to participate in the performative enactment of the public thing (res publica) called 
the state, which comes into being as a collective misrepresentation (Abrams 1988). 
 The paradoxes of and the tension between identifying the deep state in terms 
of a singular will on the one hand, and in terms of state traditions on the other is 
ultimately not fully resolvable. But as I have discussed here, the Dink case 
occasions another way of knowing the deep state. This is offered by the family 
lawyer Fethiye Çetin in the form of a counter-conspiracy with the legal archive. 
The conjectural paradigm is key for this counter-conspiracy, as it attunes itself to 
the mishaps and vagaries of intentionality, the inadvertent omissions in the tightly-
woven plot, the heterogeneity of forces that all actions and intentions are subject to. 
This kind of knowing holds out a promise for a different kind of rupture in the 
political trial, one that does not pose a sovereign claim against the sovereign, but 
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rather works to undo the reification of sovereignty through the mobilisation of 
law’s counter-archive. Thus it is a rupture strategy that undermines the sovereign 
spectacle of the trial not by claiming the space for an alternative spectacle, but by 
shunning the spectacle in search of the traces and the spectres that may well serve 
the undoing of sovereignty.  
  
 
 
 
conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
The substantive work of this thesis began with a close reading of three works 
published in the early 1960s on political trials. I argued that the writings of Otto 
Kirchheimer, Hannah Arendt and Judith Shklar marked a shift in the literature on 
political trials, as each in their own way went beyond the classic approach that 
more or less sufficed with being scandalised by the combination of ‘political’ and 
‘trial’. Instead, these thinkers crafted thoughtful accounts of the relationship 
between politics and law, and of the materialisations of this relationship in a trial. I 
proposed that a common element of these works was the recognition of the various 
ways in which legal proceedings operate performatively, and I took that as my 
point of departure in working out a framework for studying political trials that 
draws on theories of performativity. The trials that triggered Kirchheimer, Arendt 
and Shklar’s studies were, of course, those held in the aftermath of the Holocaust. 
The necessity of some kind of politico-legal response to this unprecedented form of 
political violence stood out against a background of various unsavoury practices in 
political justice, then recent and old, that had left nothing much redeemable of ‘the 
use of legal procedure for political ends’. This combination of necessity and 
controversy can be understood to account for the tangible urgency and the keen 
thinking of the political that are discernable in these works.  
Notably, later studies that draw on Kirchheimer, Arendt and Shklar to address 
political trials from a liberal perspective tend to jettison this urgency and abandon 
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the critical thinking of politics and justice that permeates their writings.1 What is 
preserved from this legacy is the recognition of the performativity of trials (albeit 
not always formulated in these very terms) and the acceptance of the idea that trials 
can have politics and that need not be an undesirable thing. But what seems to have 
been relinquished is that keen thinking of the political. For example, legal scholar 
Eric Posner (2005) cites the 1960s literature to coolly explain that while 
unavoidable, political trials in liberal democracies posit an institutional design and 
management challenge. What is at stake in a political trial according to Posner is a 
‘liberty-security trade-off’: it is a matter of balancing due-process and the public’s 
need for security. The best way to strike the right balance between liberty and 
security is to make a distinction between political opponents on the one hand, and 
public threats on the other. The latter category in this scholar’s imaginary includes 
‘anarchists, communists, Islamic terrorists’ (106). When dealing with people who 
can be categorised as such, concerns over security can legitimately be prioritised 
over due process. The 1960s’ uneasy critique of the use of legal procedure for 
political ends is thus mobilised for a comfortable argument advocating the use of 
legal procedure for fencing the political off to undesirables.  
While this kind of uptake is not entirely surprising for mainstream legal 
scholarship, the urgency for a sharpened thinking of the political of political trials 
proves dispensable in the work of critical theorists as well. In her innovative study 
The Juridical Unconscious, Shoshana Felman (2002) has two chapters on the 
Eichmann trial throughout which she is engaged in an intimate conversation with 
Arendt. One of Felman’s arguments is that Arendt failed to recognise that the 
Eichmann trial ‘consist[ed] in a juridical and social reorganisation of [the public 
sphere and the private sphere] and in a restructuring of their jurisprudential and 
political relation to each other’ (124). According to Felman, the theme of, as well as 
the occasion for this restructuring of the relationship between the public and the 
private was victimhood. For Felman, the Eichmann trial owed its historic value to 
the fact that it was a victims’ trial:  
[The] historically unprecedented revolution in the victim that was operated 
in and by the Eichmann trial is, I would suggest, the trial’s major 
                                                
1 Leora Bilsky’s work (2004, 2010) is a rare and notable exception in this regard.  
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contribution not only to Jews but to history, to law, to culture – to 
humanity at large. … a Jewish past that formerly had meant only a 
crippling disability was now being reclaimed as an empowering and 
proudly shared political and moral identity. … Victims were thus for the 
first time gaining what as victims they precisely could not have: authority, 
that is to say, semantic authority over themselves and over others. (126-7)  
Felman thus acclaims the Eichmann trial as rearticulating the Israeli body politic as 
a nation of victims and survivors. The point is important and has been made and 
reiterated by others (cf. Segev 1993; Douglas 2001; Rose 2007): the trial was the 
first time that the stories of survivors found a public voice in Israel, where their 
suffering had been silenced and suppressed until then. Thus in Felman’s account, 
we see a keen appreciation of the performative operation of the trial vis-à-vis the 
national public sphere. However, her appreciation of the actual politics of the 
performative proves extremely limited when we consider that she published this 
account in 2002, two years into the second Intifada. Palestinians are nowhere 
mentioned in her celebration of the Eichmann trial as the political event that 
secured a rearticulation of Israeli identity as one of empowered victimhood. 
Further, in her careful conversation with Arendt, Felman fails to take note of 
Arendt’s veritable horror in the face of the monstrosity of victimhood produced by 
the Nazi atrocities – one of her many insights that have proved prescient: 
just as inhuman as [the Nazi’s] guilt is the innocence of the victims. 
Human beings simply can’t be as innocent as they were in the face of the 
gas chambers (…) We are simply not equipped to deal, on a human, 
political level, with a guilt that is beyond crime and an innocence that is 
beyond goodness or virtue (…) we Jews are burdened with millions of 
innocents, by reason of which every Jew alive today can see himself as 
innocence personified. (Arendt and Jaspers 1992: 54) 
Thus Felman’s suggestion that Arendt failed to appreciate the reorganisation of the 
political that the Eichmann trial effected could at best be read as a naïve misreading 
that does not take heed of its own political implications.  
 Pertinently, Felman begins this book with reference to an address by the U.S. 
President George W. Bush following the attacks of 11 September 2001. Quoting 
Bush’s ‘Whether we bring our enemies to justice and bring justice to our enemies, 
justice will be done’, Felman interprets this as the promise of a trial to come: 
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As a pattern inherited from the great catastrophes and the collective 
traumas of the twentieth century, the promised exercise of legal justice –of 
justice by trial and by law– has become civilization’s most appropriate and 
most essential, most ultimately meaningful response to the violence that 
wounds it. (3) 
Felman follows this passage by a note, a disclaimer where she suggests that as 
thoughts articulated in the aftermath of the attacks when the U.S. had already 
launched a ‘war on terror’, her point here ‘is not political but analytical’ (182n7). 
‘Whatever the political and moral consequences’ of the war (which she seemed to 
believe ‘cannot be predicted or foreseen with total certainty or with a total clarity of 
moral vision’) the promise by ‘America’ of ‘justice by trial and by law’ exemplifies 
‘Western civilisation’s most significant and most meaningful response precisely to 
the loss of meaning and disempowerment occasioned by the trauma’ (ibid). The 
renunciation of a ‘clarity of moral vision’ vis-à-vis military war in the 21st century, 
and the civilisational argument in Felman’s disclaimer are indicators that the 
analytical and the political not only should not, but actually cannot be divorced in 
attending to the intersections of law and politics, despite her protestations to the 
contrary. 
 Of course, Felman cannot be faulted for failing to foresee that Bush Jr.’s 
‘justice will be done’ in the aftermath of 9/11 would come full-circle with Barack 
Obama’s announcement that ‘justice has been done’ following the extrajudicial 
execution of Osama bin Laden ten years later.2 Consider, however, the recourse that 
Roger Berkowitz, Director of the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and 
Humanities at Bard College, makes to Arendt and to the spectre of a political trial 
that never was, in order to argue that the assassination of Osama bin Laden was 
legally justified. Notably the trial that Berkowitz invokes counterfactually is not 
that of bin Laden, but of the members of the special operations unit that killed bin 
Laden. It is a somewhat circuitous argument, but Berkowitz refers to Arendt’s brief 
discussion in Eichmann in Jerusalem concerning the alternative to Eichmann’s 
kidnapping and trial, namely, his outright assassination in Buenos Aires.3 He cites 
                                                
2 ‘Barack Obama’s full statement on the death of Osama bin Laden’, Guardian, 2 May 2011, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/02/barack-obama-statement-bin-laden.  
3 This is Arendt responding to the argument that the outright assassination of Eichmann would have 
been preferable over a trial, as the latter would threaten to undermine the legal form – an argument 
conclusion 212 
 
 
Arendt’s discussion of the ‘precedents’ of Sholom Schwartzbard and Soghomon 
Tehlirian (the latter featured in Chapter 4 of this thesis) who assassinated 
perpetrators of mass atrocities and were eventually acquitted. According to 
Berkowitz (2011: 350), Arendt 
argues that to take the law into one’s own hands can promote justice, at 
least under particular circumstances; he who ‘takes the law into his own 
hands,’ she writes, ‘will render a service to justice only if he is willing to 
transform the situation in such a way that the law can again operate and his 
act can, at least posthumously, be validated.’ Revenge, in other words, can 
be just when done in certain ways – namely, when the avenger submits the 
justice or injustice of his act to the legal verdict of a jury.  
So Berkowitz argues, while we should not shy away from celebrating bin Laden’s 
(that’s ‘Osama’ to the author) killing by ‘whatever means it was accomplished’ 
(351), perhaps it would have seemed more like the just assassination it was, had the 
American Navy SEALS that assassinated him, voluntarily submitted themselves to 
a jury trial, ‘before an American jury because one cannot imagine them receiving a 
fair trial in Pakistan and because a trial before a judge in the Hague would lack the 
judgment of a jury and the possibility of jury nullification upon which the SEALS’ 
claim of justice must rest’ (349). Putting aside the glaring limitations of a 
legitimacy sought in an all-American jury nullification for such a case,4 we may 
note that in marshalling Arendt and her discussion of Schwartzbard and Tehlirian 
as potential ‘precedents’ to just assassinations, Berkowitz conveniently leaves out 
her conclusion to the contrary in Eichmann in Jerusalem: 
it is more than doubtful that this solution would have been justifiable in 
Eichmann’s case, and it is obvious that it would have been altogether 
unjustifiable if carried out by government agents. (Arendt [1963] 1994: 
266, emphasis mine)  
It is somehow difficult to imagine that this miscitation by the distinguished Arendt 
scholar was a mere oversight. 
 These are examples of scholarship that take a certain ideological hegemony 
for granted and address the overlap between politics and law from within that 
                                                                                                                                   
reminiscent of the initial British preference for outright executions of Nazi perpetrators rather than 
bringing them before an international tribunal in the aftermath of World War II. 
4 See Matravers (2004) and Bilsky (2010) for a discussion of the political multivalence of jury 
nullification. 
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hegemonic position. Berkowitz, for example, imagines himself as responding to 
‘one discordant clang amidst the harmony of praise’ for bin Laden’s assassination 
(347), the clang being the objections that came from a number of Western human 
rights lawyers. This analysis says much about its acoustic milieu: impenetrable to 
those speaking from outside the empire of a hegemonic (albeit ‘liberal democratic’) 
consensus, and impatient with the dissonant voices that speak from within. It also 
teaches us that contemporary liberalism normalises its hegemony partly through the 
foreclosure and monopolisation of the significance of the political in the 
coincidence of law and politics. In this vein, one potential trajectory of future 
research could be to investigate the withdrawal of political justice from the trial and 
its re-emergence in state-sponsored assassinations and legislation, such as the 
draconian anti-terror laws enacted in the aftermath of 9/11 in liberal democracies 
around the world, engineered to depoliticise conflict. Another possible direction is 
to trace the various hegemonising uptakes of the 1960s critical work on political 
justice in contemporary transitional justice and international law literature.  
 Amidst this thick consensus, which creates and perpetuates forms of violence 
and injustice that it remains deaf to, one cannot help but wonder, whence rupture? 
The professional trajectory of Jacques Vergès, the trial lawyer who thought and 
operated in terms of rupture until his recent death, may be interesting to consider in 
this sense. An anti-colonialist communist activist in the late 1940s, Vergès became 
famous for his ‘rupture strategy’ as the lawyer of Djamila Bouhired and other 
Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) fighters in 1957. In the FLN trials, the 
strategy had several aspects. The first was a jurisdictional objection that was raised 
at the beginning and sustained throughout: the French justice system could have no 
application to those who fought for national liberation in the colony, the defendants 
should be treated as enemy combatants not potential criminals (Vergès [1968] 
2009: 95). Another aspect of the strategy was to make enough of a spectacle to gain 
media and public attention so as to take the trial outside the courtroom, that is, 
render it a proper public platform from which various objectives can be pursued: 
First, the defendants speak to their own public so that they are easily identifiable as 
symbols of the struggle for national liberation, people with whom other Algerians 
can identify. Second, the legal procedure is mobilised to expose torture, serving two 
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functions: nullifying the statements extracted under torture, and using this exposure 
as a symbol of the criminality of the colonial regime in an appeal to world public 
opinion (ibid).  
Fast forward three decades and numerous other high-profile defendants 
(including the Palestinian militants who hijacked an El Al plane in Zurich in 1969, 
Lebanese militiaman Georges Ibrahim Abdallah who was accused of two political 
assassinations, Frankfurt Revolutionary Cells (RZ) militant Magdalena Kopp and 
others), Vergès was defending Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie, the former chief of 
the Gestapo in occupied Lyon, also known as the Butcher of Lyon. Here again 
Vergès deployed a rupture strategy, though with a difference: accuse the accusers, 
but this time without even making any motions to defend the defendant as such. 
The rationale of his approach was a simple tu quoque: ‘One million Algerians were 
killed [by the French] … if you want to judge Barbie, then you must also judge 
yourself.’5 Along with two colleagues, Algerian lawyer Nabil Bouaïta, and 
Congolese lawyer Jean-Martin M’Bemba, Vergès challenged the limited 
application of the notion of crimes against humanity. Here then, the strategy was to 
challenge the politicised and differential interpretation of crimes against humanity, 
and to disrupt the appropriation of the foregone conclusion of Barbie’s guilt as an 
exercise in self-righteous condemnation. 
 Before his death in August 2013, Vergès’s last high-profile defendant was 
Khieu Samphan, a senior leader in the Khmer Rouge regime, tried in the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia on charges of crimes against 
humanity and genocide. Vergès made his mark on the case only in the pre-trial 
stage, stalling the bail hearings by the objection that most of the evidence against 
his client was not made available in French translation, and therefore was 
inaccessible to his counsel. The strategy was effective in delaying the trial, which 
took about four years to get going after Khieu Samphan’s arrest. It seems that once 
the actual trial began, Vergès was not present for most of the hearings,6 perhaps due 
to his advanced age. However he had explained in a Spiegel interview the defence 
                                                
5 Martin A. Lee and Kevin Coogan, ‘Killers on the Right’, Mother Jones, May 1987, 46. 
6 Defence Support Section of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, ‘Statement on 
the Passing of Mr. Jacques Vergès’, 3 September 2013. 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/statement-passing-mr-jacques-verges.  
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strategy he had devised with his client: they would argue that Khieu Samphan was 
at a remove from the murders and the torture as he never held a position of 
authority to do with the security forces, that the defendant’s role was merely 
intellectual and technical. 7 This is indeed what Khieu Samphan argued in his trial, 
albeit unsuccessfully as the 7 August 2014 verdict shows (ECCC 2014). Notably, 
both the translation objections, and the argument concerning Khieu Samphan’s role 
in the regime can be identified as strategies of bureaucratic displacement, and have 
nothing to do with rupture. Then again, in the Spiegel interview, Vergès indicated 
the alternative perspective he held of the Khmer Rouge regime: 
There was no genocide in Cambodia … There were many murders, and 
some of them are unforgivable, which is something my client also says. 
And there was also torture, which is inexcusable. Nevertheless, it is wrong 
to define it as deliberate genocide. The majority of people died as a result 
of starvation and disease … It was a consequence of the embargo policy of 
the United States. The history of Cambodia didn’t begin when the Khmer 
Rouge came to power in 1975. There was a bloody prologue to this 
process: The Americans, under president Richard Nixon and the National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, subjected Cambodia’s civilian 
population to a brutal bombardment in the early 1970s. 
This argument did not make it into the courtroom in defence of Khieu Samphan. It 
would presumably have very limited appeal if it had. While our understanding of 
the genocidal policies of the Khmer Rouge regime may indeed be enhanced by a 
more complicated appreciation of the role of global geopolitics, the rupture value of 
Vergès’s position on Cambodia is no more and no less than the ethical failure of 
certain strands of anti-imperialism which take shelter in the convenience of empire 
figured as the source of all evil. 
 During his lifetime, Vergès managed to get a lot of press, including a well-
made documentary entirely devoted to him, Terror’s Advocate by Barbet Schroeder 
(2007). As in this documentary, he was often represented as a once honourable but 
then mostly shady character who entered unholy alliances with Nazis, dictators and 
other such villains, thus inspiring sanctimony in most of his commentators and 
interviewers. However, more telling may be the trajectory not of Vergès himself 
                                                
7 ‘Interview with Notorious Lawyer Jacques Vergès’, Spiegel, 21 November 2008, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-notorious-lawyer-jacques-verges-there-is-
no-such-thing-as-absolute-evil-a-591943.html. 
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but of his defence strategy over the years. The outline I have offered is admittedly 
not fully representative of Vergès’s practice, nevertheless, we may provisionally 
identify something in the arc of the strategy in the trials from FLN militants to 
Klaus Barbie to Khieu Samphan that contrarily complements the gradual 
consolidation of consensus over the meaning of the political as it overlaps with law. 
Vergès’s strategy went from claims to liberation to claims to historiography, from 
future-oriented performative promises to retrospective constative correctives. This 
of course has a lot to do with the different profiles of the defendants, from those 
embodying the undecidability of terrorist/freedom fighter to the really villainous 
villains of totalitarian rule. But if we are to read Vergès’s advocacy as critical legal 
practice, working against the closure that a trial attempts, countering its 
hegemonising framework from the edges of that framework, the arc symptomises 
the felicitous consolidation of consensus. This is most evident when we consider 
the shifts of his strategy vis-à-vis political violence: from the affirmation of 
political violence in the FLN trials, to its relativisation in the Klaus Barbie trial, to 
its outright disavowal in the Khieu Samphan trial. What sustains the logic of 
consensus, the failure to account for its own political violence, contaminates the 
effort to disrupt that consensus.  
The fate of the strategy of rupture as practiced by its theorist testifies to the 
necessity to rethink rupture today. In turn, the rethinking of rupture has to be keenly 
attuned to the past and future ghosts of political violence, whether it is perpetrated 
in killing fields or in serene courtrooms. In this sense, there is something crucial to 
retain of the critical acumen of the 1960s’ literature on political trials, which 
endeavoured to take account not only of the violence of the acts that are on trial, but 
also the violence of the law that attempts to address those acts through the trial. 
This thesis has been my uptake of the 1960s’ critical legacy. The attempt to pursue 
more rigorously its incipient formulations vis-à-vis the performativity of trials has 
led me to a number of considerations pertaining to the overlap between law and 
politics. These considerations included the ways in which a trial’s performance 
makes and unmakes its performativity; how the sovereign performatives of a trial 
can be undermined by not only the unconscious fears and desires embodied by its 
participants, but also by law’s structural unconscious; how spectres may disrupt 
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spectacles; how spectacular conflicts may conceal profound commonalities; and 
more generally, the ways in which law-preserving violence coincides with law-
instituting violence in the trial. This, then, was one attempt to think the ‘political’ in 
political trials.  
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